Chapter 3: The Emissions Gap by Lederer, G. et al.
Emissions Gap Report 2018
Emissions Gap Report 2018
November 2018
© 2018 United Nations Environment Programme
November 2018
 ISBN:  978-92-807-3726-4
Job number: DEW/2210/NA
This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form 
for educational or non-profit services without special permission from 
the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. 
UN Environment would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication 
that uses this publication as a source.
No use of this publication may be made for resale or any other 
commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in writing 
from UN Environment. Applications for such permission, with a 
statement of the purpose and extent of the reproduction, should be 
addressed to the Director, Communication Division, UN Environment,  
P. O. Box 30552, Nairobi 00100, Kenya.
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in 
this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever 
on the part of United Nations Environment Programme concerning 
the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or 
concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. For general 
guidance on matters relating to the use of maps in publications please 
go to http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm
Disclaimers
Mention of a commercial company or product in this document does not imply endorsement 
by UN Environment or the authors. The use of information from this document for publicity 
or advertising is not permitted. Trademark names and symbols are used in an editorial 
fashion with no intention on infringement of trademark or copyright laws.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the UN Environment. We regret any errors or omissions that may have 
been unwittingly made.
© Maps, photos, and illustrations as specified
This document may be cited as: UNEP (2018). The Emissions Gap Report 2018.  
United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi
A digital copy of this report with supporting appendices is available at
http://www.unenvironment.org/emissionsgap
Supported by:
VAcknowledgements
UN Environment would like to thank the members of the 
steering committee, the lead and contributing authors, 
reviewers and the secretariat for their contribution to the 
preparation of this assessment report. 
Authors and reviewers have contributed to the report 
in their individual capacities. Their affiliations are only 
mentioned for identification purposes.
Project steering committee
John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Navroz K. 
Dubash (Centre for Policy Research, India), Thelma Krug 
(Brazilian National Institute for Space Research), Harry 
Lehmann (German Environment Agency - UBA), Jian Liu 
(UN Environment), Simon Maxwell (Independent), Surabi 
Menon (ClimateWorks Foundation), Bert Metz (European 
Climate Foundation), Katia Simeonova (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change), Oksana 
Tarasova (World Meteorological Organization), Merlyn 
van Voore (UN Environment)
Chapter 1
Lead authors: Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), John 
Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)
Chapter 2
Lead authors: Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute), 
Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency), Kelly Levin (World Resources 
Institute), Glen Peters (Centre for International Climate 
and Environmental Research, Norway)
Contributing authors: Gabriel Blanco (National 
University of the Center of the Buenos Aires Province, 
Argentina), Jasmin Cantzler (Climate Analytics), 
Frederic Hans (NewClimate Institute), Alexandre 
Koberle (Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate 
Studies and Research in Engineering, Brazil), Lisa Luna 
(NewClimate Institute), Ritu Mathur (The Energy and 
Resources Institute, India), Marilena Muntean (Joint 
Research Centre, European Commission) Jos Olivier 
(PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), 
Jorge Villarreal Padilla (Iniciativa Climática de México), 
David Rich (World Resources Institute), Fu Sha (National 
Center for Climate Change Strategy and International 
Cooperation, China), Heleen van Soest (PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency)
Chapter 3
Lead authors: Gunnar Luderer (Potsdam Institute 
for Climate Impact Research, Germany), Joeri Rogelj 
(Imperial College London, UK; International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis, Austria), Michel den Elzen 
(PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), 
Jiang Kejun (Energy Research Institute, China)
Contributing authors: Daniel Huppmann (International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis)
Chapter 4
Lead authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute), 
Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute)
Chapter 5
Lead authors: Angel Hsu (Yale-NUS College/Data-
Driven Yale), Oscar Widerberg (IVM, Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam)
Contributing authors: Fatemeh Bakhtiari (UNEP DTU 
Partnership), Sander Chan (German Development 
Institute), Katharina Lütkehermöller (NewClimate 
Institute), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency), Amy Weinfurter 
(Data-Driven Yale)
Chapter 6
Lead authors: Matthias Kalkuhl (Mercator Research 
Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change 
and University of Potsdam), Brigitte Knopf (Mercator 
Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate 
Change), Kurt Van Dender (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development)
Contributing authors: Harro van Asselt (University of 
Eastern Finland), David Klenert (Joint Research Centre, 
European Commission), Ruben Lubowski (Environmental 
Defense Fund), Tobias S. Schmidt (ETH Zurich), Bjarne 
Steffen (ETH Zurich)
VI VIIEMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Chapter 7
Lead authors: Mariana Mazzucato (UCL Institute for 
Innovation and Public Purpose), Gregor Semieniuk (SOAS 
University of London)
Contributing authors: Kelly Sims Gallagher (Tufts 
University), Anna Geddes (ETH Zurich), Ping Huang 
(Tufts University), Friedemann Polzin (Utrecht University), 
Clare Shakya (International Institute for Environment and 
Development), Bjarne Steffen (ETH Zurich), Hermann 
Tribukait (Mexico Energy Innovation Funds) 
Reviewers 
Juan Carlos Altamirano (World Resources Institute), 
Juan Carlos Arredondo, (Latin America Regional 
Climate Initiative), Céline Bak (Centre for International 
Governance Innovation), Maria Belenky (Climate 
Advisers), Pieter Boot (PBL, Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency), Sylvain Cail (Enerdata), Jasmin 
Cantzler (Climate Analytics), Maria Carvalho (London 
School of Economics), Alex Clark (Climate Policy 
Initiative), Heleen de Coninck (Radboud University 
Nijmegen), Jacqueline Cottrell (Green Budget Europe), 
Steffen Dockweiler (Danish Energy Agency), Philip Drost 
(UN Environment), Donovan Escalante (Climate Policy 
Initiative), James Foster (UK Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy), Junichi Fujino (National 
Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan), Ajay Gambhir 
(Imperial College London), Arunabha Ghosh (Council 
on Energy, Environment and Water), Olivia Gippner 
(European Commission DG CLIMA), Jenny Gleed (CDP), 
Vaibhav Gupta (Council on Energy, Environment and 
Water), Thomas Hale (Oxford University), Stephen Hall 
(University of Leeds), Stephane Hallegatte (World Bank), 
Yasuko Kameyama (National Institute for Environmental 
Studies, Japan), Gerd Leipold (Humboldt-Viadrina 
Governance Platform), Karan Mangotra (The Energy and 
Resources Institute), Molly McGregor (World Resources 
Institute), Laura Merrill (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development), Rachel Chi Kiu Mok (World 
Bank), Milimer Morgado (The Climate Group), Helen 
Mountford (New Climate Economy), Caetano Penna 
(Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro), Miles Perry 
(European Commission DG CLIMA), Sumit Prasad 
(Council on Energy, Environment and Water), Jun Erik 
Rentschler (World Bank), Marcia Rocha (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development), Mark 
Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency), William Scott (Smart Prosperity), Jean-Charles 
Seghers (The Climate Group), Malcom Shield (C40), 
Neelam Singh (World Resources Institute), Marcel Taal 
(Netherlands government), Kentaro Tamura (Institute for 
Global Environmental Strategies, Japan), Oras Tynkkynen 
(SITRA), Christopher Weber (WWF Global Science), 
Shelagh Whitley (Overseas Development Institute), 
William Wills (Laboratório Interdisciplinar de Meio 
Ambiente), Harald Winkler (University of Cape Town), 
Peter Wooders (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development), Zhao Xiusheng (Tsinghua University)
Chief scientific editors
Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), John Christensen 
(UNEP DTU Partnership)
Editorial team
Lars Christiansen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Olivier 
Bois von Kursk (UNEP DTU Partnership), James Arthur 
Haselip (UNEP DTU Partnership)
Project coordination
Lars Christiansen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Olivier 
Bois von Kursk (UNEP DTU Partnership), Anne Olhoff 
(UNEP DTU Partnership), John Christensen (UNEP DTU 
Partnership), Philip Drost (UN Environment), Edoardo 
Zandri (UN Environment)
External global and national modelling data 
contributors
Joint Research Centre, European Commission (Kimon 
Keramidas and Giacomo Grassi) Princeton University 
(Hélène Benveniste)
Scenario database hosting and support
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(Daniel Huppmann and Peter Kolp), and the Integrated 
Assessment Modelling Consortium
Media and launch support 
Keith Weller (UN Environment), Shari Nijman (UN 
Environment), Philip Drost (UN Environment), Roxanna 
Samii (UN Environment), David Cole (UN Environment), 
Mette Annelie Rasmussen (UNEP DTU Partnership)
Design, layout and printing
Caren Weeks (independent consultant), Joseph und 
Sebastian (cover), Phillip Amunga (UN Environment), 
Kailow A/S
Language editing and translation of  
Executive Summary
Strategic Agenda
Thanks also to:
Climate Transparency, Nick Mabey (E3G), Niklas 
Hagelberg (UNEP), Jacob Ipsen Hansen (UNEP DTU 
Partnership), Ghita Hjarne (UNEP DTU Partnership), Pia 
Riis Kofoed-Hansen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Susanne 
Konrad (UNEP DTU Partnership) Thomas Kragh Laursen 
(UNEP DTU Partnership) and Lana Schertzer (UNEP DTU 
Partnership)
Finally, UN Environment would like to thank the 
German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), the Netherlands 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, the 
Climate Works Foundation, and the Danish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs for their support to the work of the 
Emissions Gap Report
Contents
Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII
Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX
Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XII
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII
Executive summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIV
Chapter 1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2. Trends and progress towards the Cancun pledges, NDC targets and peaking of emissions  . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
2.2  Peaking of greenhouse gas emissions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
2.3  Current global emissions: status and trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
2.4  Assessment of current policies: are G20 members on track to meet the Cancun pledges for 2020 
 and NDC targets for 2030, and to peak their emissions?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
Chapter 3. The emissions gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
3.2 Scenarios considered and updates made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
3.3 The emissions gap in 2030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
3.4 Temperature implications of the NDCs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
3.5 Implications of 2030 emission levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
Chapter 4. Bridging the gap: Strengthening NDCs and domestic policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
4.2 Rationale and context for enhancing Nationally Determined Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
4.3 Options for Parties to enhance mitigation ambition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
4.4 Strengthening domestic policies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
4.5 The scope for bridging the emissions gap through enhanced ambition and strengthened action . . . . . . . . .  26
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
VIII IXEMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – CONTENTS
Glossary
This glossary is compiled according to the Lead Authors of the Report drawing on glossaries and other resources available 
on the websites of the following organizations, networks and projects: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,  
Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action, United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and World Resources Institute.
Baseline/reference: The state against which change is 
measured. In the context of transformation pathways, 
the term ‘baseline scenarios’ refers to scenarios that 
are based on the assumption that no mitigation policies 
or measures will be implemented beyond those that 
are already in force and/or are legislated or planned 
to be adopted. Baseline scenarios are not intended to 
be predictions of the future, but rather counterfactual 
constructions that can serve to highlight the level of 
emissions that would occur without further policy 
effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are then compared 
to mitigation scenarios that are constructed to 
meet different goals for greenhouse gas emissions, 
atmospheric concentrations or temperature change. The 
term ‘baseline scenario’ is used interchangeably with 
‘reference scenario’ and ‘no policy scenario’. In much 
of the literature the term is also synonymous with the 
term ‘business as usual (BAU) scenario’, although the 
term ‘BAU’ has fallen out of favour because the idea 
of ‘business as usual’ in century-long socioeconomic 
projections is hard to fathom.
Bioenergy: Energy derived from any form of biomass 
such as recently living organisms or their metabolic by-
products
Black carbon: The substance formed through the 
incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, and 
biomass, which is emitted in both anthropogenic and 
naturally occurring soot. It consists of pure carbon in 
several linked forms. Black carbon warms the Earth 
by absorbing heat in the atmosphere and by reducing 
albedo – the ability to reflect sunlight – when deposited 
on snow and ice.
Cancun pledge: During 2010, many countries submitted 
their existing plans for controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions to the Climate Change Secretariat and these 
proposals were formally acknowledged under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Developed countries presented their plans in 
the shape of economy-wide targets to reduce emissions, 
mainly up to 2020, while developing countries proposed 
ways to limit their growth of emissions in the shape of 
plans of action. 
Carbon dioxide emission budget (or carbon budget): 
For a given temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5°C 
or 2°C long-term limit, the corresponding carbon budget 
reflects the total amount of carbon emissions that can 
be emitted for temperatures to stay below that limit. 
Stated differently, a carbon budget is the area under a 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emission trajectory that satisfies 
assumptions about limits on cumulative emissions 
estimated to avoid a certain level of global mean surface 
temperature rise. 
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e): A way to place 
emissions of various radiative forcing agents on a 
common footing by accounting for their effect on 
climate. It describes, for a given mixture and amount of 
greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have 
the same global warming ability, when measured over 
a specified time period. For the purpose of this report, 
greenhouse gas emissions (unless otherwise specified) 
are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed 
in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e 
assuming a 100-year global warming potential. 
Carbon intensity: The amount of emissions of CO2 
released per unit of another variable such as gross 
domestic product, output energy use, transport or 
agricultural/forestry products.
Carbon offset: See Offset.
Carbon price: The price for avoided or released CO2 or 
CO2e emissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon 
tax or the price of emission permits. In many models that 
are used to assess the economic costs of mitigation, 
carbon prices are used as a proxy to represent the level 
of effort in mitigation policies. 
Carbon tax: A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels. 
Because virtually all of the carbon in fossil fuels is 
ultimately emitted as CO2, a carbon tax is equivalent to 
an emission tax on CO2 emissions. 
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Co-benefits: The positive effects that a policy or 
measure aimed at one objective might have on other 
objectives, without yet evaluating the net effect on 
overall social welfare. Co-benefits are often subject 
to uncertainty and depend on, among others, local 
circumstances and implementation practices. Co-
benefits are often referred to as ancillary benefits. 
Conditional NDC: NDC proposed by some countries that 
are contingent on a range of possible conditions, such as 
the ability of national legislatures to enact the necessary 
laws, ambitious action from other countries, realization 
of finance and technical support, or other factors. 
Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. It currently meets once a year to review the 
Convention’s progress. 
Crowding in: The mobilization of private sector finance 
for innovative investment projects through public sector 
(co-)financing of these investments
Current policy trajectory: This trajectory is based on 
estimates of 2020 emissions considering projected 
economic trends and current policy approaches including 
policies at least through 2015. Estimates may be based 
on either official data or independent analysis.
Deforestation: Conversion of forest to non-forest.
Economic mitigation potential: The mitigation potential, 
which takes into account social costs and benefits and 
social discount rates, assuming that market efficiency 
is improved by policies and measures and barriers are 
removed
Effective carbon rate: Is the sum of carbon prices and 
excise taxes per unit of carbon contained in a specific 
fossil fuel.
Emissions gap: The difference between the greenhouse 
gas emission levels consistent with a specific probability 
of limiting the mean global temperature rise to below 2°C 
or 1.5°C in 2100 above pre-industrial levels and the GHG 
emission levels consistent with the global effect of the 
NDCs, assuming full implementation from 2020.
Emission pathway: The trajectory of annual greenhouse 
gas emissions over time. 
Excise tax: A tax on the consumption or use of a specific 
good, service, or activity. Excise taxes are mainly 
introduced with the intention to create public revenues 
for local, state or federal governments. Common 
examples for excise taxes are taxes on alcohol, tobacco, 
or fuel.
Global warming potential: An index representing the 
combined effect of the differing times greenhouse gases 
remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness 
in absorbing outgoing infrared radiation. 
Green fiscal reform: A major change in the tax system 
with the intention of introducing or increasing taxes 
on environmental bads (such as pollution, carbon 
emissions) while simultaneously decreasing other taxes 
(such as income taxes).
Greenhouse gases: The atmospheric gases responsible 
for causing global warming and climatic change. The 
major greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Less prevalent, 
but very powerful, GHGs are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). 
Innovation landscape: The entirety of the activities of 
innovation from research and development to diffusion 
of competitive products
Integrated assessment models: Models that seek to 
combine knowledge from multiple disciplines in the 
form of equations and/or algorithms in order to explore 
complex environmental problems. As such, they describe 
the full chain of climate change, from production of 
greenhouse gases to atmospheric responses. This 
necessarily includes relevant links and feedbacks 
between socio-economic and biophysical processes. 
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): 
INDCs are submissions from countries describing the 
national actions it intends to take to reach the Paris 
Agreement’s long-term temperature goal of limiting 
warming to well below 2°C. Once a country has ratified 
the Paris Agreement, its INDC is automatically converted 
to its NDC (see below), unless it chooses to further 
update it. INDCs are thus only used in this publication in 
reference to countries that have not yet ratified the Paris 
Agreement. 
Kigali Amendment: The Kigali Amendment to the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer aims for the phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs) by cutting their production and consumption.
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement, standing 
on its own, and requiring separate ratification by 
governments, but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto 
Protocol, among other things, sets binding targets for the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by industrialized 
countries. 
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF): A 
greenhouse gas inventory sector that covers emissions 
and removals of greenhouse gases resulting from direct 
human-induced land use, land use change and forestry 
activities. 
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 percent 
chance. Used in this assessment to convey the 
probabilities of meeting temperature limits. 
Lock-in: Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with a 
standard even though participants would be better off 
with an alternative. 
Mitigation: In the context of climate change, a human 
intervention to reduce the sources, or enhance the sinks 
of greenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels 
more efficiently for industrial processes or electricity 
generation, switching to solar energy or wind power, 
improving the insulation of buildings and expanding 
forests and other ‘sinks’ to remove greater amounts of 
CO2 from the atmosphere. 
Monitoring, reporting and verification: A process/
concept that potentially supports greater transparency in 
the climate change regime. 
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): Submissions 
by countries that have ratified the Paris Agreement 
which presents their national efforts to reach the Paris 
Agreement’s long-term temperature goal of limiting 
warming to well below 2°C. New or updated NDCs are 
to be submitted in 2020 and every five years thereafter. 
NDCs thus represent a country’s current ambition/target 
for reducing emissions nationally.  
Non-state and subnational actors: ‘Non-state and 
subnational actors’ includes companies, cities, 
subnational regions and investors that take or commit to 
climate action. 
Offset (in climate policy): A unit of CO2e emissions that 
is reduced, avoided, or sequestered to compensate for 
emissions occurring elsewhere.
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold 
based on ‘if-then’ propositions. Scenarios typically 
include an initial socio-economic situation and a 
description of the key driving forces and future changes 
in emissions, temperature or other climate change-
related variables.
Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releases 
a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a 
greenhouse gas or aerosol into the atmosphere. 
Sustainable development: Development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs. 
Technical mitigation potential: Such potential 
is estimated for given scenarios assuming full 
implementation of best available pollutant reduction 
technology, as it exists today, by 2030 independent 
of their costs but considering technical lifetime of 
technologies and other key constraints (e.g., cultural 
acceptance) that could limit applicability of certain 
measures in specific regions.
Uncertainty: A cognitive state of incomplete knowledge 
that can result from a lack of information or from 
disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It 
may have many types of sources, from imprecision in the 
data to ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, or 
uncertain projections of human behaviour. Uncertainty 
can therefore be represented by quantitative measures 
(for example a probability density function) or by 
qualitative statements (for example reflecting the 
judgement of a team of experts). 
Unconditional NDCs: NDCs proposed by countries 
without conditions attached. 
2020 pledge: See Cancun pledge. 
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Foreword
The world is at last beginning to tackle its fossil fuel 
addiction. Coal is no longer competitive, and wind 
farms and solar installations are gathering pace – in 
Australia, northern Europe, China, India and elsewhere. 
Electric mobility and ride sharing are redefining transport, 
especially in cities tired of breathing dirty air. Huge 
strides in energy efficiency are being made.
The problem, as the science here is telling us, is that 
we’re not making the change nearly as quickly as we 
need to. This is of course not new – it’s an almost 
carbon copy of what we were told last year, and the 
years before that. But what we do have is yet more 
compelling science, and something that adds to that 
provided by the 1.5 degree report recently released by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
The message is clear: we need to make an almost 
existential change, the solutions are there, and we have 
no excuse.
And yes, it is still possible to bridge the emissions 
gap to keep global warming below 2°C. However, the 
opportunity to bridge the 1.5°C gap is dwindling. We 
can also see that the kind of unprecedented action we 
urgently need is not happening yet: in fact, global CO2 
emissions did increase in 2017 after a few years of 
stagnation.
Even if the nations of the world live up to their current 
commitments, that will likely result in global warming of 
around 3°C by the end of the century. That’s a number 
that would be catastrophic – and fatal for many small 
island states and coastal areas. The fact is that we are 
already seeing climate change play out in front of us. 
From the Caribbean superstorms to droughts in the Horn 
of Africa, or record temperatures and wildfires, our planet 
is already changing.
Closing the Emissions Gap means upping our ambition. 
Net zero must become the new mantra, and we must 
pursue this goal with confidence. After all, the science 
and data also show us that reducing and offsetting 
emissions does not mean cutting growth. Quite the 
contrary.
The science also shows emission reduction potential 
from other actors such as regional and local 
governments and businesses – is very large. That 
means that initiatives like the C40 cities coalition must 
be commended and supported. So too must action to 
improve air quality in cities – a double win that spares 
both children from the trauma of asthma and tackles 
some of the root causes of other emissions.
Current impacts of actions by other actors are still 
limited and not well enough documented, but we need to 
look for action in all corners of the modern world.
We can also see that fiscal policies provide a huge 
opportunity to reduce future emissions but need to be 
designed and implemented carefully to deliver desired 
results without creating economic and social issues. 
The space for policies to boost innovation and open new 
markets for emerging technologies and practices also 
has significant mitigation potential.
The key is to understand we are not powerless in the 
face of climate change. The science may be frightening, 
but the solutions are clear. The only missing link is 
leadership.
Joyce Msuya
Acting Executive Director
United Nations Environment Programme
Acronyms
°C Degree Celsius
CDR Carbon Dioxide Removal
CO2  Carbon dioxide
CO2e Carbon dioxide equivalent
COP Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
ETS Emissions Trading System
EU European Union
EV Electric Vehicle
G20 Group of twenty
GHG Greenhouse Gas
Gt Gigaton
GW Gigawatt
ICI International Cooperative Initiative
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LUC Land Use Change 
LULUCF Land use, land-use change and forestry
m2 Square metre
Mt Million metric ton 
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
NSA Non-state and Subnational Actor
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PV Solar Photovoltaic
R&D Research and Development
SIB State Investment Bank
tCO2 Metric ton of CO2
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USA United States of America
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Executive summary
This is the 9th edition of the UN Environment Emissions 
Gap Report. It assesses the latest scientific studies on 
current and estimated future greenhouse gas emissions 
and compares these with the emission levels permissible 
for the world to progress on a least-cost pathway to 
achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. This difference 
between “where we are likely to be and where we need to 
be” is known as the ‘emissions gap’. As in previous years, 
the report explores some of the most important options 
available for countries to bridge the gap. 
The political context this year is provided by several 
processes and events:
• The Talanoa Dialogue – an inclusive, participatory 
and transparent dialogue about ambitions 
and actions, conducted under the auspices of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and designed to help 
build momentum for new or updated Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) to be submitted 
by 2020.
•  The Global Climate Action Summit in September 
2018 – bringing together many non-state and 
subnational actors (NSAs) that are actively 
involved in climate issues.
•  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Special Report on Global Warming of 
1.5°C – focusing on “the impacts of global 
warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels 
and related global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways, in the context of strengthening the 
global response to the threat of climate change, 
sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate 
poverty”. The Emissions Gap Report has benefited 
significantly from the IPCC Special Report and its 
underlying studies.
This Emissions Gap Report has been prepared by an 
international team of leading scientists, assessing all 
available information, including that published in the 
context of the IPCC Special Report, as well as in other 
recent scientific studies. The assessment production 
process has been transparent and participatory. The 
assessment methodology and preliminary findings were 
made available to the governments of the countries 
specifically mentioned in the report to provide them with 
the opportunity to comment on the findings.
1. Current commitments expressed in the NDCs are 
inadequate to bridge the emissions gap in 2030. 
Technically, it is still possible to bridge the gap 
to ensure global warming stays well below 2°C 
and 1.5°C, but if NDC ambitions are not increased 
before 2030, exceeding the 1.5°C goal can no longer 
be avoided. Now more than ever, unprecedented 
and urgent action is required by all nations. The 
assessment of actions by the G20 countries 
indicates that this is yet to happen; in fact, global 
CO2 emissions increased in 2017 after three years of 
stagnation.
This year’s report presents the newest assessment of the 
emissions gap in 2030 between emission levels under 
full implementation of the unconditional and conditional 
NDCs and those consistent with least-cost pathways to 
stay below 2°C and 1.5°C respectively. 
• With the results of the new global studies 
prepared for the IPCC report, the emissions 
gap – especially to stay below 1.5°C warming – 
has increased significantly in comparison with 
previous estimates, as new studies explore more 
variations and make more cautious assumptions 
about the possibility of global carbon dioxide-
removal deployment. 
•  Pathways reflecting current NDCs imply global 
warming of about 3°C by 2100, with warming 
continuing afterwards. If the emissions gap is not 
closed by 2030, it is very plausible that the goal of 
a well-below 2°C temperature increase is also out 
of reach. 
•  The assessment of country action for this 
Emissions Gap Report concludes that while most 
G20 countries are on track to meet their Cancun 
pledges for 2020, the majority are not yet on a 
path that will lead them to fulfilling their NDCs for 
2030. 
•  Concerns about the current level of both ambition 
and action are thus amplified compared to 
previous Emissions Gap Reports. According to 
the current policy and NDC scenarios, global 
emissions are not estimated to peak by 2030, let 
alone by 2020. The current NDCs are estimated to 
lower global emissions in 2030 by up to 6 GtCO2e 
compared to a continuation of current policies. 
As the emissions gap assessment shows, this 
original level of ambition needs to be roughly 
tripled for the 2°C scenario and increased around 
fivefold for the 1.5°C scenario. 
•  Action by non-state and subnational actors 
(NSAs), including regional and local governments 
and businesses, is key to implementing the NDCs. 
The strong engagement by NSAs demonstrated 
at the recent Global Climate Action Summit is 
promising and can help governments deliver on 
their NDCs, but the impact of current individual 
NSA pledges on reducing the gap is extremely 
limited. Chapter 5 of this Emissions Gap Report 
was pre-released at the Summit, and documents 
that if international cooperative initiatives 
succeed in increasing their membership and 
ambition, substantially greater potential can be 
realized. The chapter emphasizes that enhanced 
monitoring and reporting of actions and resulting 
emissions reductions will be essential for the 
credibility of NSA action.
• Countries therefore need to move rapidly on the 
implementation of their current NDCs; at the 
same time, more ambitious NDCs are necessary 
by 2020 to meet the jointly agreed goals. This 
report summarizes the different approaches 
countries can take to build enhanced ambition 
and enhance the scale, scope and effectiveness 
of their domestic policy.  
• The policies and measures chapters in this year’s 
report address two key aspects for the longer-
term transition to a zero-emission economy and 
society. Fiscal policies provide a key opportunity 
for reducing future emissions, and there are 
options to design them in such a way that they 
deliver the desired results without creating 
economic and social problems. Several countries 
have demonstrated that it is possible to overcome 
social resistance, but few have gone far enough 
to have the necessary emissions reduction 
impact. Innovation policy and market creation 
also offer significant mitigation potential and 
governments should play a key role in ensuring 
the development and market introduction of 
new and emerging low-carbon technologies and 
practices.
The key messages from the 2018 Emissions Gap Report 
send strong signals to national governments and to the 
political part of the Talanoa Dialogue at the 24th session 
of the Conference of the Parties (COP 24). Along with the 
recent IPCC Special Report, these messages provide the 
scientific underpinning for the UN 2019 Climate Summit, 
which will convene on the theme of ‘A Race We Can Win. 
A Race We Must Win’. By way of the summit, the United 
Nations Secretary-General will seek to challenge States, 
regions, cities, companies, investors and citizens to step 
up action in six key areas: energy transition, climate 
finance and carbon pricing, industry transition, nature-
based solutions, cities and local action, and resilience.
2. Global greenhouse gas emissions show no signs 
of peaking. Global CO2 emissions from energy and 
industry increased in 2017, following a three-year 
period of stabilization. Total annual greenhouse 
gases emissions, including from land-use change, 
reached a record high of 53.5 GtCO2e in 2017, 
an increase of 0.7 GtCO2e compared with 2016. 
In contrast, global GHG emissions in 2030 need 
to be approximately 25 percent and 55 percent 
lower than in 2017 to put the world on a least-cost 
pathway to limiting global warming to 2°C and 1.5°C 
respectively.
In 2017 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions - excluding 
emissions from land-use change - reached a record 
49.2 GtCO2e. This is an increase of 1.1 percent on the 
previous year. Emissions from land-use change, which 
vary from year to year because of weather conditions, 
added another 4.2 GtCO2, bringing the total to 53.5 
GtCO2e. 
Despite modest growth in the world economy, CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion, cement 
production and other industrial processes remained 
relatively stable from 2014 to 2016. This brought 
optimism to climate policy discussions, indicating that 
global GHG emissions might show signs of peaking. 
However, preliminary estimates of global CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuels, industry and cement for 2017 suggest 
an increase of 1.2 percent (figure ES.1). The main drivers 
of the increase are higher gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth (about 3.7 percent) and slower declines 
in energy, and especially carbon, intensity, compared 
with the 2014–2016 period. The 2017 increase leaves 
considerable uncertainty as to whether the 2014–2016 
slowdown was driven primarily by short-term economic 
factors. 
Since CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, industry and 
cement dominate total GHG emissions, the changes 
in CO2 emissions had the largest influence on GHG 
emissions from 2014 to 2017. Land-use change 
emissions have remained relatively flat, despite large 
annual variations driven by weather patterns and 
uncertainty in input data.
Global peaking of emissions by 2020 is crucial 
for achieving the temperature targets of the Paris 
Agreement, but the scale and pace of current mitigation 
action remains insufficient. Following on from the 
Talanoa Dialogue, which has raised confidence in 
implementation efforts and has shown that increased 
ambition is possible, national governments have the 
opportunity to strengthen their current policies and their 
NDCs by 2020. 
Global peaking of GHG emissions is determined by the 
aggregate emissions from all countries. While there has 
been steady progress in the number of countries that 
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have peaked their GHG emissions or have pledged to 
do so in the future (figure ES.2), the 49 countries that 
have so far done so, and the 36 percent share of global 
emissions they represent, is not large enough to enable 
the world’s emissions to peak in the near term. By 2030, 
up to 57 countries, representing 60 percent of global 
emissions, will have peaked, if commitments are fulfilled. 
Note: Land-use change emissions are not included due to large inter-annual variability. Leap-year adjustments are not included in the growth rates.
Figure ES.1: Average annual growth rates of key drivers of global CO2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components of 
GHG emissions (right of dotted line).
Figure ES.2: Number of countries that have peaked or are committed to peaking their emissions, by decade (aggregate) 
and percentage of global emissions covered (aggregate).
Countries that have already peaked have a critical role 
to play in determining the timing and level of global 
emissions peaking, as each country’s decarbonization 
rate after peaking will be a defining factor in global 
cumulative emissions. However, it is clear that countries 
that have peaked their GHG emissions have not reduced 
their emissions at a fast-enough rate since the peak year. 
Collectively, G20 members are projected to achieve the 
Cancun pledges by 2020, but they are not yet on track 
to realize their NDCs for 2030. Consistent with past 
Emissions Gap Reports, this report finds that the GHG 
emissions of the G20 countries, as a group, will not 
have peaked by 2030 unless there is a rapid increase in 
ambition and action within the next few years.  
While G20 members collectively are on track to achieving 
the target emission levels in 2020 implied by the Cancun 
pledges, some countries (Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, the 
Republic of Korea, South Africa and the USA) are either 
not projected to achieve their Cancun pledges, or there is 
uncertainty on whether they will achieve them. 
At present, the G20 countries are collectively not on track 
to meet their unconditional NDCs for 2030. Around half 
of the G20 members’ GHG emissions trajectories fall 
short of achieving their unconditional NDCs (Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, EU28, the Republic of Korea, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa and the USA). Three G20 members 
(Brazil, China and Japan) are on track to meeting their 
NDC targets under current policies, while emissions 
under current policies of three additional countries 
(India, Russia and Turkey) are projected to be more than 
10 percent below their unconditional NDC targets. This 
may, in some cases, reflect relatively low ambition in the 
NDCs. It is uncertain whether two countries (Indonesia 
and Mexico) are on track to meeting their NDC targets in 
2030 under current policies.
G20 members will need to implement additional policies 
to reduce their annual GHG emissions further by about 
2.5 GtCO2e to achieve their unconditional NDCs and by 
about 3.5 GtCO2e to achieve their conditional NDCs by 
2030. These additional reductions needed have gone 
down by approximately 1 GtCO2e compared with 2017, 
due to lower projections of emissions under current 
policies in China, the EU28 and the USA.
Table ES.1:  Total global greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile 
range), temperature implications and the resulting emissions gap.
Scenario
(rounded to 
the nearest 
gigatonne)
Number 
of 
scenarios 
in set
Global total 
emissions 
in 2030
[GtCO2e]
Estimated temperature outcomes Emissions Gap in 2030
[GtCO2e] 
50%  
chance
66%  
chance
90%  
chance
Below  
2°C 
Below 
1.8°C
Below 
1.5°C  
in 2100
No-policy 
baseline 179 65 (60–70)
Current policy 4 59 (56–60) 18 (16–20) 24 (22–25) 35 (32–36)
Unconditional 
NDCs 12 56 (52–58) 15 (12–17) 21 (17–23) 32 (28–34)
Conditional 
NDCs 10 53 (49–55) 13 (9–15) 19 (15–20) 29 (26–31)
Below 2.0°C  
(66% chance) 29 40 (38–45)
Peak: 
1.7–1.8°C
In 2100:  
1.6–1.7°C
Peak:
1.9–2.0°C
In 2100:
1.8–1.9°C
Peak:
2.4–2.6°C
In 2100:
2.3–2.5°C
Below 1.8°C  
(66% chance) 43 34 (30–40)
Peak:
1.6–1.7°C 
In 2100:
1.3–1.6°C
Peak:
1.7–1.8°C
In 2100:
1.5–1.7°C
Peak:
2.1–2.3°C
In 2100:
1.9–2.2°C
Below 1.5°C in 
2100  
(66% chance) 
13 24 (22–30)
Peak:
1.5–1.6°C 
In 2100:
1.2–1.3°C
Peak:
1.6–1.7°C
In 2100:
1.4–1.5°C
Peak:
2.0–2.1°C
In 2100:
1.8–1.9°C
Note: The gap numbers and ranges are calculated based on the original numbers (without rounding), which may differ from the rounded numbers (third 
column) in the table. Numbers are rounded to full GtCO2e. GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year global warming potential (GWP) values of 
the IPCC Second Assessment Report. The NDC and current policy emission projections may differ slightly from the presented numbers in Cross-Chapter 
Box 11 of the IPCC Special Report (Bertoldi et al., 2018) due to the inclusion of new studies after the literature cut-off date set by the IPCC. Pathways were 
grouped in three categories depending on whether their maximum cumulative CO2 emissions were less than 600 GtCO2, between 600 and 900 GtCO2, or 
between 900 and 1,300 GtCO2 from 2018 onwards until net zero CO2 emissions are reached, or until the end of the century if net zero is not reached before. 
Pathways assume limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation thereafter. Estimated temperature outcomes are based on the method used in the 
IPCC 5th Assessment Report.
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3. The gap in 2030 between emission levels under 
full implementation of conditional NDCs and those 
consistent with least-cost pathways to the 2°C 
target is 13 GtCO2e. If only the unconditional NDCs 
are implemented, the gap increases to 15 GtCO2e. 
The gap in the case of the 1.5°C target is 29 GtCO2e 
and 32 GtCO2e respectively. This gap has increased 
compared with 2017 as a result of the expanded and 
more diverse literature on 1.5°C and 2°C pathways 
prepared for the IPCC Special Report.  
The 2018 Emissions Gap Report draws on a substantial 
number of new, least-cost scenarios for meeting the 2°C 
and 1.5°C warming limits. Last year 16 scenarios were 
available for both the 1.5°C and 2°C pathway categories; 
this year, there are a total of 85. These new scenarios are 
more diverse and often set a lower maximum potential 
for carbon dioxide removal, which in turn results in 
deeper emissions reductions over the coming decades to 
stay within the same overall carbon budget. Each of the 
scenarios considers least-cost climate change mitigation 
pathways that start reductions from 2020 and is based 
on the climate model and set-up used in the IPCC 5th 
Assessment Report. 
Three temperature levels – 2°C, 1.8°C and 1.5°C – are 
chosen to provide a more nuanced overview of pathways 
that keep warming in the range of 2°C to 1.5°C, including 
providing an overview of the peak and 2100 temperature 
outcomes associated with different likelihoods (table 
ES.1). The inclusion of the 1.8°C level allows a more 
nuanced interpretation and discussion of the Paris 
Agreement’s temperature targets. 
Current policies are estimated to reduce global 
emissions in 2030 by around 6 GtCO2e compared with 
Figure ES.3: Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 
(median estimate and 10th to 90th percentile range).
the no-policy scenario (table ES.1). This is in line with 
the 2017 assessment, implying that studies have not 
identifi ed signifi cant and unambiguous progress in the 
implementation of policies that would enable the NDCs 
to be achieved by 2030.  
The updates to this year’s assessment result in changes 
of the GHG emission levels in 2030, compared with the 
2017 Emissions Gap Report, consistent with limiting 
global warming to 2°C and lower. According to the new 
scenario estimates, emissions of all GHGs should not 
exceed 40 (range 38–45) GtCO2e in 2030, if the 2°C 
target is to be attained with about 66 percent chance. 
To keep global warming to 1.8°C with about 66 percent 
chance, global GHG emissions in 2030 should not 
exceed 34 (range 30–40) GtCO2e. For a 66 percent 
chance of keeping temperature increase below 1.5°C 
in 2100 (associated with no or a low overshoot), global 
GHG emissions in 2030 should not exceed 24 (range 
22–30) GtCO2e. 
The full implementation of the unconditional NDCs is 
estimated to result in a gap of 15 GtCO2e (range 12–17) 
in 2030 compared with the 2°C scenario. This is about 
2 GtCO2e higher than the gap assessed in the previous 
report because the most recent 2°C scenarios indicate 
a lower benchmark. If, in addition, the conditional NDCs 
are fully implemented, the gap is reduced by about 2 
GtCO2e. The emissions gap between unconditional NDCs 
and 1.5°C pathways is about 32 GtCO2e (range 28–34). 
This is about 13 GtCO2e higher than the assessment 
in the 2017 report, due to the much larger number of 
available scenario studies that rely less on large volumes 
of carbon dioxide removal and thus show lower 2030 
benchmark values. Considering the full implementation 
of both unconditional and conditional NDCs would 
reduce this gap by about 3 GtCO2e.  
Implementing unconditional NDCs, and assuming that 
climate action continues consistently throughout the 
21st Century, would lead to a global mean temperature 
rise of about 3.2°C (with a range of 2.9–3.4°C) by 2100 
relative to pre-industrial levels, and continuing thereafter. 
Implementation of the conditional NDCs would reduce 
these estimates by 0.2°C in 2100. These projections are 
similar to the 2017 estimates.
4. Countries need to strengthen the ambition of NDCs 
and scale up and increase effectiveness of domestic 
policy to achieve the temperature goals of the Paris 
Agreement. To bridge the 2030 emissions gap and 
ensure long-term decarbonization consistent with 
the Paris Agreement goals, countries must enhance 
their mitigation ambition. Enhanced ambition in 
the NDCs sends an important signal regarding 
mitigation commitment, both internationally and 
domestically. However, domestic policies are crucial 
to translate mitigation ambition into action. 
Ambition can, in this context, be viewed as a combination 
of target-setting, preparedness to implement and a 
capacity to sustain further reductions over time.  
There are various ways in which a country could refl ect 
enhanced mitigation ambition in its NDCs (fi gure ES.4). 
These options are not mutually exclusive, and whether 
an NDC revision results in enhanced ambition depends 
on the scale of the revision rather than its form. It is 
important for countries to consider a wide range of 
options to identify those that are most meaningful and 
practical in their unique circumstances, and to bring 
about the deep emission reductions required to bridge 
the gap.
Major gaps in coverage and stringency of domestic 
policies remain, including among G20 members, in, for 
example, fossil fuel subsidy reduction, material effi  ciency 
measures in industry, oil and gas, methane, support 
schemes for renewables heating and cooling, emission 
standards for heavy-duty vehicles, and e-mobility 
programmes. Even in areas where policy coverage is 
high, stringency can be improved. For example, while all 
G20 countries have policies to support renewables in the 
electricity sector, stringency of these policies can still be 
enhanced.  
The technical potential for reducing GHG emissions 
is signifi cant and could be suffi  cient to bridge 
the emissions gap in 2030. A substantial part 
of this potential can be realized through scaling 
up and replicating existing, well-proven policies 
that simultaneously contribute to key sustainable 
development goals.
The 2017 Emissions Gap Report provided an updated 
assessment of the sectoral emission reduction 
potentials that are technically and economically feasible 
in 2030, considering prices up to US$100/tCO2e. It found 
that global emissions could be reduced by 33 (range 
30–36) GtCO2e/year in 2030, compared with the current 
policy scenario of 59 GtCO2e/year (Chapter 3). If, in 
addition, a number of newer and less certain mitigation 
options were included, the mitigation potential would 
increase to 38 (range 35–41) GtCO2e. The emissions 
reduction potential is thus suffi  cient to bridge the gap in 
2030. As the 2017 Emissions Gap Report showed, a large 
part of the technical potential lies in three broad areas: 
renewable energy from wind and solar, energy-effi  cient 
appliances and cars, and afforestation and stopping 
deforestation. 
In these and many other areas – and across all 
countries – there is signifi cant potential to realize a 
substantive part of the technical mitigation potential 
through the replication of proven good-practice policies 
that can simultaneously contribute to key sustainable 
development goals. Realizing this potential would 
signifi cantly narrow the gap by 2030, beyond current 
NDCs.
5. Non-state and subnational action plays an important 
role in delivering national pledges. Emission 
reduction potential from non-state and subnational 
action could ultimately be signifi cant, allowing 
countries to raise ambition, but the current impacts 
are extremely limited and poorly documented.
NSAs provide important contributions to climate action 
beyond their quantifi ed emission reductions. They 
build confi dence in governments concerning climate 
policy and push for more ambitious national goals. 
They provide space for experimentation or act as 
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orchestrators, coordinating with national governments on 
climate policy implementation. Initiatives and actors also 
incentivize, support and inspire additional climate action 
by exchanging knowledge and good practices, engaging 
in advocacy and policy dialogue, assisting in formulating 
action plans, and rewarding and recognizing climate 
actions.
The number of actors participating is rising fast: 
more than 7,000 cities from 133 countries and 245 
regions from 42 countries, along with more than 6,000 
companies with at least US$36 trillion in revenue, have 
pledged mitigation action. Commitments cover large 
parts of the economy and are gradually expanding in 
regional coverage. Many of the actors are engaging in 
so-called ‘international cooperative initiatives’, which 
are characterized by multi-country and multi-actor 
engagement.
The numbers seem impressive, but there is still huge 
potential for expansion. Based on available data, not 
even 20 percent of the world population is represented 
in current national and international initiatives, and many 
more of the over 500,000 publicly traded companies 
worldwide still can, and must, act. On the fi nancial side, 
a record of just over US$74 billion of Green Bonds were 
issued in the fi rst half of 2018, but this still represents 
only a very small fraction of the capital markets around 
the world.
The emission reduction potential from NSAs is large, but 
estimates vary considerably across studies (fi gure ES.5). 
If international cooperative initiatives are scaled up to 
their fullest potential, the impact could be considerable 
compared with current policy: up to 19 GtCO2e/year by 
2030 (range 15–23 GtCO2e) according to one study. 
If realized, this would be instrumental in bridging the 
emissions gap to 2°C pathways. 
Figure ES.5: The range of estimated potential emission reductions in various NSA studies.
However, the additional emission reductions under full 
implementation of pledged commitments made so far 
by individual non-state actors are still quite limited: up to 
0.45 GtCO2e/year (range 0.2–0.7 GtCO2e/year) by 2030 
compared with full unconditional NDC implementation, 
and up to 1.85 GtCO2e/year (range 1.5–2.2 GtCO2e/year) 
compared with current policy. A more comprehensive 
assessment of all non-state and subnational climate 
action occurring globally is limited by the current low 
level of available data and lack of consistent reporting on 
non-state and subnational climate action.
Non-state actors need to adopt common principles 
when formulating their actions. Such principles should 
include clear and quantifi able targets based on relevant 
benchmarks, technical capacity of the actors, availability 
of fi nancial incentives and the presence of regulatory 
support.
6. Fiscal policy reform can play a key role in creating 
strong incentives for low-carbon investments and 
reducing GHG emissions. Revenues from carbon 
pricing can be used for reducing other taxes, 
increase spending on social issues or compensating 
low-income households. Well-designed fi scal 
reform packages can reduce the costs of mitigating 
emissions, thereby making these fi scal reforms 
more socially acceptable. The use of carbon pricing 
to reduce GHG emissions is still only emerging 
in many countries and generally not applied at a 
suffi  cient level to facilitate a real shift towards low-
carbon societies.
Fiscal policy is a key government tool for managing and 
infl uencing the national economy and can be used to 
tax fossil fuels or subsidize low-emission alternatives 
as a way of infl uencing carbon emissions and ultimately 
investments in the energy sector.  
Pricing of carbon emissions through taxes or domestic 
emissions trading systems is, in many countries, part 
of the national climate policy and is referenced in many 
NDCs as one of the possible policy tools to be used. 
Before 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, 
hardly any emissions were covered by carbon taxes or 
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Figure ES.5a: Emission reduction potential 
of pledged commitments by NSAs.
Figure ES.5b: Scaled up potential emission 
reductions based on single and multiple initiatives.
Figure ES.4: Typology of strengthening mitigation ambition of NDCs.
Strengthen or add a 
GHG target
Strengthen or add a 
sectoral non-GHG 
target
Strengthen or add
policies and actions
Align imlementation
of the existing NDC 
with long-term goals
Commit to achieving 
the existing NDC via 
policies and actions 
that support long-term 
decarbonization 
pathways
Strengthen existing 
policies and actions
Add new
policies and actions
Increase the stringency 
of a sectoral
non-GHG target
Advance the target
year of a sectoral 
non-GHG target
Declare an intent to 
overachieve a sectoral 
non-GHG target
Adopt a new sectoral 
non-GHG target
Increase the
stringency of an 
existing GHG target
Expand the scope
and coverage of an
existing GHG target
Change the
target period of an
existing GHG target
Declare an intent
to overachieve an
existing GHG target
Strengthen the 
modalities of an 
existing GHG target
Change the type of an 
existing GHG target
Adopt a
new GHG target
Source: adapted from Franzen et al., (2017)
Source: adapted from Fransen et al. (2017).
Source: Based on data in table 5.2.
Note: a)  For studies that include ranges, median estimates are provided with ranges indicated in fi gures ES.5a and ES.5b.
 b)  Studies that are cross-hatched evaluate single and multiple ICI goals rather than individual actors’ recorded and quantifi ed pledges. They rely on 
assumptions of future scaled-up impact and therefore represent potential rather than a quantifi ed analysis of individual actors’ NSA pledges.
 c)  Extrapolation of 2025 estimates has been made.
Innovation in solar photovoltaic (PV) 
technology illustrates both the nonlinear 
nature of innovation and how the various 
innovation policies reviewed drive and shape 
it. PV was deployed with a compound annual 
growth rate of about 38 percent from 1998 
to 2015, continually defying forecasts. PV 
diffusion spurred cost reductions through 
‘learning by doing’, scale economies and 
R&D, and also lower profi t margins through 
increasing competition, which in turn 
stimulated further deployment of ever-
cheaper systems. From 1975 to 2016, PV 
module prices fell by about 99.5 percent, and 
every doubling of installed capacity coincided 
with a 20 percent drop in costs. Public 
innovation policies were, and continue to be, 
crucial for this process across the innovation 
chain.
In addition to assessing the emissions 
gap, the Emissions Gap Reports cover 
opportunities for bridging the gap. Previous 
reports have demonstrated how proven 
policies and measures, if scaled up across 
countries and regions in terms of ambition, 
stringency and geographical reach can 
contribute to bridging the emissions gap, 
while supporting broader development goals. 
A summary of key areas and sectors covered 
in previous reports is provided at the back of 
this report.
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trading systems. Coverage of explicit carbon pricing 
policies increased to about 5 percent of global GHG 
emissions between 2005 and 2010, primarily because 
of the introduction of the European Union’s Emissions 
Trading System. Between 2010 and 2018, coverage rose 
to about 15 percent of global emissions, with 51 carbon 
pricing initiatives now in place or scheduled. If China 
implements carbon pricing as announced, coverage 
would rise to about 20 percent of global GHG emissions. 
However, in most countries, fi scal policy is currently not 
yet geared towards delivering the required transition to a 
low-carbon economy. Effective carbon prices are too low 
and inconsistent, and the broader fi scal policy framework 
is often poorly aligned with climate policy goals. Besides 
carbon pricing, many governments levy specifi c taxes on 
energy use—partly to collect additional revenues. Even 
when considering energy-specifi c taxes together with 
explicit carbon pricing policies, half of the emissions 
from fossil fuels are not priced at all, and only 10 percent 
of global emissions from fossil fuels are estimated to be 
priced at a level consistent with limiting global warming 
to 2°C. 
Studies show that a carbon tax of US$70/tCO2 in addition 
to existing measures could reduce emissions from just 
above 10 percent in some countries to more than 40 
percent in other countries. Furthermore, in developing 
and emerging economies, an additional carbon tax of 
this order could raise the equivalent of 2 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in public revenue. 
Fiscal policies are used for different purposes and many 
countries actually subsidize fossil fuels for various 
economic and social reasons. If all fossil fuel subsidies 
were phased out, it would lead to a reduction of global 
carbon emissions of up to about 10 percent by 2030. 
Figure ES.6: Key issues for making fi scal reforms politically viable (upper part) and solutions and measures to address 
them (lower part).
Note: The green arrows show different ways to use revenues from carbon pricing. Measures that are related to fi nancial fl ows have a green mark.
Several key issues need to be considered when 
introducing carbon pricing and phasing out fossil 
energy subsidies with the aim of reducing carbon 
emissions. These issues, along with possible ways of 
addressing them, are illustrated in fi gure ES.6 below. 
Embedding carbon pricing in fi scal reform packages 
that are progressive, equitable and socially acceptable, 
and incentivizing investment in new and job-creating 
industries is essential. It is instructive for policymakers 
to refl ect on experience with other environmental fi scal 
reforms, where positively worded narratives, transparent 
communication, engagement with stakeholders and 
appropriate compensation have often helped overcome 
political and popular resistance to policies that increase 
fossil energy prices.
 7. Accelerating innovation is a key component of any 
attempt to bridge the emissions gap, but it will 
not happen by itself. Combining innovation in the 
use of existing technologies and in behaviour with 
the promotion of investment in new technologies 
and market creation has the potential to radically 
transform societies and reduce their GHG emissions. 
Based on an assessment of existing studies of what 
works, there are fi ve key principles or ‘success factors’ 
that policymakers should consider when designing 
policies and programmes to accelerate low-carbon 
innovation:
1. Public organizations must be willing to take on the 
high, early-stage risk that private organizations shy 
away from.
2. At the mid-stage of the innovation chain, public 
organizations must be able to nurture feedback 
effects among different parts of the innovation 
landscape and help de-risk private investment in 
commercial-scale projects. 
Ensure equitable distribution
of costs: 
Support households and firms
Alleviate effect of 
unilateral policies: 
Tackle carbon leakage
Foster public support:
Political and behavioral enablers to 
higher energy prices or taxes
Use revenues appropriately
Affected industry support: 
trade-exposed
industries
Carbon tariffs and 
border-carbon 
adjustment (BCA)
Key issues
Solutions
and
measures
Cash transfers for
households/consumers
Establish trust
in governments 
Investments fostering 
structural change
(energy, infrastructure)
Affected industry support:
targeted compensation 
(firms & workers)
Information and 
communication about 
impacts 
Reduce income taxes
Consider wording
and framing
Appropriate timing
and sequencing
Avoid solution aversion
Climate projects, low- 
carbon investment
3. Green policies must set a direction for the whole 
economy, not for each sector separately.
4. Mission-oriented innovation is useful for stimulating 
investment and innovation across different parts of 
the economy to reach concrete, target-specifi c goals, 
such as X percent cost reduction in a specifi c low-
carbon technology, by a specifi c date. 
5. Policy instruments need to be structured to 
mobilize actors through bottom-up exploration and 
participation. All these policies benefi t from a long-
term design horizon that creates certainty for private 
fi nance to be crowded in.
While these principles apply to countries at any stage of 
economic development, a country’s fi nancial resources 
and technological capacity determine what types of 
concrete policies are most appropriate.
In order to illustrate these rather abstract concepts, the 
global solar photovoltaic (PV) technology development 
is presented as a case example of how application of the 
various innovation policy components has been driving 
and shaping PV technology and market development, 
with different countries in the lead during different 
periods. 
The PV experience cannot be applied as a universal 
model, but it illustrates the various innovation success 
factors and the vision, patience and long-term thinking 
often required. Indeed, it is useful to refl ect on how 
commercially viable, low-carbon technologies, such as 
PV and on-shore wind turbines, achieved their present 
status, when thinking about what is needed to reach 
new goals. For example, how can we deliver on the 
need for commercially viable and sustainable batteries 
and other power-storage technologies to rapidly reduce 
global transport-sector emissions by 2030? What kind 
of political vision and combination of public and private 
resources, at what scale, should be agreed upon and 
committed to in order to make this happen? 
1Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
Authors: Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership) and John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)
The year 2018 will most likely be the fourth warmest 
year on record since 1880, with the past five years the 
five warmest ever recorded (NOAA, 2018). In addition 
to increased temperatures, 2018 has experienced 
numerous other climate-related extremes, including 
devastating storms, floods, heatwaves and droughts, 
causing thousands of casualties and huge economic 
losses for citizens, companies and states. While it is 
difficult to attribute single events to climate change, the 
patterns are well aligned with the findings of the recently 
released Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C 
(IPCC, 2018). The report details how climate variability 
and extreme events will escalate with increased global 
temperatures and determines that many impacts will 
be irreversible, even if temperatures decrease again in 
the long term. This Emissions Gap Report has benefited 
significantly from the IPCC Special Report and its 
underlying studies and scenarios. 
In its decision to adopt the Paris Agreement, the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
invited the IPCC to produce the special report on ‘the 
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels and related to global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global 
response to the threat of climate change, sustainable 
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty’.
The IPCC special report is a major scientific input to 
the political process of the United Nations Climate 
Convention, in which the Talanoa Dialogue plays a key 
role this year. Both the IPCC report and the Talanoa 
Dialogue are inputs to the stepwise ‘ramping-up’ 
mechanism of the Paris Agreement, created to address 
the huge gap between the level of ambition reflected 
by countries in their current Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) and the level required to achieve 
the goals of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement 
specifies that countries must update their NDCs every 
five years and that each update should reflect progress 
in terms of enhanced ambition (UNFCCC, 2015). NDC 
updates will be informed by global stocktakes, the first 
of which will take place in 2023, leading to revised NDCs 
by 2025.
The 2018 Talanoa Dialogue1 is an important precursor 
to the global stocktakes. It is convened by the UNFCCC 
as an inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue 
about future ambitions and current actions, designed 
to take initial stock of countries’ collective efforts 
and inform the preparation of new or updated NDCs 
to be communicated by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2015:4). The 
Dialogue consists of a preparatory and a political phase. 
During the preparatory phase, Parties and non-Party 
stakeholders are invited to submit inputs and participate 
in discussions addressing three questions: Where are 
we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there? 
So far, Parties and non-Party stakeholders have shared 
almost 500 stories, submitted over 280 written inputs 
and attended over 75 events (UNFCCC, 2018). This  
will be synthesized and presented at the 24th session 
of the Conference of the Parties (COP 24) in December 
2018, where the political phase will take place, informed 
by the outcome of the preparatory phase, the IPCC 
special report and the forthcoming Yearbook of Global 
Climate Action (United Nations Climate Change 
Secretariat).
The Global Climate Action Summit held between 12 
and 14 September 2018 in San Francisco was another 
significant event under the climate change political 
process. It brought together more than 4,500 local and 
regional government and business leaders and other 
non-state and subnational actors on climate change 
to showcase climate actions around the world (Global 
Climate Action Summit, 2018). The Summit resulted in 
more than 500 announcements to strengthen climate 
action by non-state and subnational actors. 
1 Previously referred to as the ‘Facilitative Dialogue’, the Dialogue was re-named under the COP Presidency of Fiji in 2017.
2 3EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – INTRODUCTION
This Emissions Gap Report is the 9th independent 
scientific assessment produced by UN Environment to 
assess how countries’ mitigation actions and pledges 
are affecting the global greenhouse gas emissions trend, 
comparing it against the emission reductions necessary 
to limit global warming to well below 2°C and 1.5°C in 
accordance with the Paris Agreement. The difference 
between these is known as the ‘emissions gap’. This 
report has been prepared at the request of numerous 
countries as an input to inform international climate 
negotiations as the full implementation of the Paris 
Agreement moves closer. A special pre-release version 
of chapter 5 of this report was published in time for the 
Global Climate Action Summit. 
This year, the Emissions Gap Report has focused on 
providing information relevant to the Talanoa Dialogue, 
offering an updated assessment of the important roles 
and potential contributions of non-state and subnational 
actors to climate change, and updating and improving 
the gap assessment, using the most recent studies and 
scenarios.
The report is organized into seven chapters, including 
this introduction. Chapter 2 presents an update of 
current global emissions and assesses the trends and 
progress of G20 members towards achieving pledged 
2020 emission reductions, the Cancun pledges and NDC 
emission targets. The chapter also considers whether 
global greenhouse gas emissions show signs of peaking, 
which is crucial for achieving the temperature targets of 
the Paris Agreement and depends on when emissions 
peak in individual countries, the level at which emissions 
peak and the rate of decline following this. Chapter 3 
provides an updated assessment of global emission 
levels in 2030 consistent with the temperature goal of the 
Paris Agreement, based on the significantly expanded set 
of new least-cost scenarios, which were prepared in the 
context of the IPCC Special Report. Updated estimates 
of global emission levels in 2030 under different policy 
and NDC implementation scenarios are also provided. 
Together, these form the basis for an update of the 2030 
emissions gap.
In line with previous editions, the report provides insight 
into how the emissions gap can be bridged. Chapter 
4 presents an overview of options for enhancing the 
ambition of NDCs, while strengthening action through 
a suite of domestic policies targeting climate change. 
Chapter 5 assesses the role and potential of non-state 
and subnational actors in bridging the emissions gap, 
based on the most recent studies, while chapter 6 
examines the role of fiscal policy reform in creating 
strong incentives for low carbon investments and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, with particular 
attention given to carbon pricing and taxation. Finally, 
chapter 7 assesses how accelerating innovation can 
help bridge the emissions gap, while also transforming 
societies. Previous Emissions Gap Reports have covered 
a number of other important areas and sectors with 
significant potential to bridge the emissions gap. A 
summary of these is provided at the back of this report.
This report has been prepared by an international team 
of 42 leading scientists from 25 scientific groups in 14 
countries. As in previous years, a renowned steering 
committee guided the assessment, which followed a 
transparent and participatory production process. The 
assessment methodology and preliminary findings 
were made available to the governments of countries 
specifically mentioned in this report, which were invited 
to comment on the findings.
The information contained in the report provides 
important inputs to the current debate on global climate 
policy and the actions needed to meet the goal of the 
Paris Agreement. Meeting the 2030 targets is crucial 
for limiting the adverse impacts of climate change and 
creating the foundation necessary to develop more 
ambitious mitigation targets under the NDCs beyond 
2030, aimed at achieving emission neutrality in the 
second half of this century alongside sustainable 
development and poverty eradication efforts.
UN Environment hopes that this 9th edition of the 
Emissions Gap Report will support the much-needed 
move towards enhanced ambition and accelerated action 
in the forthcoming climate negotiations in Katowice.
Chapter 2. 
Trends and progress towards the Cancun pledges,  
NDC targets and peaking of emissions 
Lead authors: Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency), Kelly Levin (World Resources Institute), Glen Peters (Centre for International Climate and Environmental 
Research, Norway) 
Contributing authors: Gabriel Blanco (National University of the Center of the Buenos Aires Province, Argentina), Jasmin 
Cantzler (Climate Analytics), Frederic Hans (NewClimate Institute), Alexandre Koberle (Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute 
for Graduate Studies and Research in Engineering, Brazil), Lisa Luna (NewClimate Institute), Ritu Mathur (The Energy 
and Resources Institute, India), Marilena Muntean (Joint Research Centre, European Commission), Jos Olivier (PBL 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Jorge Villarreal Padilla (Iniciativa Climática de México), David Rich 
(World Resources Institute), Fu Sha (National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation, China), 
Heleen van Soest (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)  
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the latest trends in greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions and progress towards achieving 
both the Cancun pledges and Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs). Particular focus is given to the 
peaking of emissions at the global and national levels 
(section 2.2), the current status and recent trends 
of global GHG emissions and for emitting countries 
(section 2.3), and whether GHG emissions are peaking 
at the national level and the implications for global 
peaking. In addition, this chapter also assesses whether 
countries are on track to meet their Cancun pledges and 
NDC targets and provides and update of recent policy 
developments in G20 member countries (section 2.4).
2.2 Peaking of greenhouse gas emissions 
To limit global warming to well below 2°C and 1.5°C, 
global GHG emissions have to peak and decline rapidly 
thereafter. Mitigation pathways consistent with a likely 
chance of achieving the temperature targets require that, 
global emissions peak by 2020. The Paris Agreement 
suggests that Parties should collectively aim to reach 
global peaking of GHG emissions “as soon as possible”, 
recognizing that “peaking will take longer for developing 
country Parties” and should be guided by the principle 
of equity, acknowledging common but differentiated 
responsibilities and capabilities.
Global and national peaking of emissions and the ability 
to meet the climate objective of the Paris Agreement 
are dependent on three factors: the timing of national 
and global peaking, the level of emissions peaking and 
the rate of decline in emissions following the peak. It 
is therefore crucial that countries not only commit to 
peaking their emissions at lower levels, but that they 
achieve this as soon as possible and that the subsequent 
rate of emissions decline is substantial (Levin and Rich, 
2017). Although this applies to all countries, major 
emitters play a key role in determining when and at what 
level global emissions peak. This chapter therefore pays 
particular attention to G20 members, who currently 
account for around 78 percent of global GHG emissions.
Figure 2.1 shows the steady progress from 1990 to 2030 
in the number of countries that have either peaked their 
emissions or are expected to do so, provided that they 
meet their commitments, alongside the percentage of 
global emissions of these countries. By 2030, up to 57 
countries representing 60 percent of global emissions 
will have peaked, if they fulfil their commitments.  
A country is considered to have peaked its emissions 
if two criteria are met: its emissions reached their 
maximum level at least 5 years before the most recent 
GHG inventory year; and the country has unconditionally 
committed to continue lowering its emissions below the 
peak emissions level in the future. In some countries 
classified as having peaked, emissions declined after the 
initial peak year and then increased again, rather than 
declining steadily after the initial peak year. Despite these 
fluctuations, the initial peak year is still considered as the 
peak, since emissions are below this maximum emission 
level.1 
1 See Levin and Rich (2017) for a full discussion of the methodology and assumptions on how peaking was determined. One limitation of the referenced study is that it takes 
countries’ commitments at face value by assuming they will be achieved by the target date, without considering whether targets will be underachieved or overachieved.
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2 It should be noted that while some of these countries’ commitments for 2020 and 2030 indicate an intended increase from recent emissions levels (e.g. Russia), future 
commitments do not propose to surpass 1990 emissions levels. 
3 Brazil’s peak and subsequent decline in emissions reduction is primarily the result of actions to reduce deforestation in the Amazon region (Azevedo, T. R. et al. (2018)).  
Any reversal of policy implementation could lead to increased emissions. Brazil’s emissions, excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), have not yet peaked.
4 Mexico’s NDC mentions “a net emissions peak starting from 2026” (UNFCCC, 2016). 
5 Russia’s emissions peaked prior to 1990. Although Russia’s commitments for 2020 and 2030 indicate an intended increase from recent emissions levels, its future 
commitments do not propose to surpass 1990 emissions levels.
6 As a conservative assumption, South Africa is not considered as having a firm commitment to peak, since there is no guarantee that the conditions upon which they made the 
pledge will be met.
7 This analysis is based primarily on GHG emissions data (fossil and industry CO2 and sources of CH4, N2O and fluorinated gases, but excluding land use CO2) using EDGAR 
v5.0 (CO2)/v4.3.2 FT2017 for non-CO2 gases (Olivier et al., 2018). The largest changes compared with v4.3.2 FT2016 (Olivier et al., 2017) are in the CO2 emissions, since 
the energy consumption data have been revised and expanded to include updated energy statistics from the International Energy Agency (IEA) for the whole time series 
to 2015 instead of to 2012 (from v4.3.2 to v5.0) and revised BP statistics for the latest years. Furthermore, revisions for cement clinker and gas flaring were made using 
updated statistics, which also changed the data before 2012, and the coverage of 3 other sources was improved (ethylene production, other chemical product use and waste 
incineration).For non-CO2 sources updated statistics from IEA, BP, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and UNFCCC (reported data), among 
others were used to estimate the 2012–2017 CH4 and N2O emissions. This means that statistics-based emissions are now updated to 2016 or 2017, with new statistics 
and several revisions available for previous years. In total, these revisions show that total GHG emissions are roughly 0.9 GtCO2e higher than figures presented in recent 
Emissions Gap Reports.
8 There are various estimates of emissions from LUC based on different system boundaries (Grassi et al., 2018) and different methods (Le Quéré et al., 2018). There is no 
commonly accepted value of emissions from LUC, with different estimates giving different emission levels and trends (Le Quéré et al., 2018). Global emissions from LUC also 
have large inter-annual variability driven by weather phenomena (e.g. El Niño). For this reason, LULUCF is not a focus of the analysis of global or country GHG trends.
9 Alternative datasets exist (particularly for CO2 emissions), though they generally lead to the same conclusions due to similar growth rates. For this reason, the discussion 
focuses only on one dataset.
10 The scientific community uses different definitions for land-use change emissions compared to UNFCCC, leading to higher estimates in section 2.2 compare to the rest of the 
report (Grassi et al., 2018).
11 Calculated using the Global Warming Potentials metric from the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), similar to the 2017 
Emissions Gap Report.
12 Growth rates are not adjusted for leap years.
Of the 19 countries that peaked their emissions in 
or prior to 1990, 16 were former Soviet republics or 
economies in transition or both.2 Other countries that 
peaked by 1990 include Germany and Norway. By 2010, 
39 of the world’s 43 Annex I countries peaked their 
emissions. The 10 non-Annex I countries that peaked 
by 2010 or earlier are Azerbaijan, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Georgia, Micronesia, Moldova, Montenegro, San Marino, 
Serbia and Tajikistan. Brazil is the first major emitting 
developing country to peak their emissions, reaching a 
maximum level in 2004.3  
By 2020, all but one Annex I country (Turkey, an emerging 
economy) are expected to have peaked their emissions. 
15 non-Annex I countries are committed to peaking their 
emissions by 2030 or sooner, including China (for CO2 
only) and Mexico,4 among others.
By 1990, three G20 members (the EU28, Germany and 
Russia)5  had peaked emissions. Half of G20 members 
(additionally, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and the USA) had peaked emissions by 
Source: Levin and Rich (2017).
Note: Emissions from LUC are not included due to large inter-annual variability.
Figure 2.1: Number of countries that have peaked or are committed to peaking their emissions, by decade (aggregate) 
and percentage of global emissions covered (aggregate).
Figure 2.2: Average annual growth rates of key drivers of global CO2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components of 
greenhouse gas emissions (right of dotted line).
2010 and another four member countries’ emissions will 
peak by 2020 (Japan and the Republic of Korea), or by 
2030 (China (for CO2 only) and Mexico) if commitments 
are achieved. Given existing unconditional commitments, 
six G20 members’ GHG emissions show no sign of 
peaking, (Argentina, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa6 and Turkey). 
Figure 2.1 indicates that the number of countries 
expected to peak by 2030 and the share of global 
emissions they represent is insufficient for global 
emissions to peak in the near future. The following 
sections provide further insight into issues relating to 
the timing of national and global peaking, the level of 
emissions peaking and the rate of decline in emissions 
following peaks, examining the status and trends in 
current global emissions and progress of G20 members.
2.3  Current global emissions: status and trends
Total GHG emissions7,8,9 have increased steadily since 
1970, with trend variations usually explained by changes 
in economic output (such as recessions, Peters et al., 
2011). In 2017, the total GHG emissions, excluding 
emissions from land-use change (LUC),10 reached a 
record 49.2 GtCO2e.
11 Including LUC adds another 4.2 
GtCO2, bringing the total to 53.5 GtCO2e, which is an 
increase of 0.7 GtCO2e (1.3 percent) compared with 
2016. All GHGs have shown strong growth in the last 
decades (figure 2.2), except for emissions from LUC, 
which have remained relatively steady.
From 2014 to 2016 there was a distinct change in the 
GHG emissions trend (excluding the more variable 
emissions from LUC), even though the economy 
continued growing (figure 2.2).
The slowdown brought renewed optimism to climate 
policy discussions, since it may indicate a necessary 
peak in global GHG emissions. Preliminary estimates of 
global GHG emissions suggest they grew12 1.1 percent 
in 2017, leaving considerable uncertainty as to whether 
short-term economic factors were primarily responsible 
for the 2014–2016 slowdown. 
Since CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial 
processes dominate total GHG emissions, changes 
in CO2 emissions have the largest influence on GHG 
emission trends. Despite the strong growth in economic 
activity (Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) from 2014 to 
2016, growth in energy consumption and CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuels, industry, and cement slowed due to 
faster than expected declines in energy and carbon 
intensity (figure 2.2). Other GHGs (methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), fluorinated gases) continued to grow from 
2014 to 2016, but with smaller changes compared with 
the decadal trend (figure 2.2). 
Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial 
processes grew at an annual rate of 2.3 percent from 
2004 to 2014. During 2014–2016 emissions had no 
growth despite the economy growing 3.2 percent/year, 
meaning that energy and carbon intensity reduced faster 
in these years than in the previous decade. The increase 
in global CO2 emissions in 2017 (1.2 percent) resulted 
from stronger Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
(estimated at 3.7 percent) and slower declines in energy 
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and especially carbon intensity. The 2017 growth raises 
concerns that the progress made in the 2014–2016 
period may be short-lived.
Global CO2 emissions from LUC are less strongly linked 
to economic activity, more volatile owing to changes 
in climatic conditions and uncertain due to purely 
constrained input data (Le Quéré et al., 2018). For these 
reasons, CO2 emissions from LUC are often considered 
independently from emissions from fossil fuels and 
industrial processes. Over the last decade, emissions 
from LUC accounted for 10 percent of total GHG 
emissions, a share that is declining due to the strong 
growth in emissions from fossil fuels and industrial 
processes. Emissions from LUC have remained relatively 
stable for decades, albeit with high uncertainty on 
the level and trend of these (Le Quéré et al., 2018). In 
2015, emissions from LUC were relatively high due to El 
Niño causing hotter and drier conditions in the tropics, 
resulting in more intense fires and thus more rapid 
growth in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (Peters et 
al., 2017; WMO, 2017). 
The remaining GHGs (CH4, N2O, fluorinated gases) are 
responsible for 25 percent of GHG emissions over the 
last decade when excluding LUC, rising to 32 percent 
when including LUC.13  Non-CO2 GHGs have grown at 
roughly half the rate of CO2 emissions since 1990. CH4 
Source: EDGAR v5.0/v4.3.2 FT2017 CO2 (Olivier et al., 2018) and Global Carbon Project (Le Quéré et al., 2018).
Figure 2.3: Global greenhouse gas emissions per type of gas (left) and top greenhouse gas emitters excluding land-use 
change emissions due to lack of reliable data (right).
13 Weighted using a Global Warming Potential of the IPCC Second Assessment Report and 100 years as the time period, which is common in climate policy. 14 https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-indias-co2-emissions-grew-strongly-in-2017.
emissions are responsible for 16 percent of global GHG 
emissions (excluding LUC) over the last decade and 
grew at an annual rate of 1.4 percent from 2004 to 2014 
and only 0.5 percent from 2014 and 2016, with growth 
estimated to be 0.3 percent in 2017. Concentrations of 
CH4 in the atmosphere have grown faster than expected 
in the last decade (Saunois et al., 2016), primarily due 
to biogenic emissions in the tropics and fossil fuel 
emissions in temperate regions (Worden et al., 2017), 
though scientific debate on the causes continues. 
N2O emissions are responsible for 6.3 percent of 
GHG emissions (excluding LUC) and had more rapid 
growth from 2014 to 2016 (1.4 percent/year) and 2017 
(1.4 percent) than from 2004 to 2014 (0.8 percent/
year), compared with other gases. Fluorinated gases 
(hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)) are only responsible for 2.4 
percent of total GHG emissions and continue to have 
strong growth at around 5 percent/year.
While global emissions statistics provide important 
information on collective progress, they mask the 
dynamics at the country level (figure 2.3). The 2014–
2016 slowdown in the growth of global emissions and 
the return to modest growth in 2017 is indicative of 
countries’ underlying behaviour. The top 4 emitters 
(China, USA, EU28 and India) contribute to over 56 
percent of the total GHG emissions over the last decade 
when excluding LUC, the top 7 (including Russia, Japan 
and international transport) account for more than 66 
percent, while G20 members contribute 78 percent. 
Aggregated GHG emissions from G20 countries grew at 
2.1 percent/year from 2004 to 2014, remained relatively 
steady from 2014 to 2016 and are estimated to grow 
0.9 percent in 2017. Even though emission reductions 
are needed from all countries, the top emitters are 
responsible for most of the changes in global emissions.
China emits more than one quarter (27 percent) of 
global GHG emissions (excluding LUC), and the ups 
and downs of Chinese emissions leave an important 
signature on global emissions growth. From 2004 to 
2014, Chinese GHG emissions grew at an annual rate of 
6 percent (accounting for two thirds of global emissions 
growth), before declining slightly from 2014 to 2016. 
The slowdown during the 2014–2016 period was across 
all GHGs, though CO2 dominated the trend due to a 
marked decline in coal consumption. Some reports have 
speculated that Chinese emissions, more specifically 
coal consumption, may have peaked (Qi et al., 2016). 
However, the increase of 1.2 percent in global CO2 
emissions in 2017, due to renewed growth of emissions 
at a rate of 0.9 percent, suggests that it may be too soon 
to consider Chinese emissions to have peaked.
The European Union (EU) and USA play key strategic 
roles in global climate policy due to their historical 
responsibility, and together account for more than 20 
percent of global GHG emissions (13 percent for the 
USA and 9 percent for the EU, excluding LUC). Emissions 
in the USA likely peaked in 2007 and decreased at an 
annual rate of 0.4 percent from 2004 to 2014. The rate 
of reductions increased from 2014 to 2016 (annual 
declines of 2 percent), with significant drops in 2015 and 
2016 due to less coal-powered electricity generation. 
Emissions decreased slightly in 2017 by 0.3 percent. 
Reductions have been strongest for CO2 emissions, 
but there has been strong growth in fluorinated 
gas emissions. This indicates that the USA made 
considerable contributions to the observed slowdown in 
global GHG emissions growth for the 2014–2016 period.
The EU has had steady declines in GHG emissions 
since 1990, with accelerated reductions of 2 percent/
year from 2004 to 2014. However, EU emissions have 
been increasing since 2014 (on average 1 percent/year), 
reversing the long-term trend. Increases in CO2 emissions 
due to strong growth in oil and gas use are largely 
responsible for the overall rise, though N2O emissions 
have also increased and the growth of fluorinated gas 
emissions has also remained strong. CH4 emissions 
continued to decline but at a slower rate.
Due to its large population, India’s GHG emissions 
represent 7.1 percent of the global total, despite its low 
per capita emissions and large parts of the population 
needing better living standards. Indian emissions grew 
strongly in the 2004–2014 period, at an annual rate of 5 
percent, with only a slight respite during the 2014–2016 
period, when the annual rate dropped to 3 percent. 
India’s GHG emissions are estimated to grow at a rate 
of 3 percent in 2017 due to the demonetization process 
(removal of some rupees from circulation) and the 
introduction of a goods and services tax.14
Although the top 4 countries represent 56 percent of 
global GHG emissions (excluding LUC), this does not 
downplay the importance of the remaining countries. 
GHG emissions in the Russian Federation are 4.6 percent 
of the global total and since 2014 have continued to 
grow by about 1 percent/year (excluding LUC). In Japan, 
GHG emissions (2.9 percent of the global total) have 
declined on average 1 percent/year since 2014, despite 
significant fluctuations following the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster. Emissions from international aviation 
and marine transport, which represent 2.5 percent of 
global GHG emissions, have grown strongly at an annual 
rate of over 2 percent since 2014. 
Despite a distinct slowdown in emissions growth 
from 2014 to 2016, initial data for 2017 indicates GHG 
emissions have started to increase, both globally and 
in key countries. It is unclear whether the 2017 growth 
trend will be sustained in the next few years or whether 
2017 will just be an anomalous year as global emissions 
reach a plateau. While it seemed that global GHG 
emissions could peak in the near future, recent changes 
have now delayed this.
2.4  Assessment of current policies: are G20 
members on track to meet the Cancun 
pledges for 2020 and NDC targets for 2030, 
and to peak their emissions? 
2.4.1 Overview and comparison of G20 members
As G20 members currently account for around 78 
percent of global emissions, they will greatly influence 
the achievement of the Paris Agreement climate goal. 
This section provides an update of the extent to which 
G20 members are putting in place and implementing 
policies that enable them to meet the Cancun pledges 
and NDCs. In addition, it offers an overview of G20 
members’ respective shares of global emissions, the 
implications of their unconditional NDCs for per capita 
emissions and where they stand with respect to peaking 
of emissions and decarbonization rates. Table 2.1 
provides a comparative overview of this information for 
all G20 members (with the EU28 represented collectively 
instead of as the four Member States that are also 
individual G20 members).
Collective progress towards the Cancun pledges 
and NDCs
G20 members are collectively projected to achieve the 
conditional end of the Cancun pledges for 2020 under 
current policies. However, as table 2.1 indicates, six G20 
20171970 1980 1990 2000 2010
G
tC
O
2e
G
tC
O
2e
0
3
6
9
12
15
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
20171970 1980 1990 2000 2010
GHG w LUC
LUC
GHG w/o LUC
F-gas
N2O
CH4
CO2 w/o LUC
China
Russia
USA
int. transport
Japan
India
EU-28
8 9EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – TRENDS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CANCUN PLEDGES, NDC TARGETS AND PEAKING OF EMISSIONS
members (Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, the Republic of 
Korea, South Africa, the USA) are either not projected 
to achieve their Cancun pledges, or have uncertainty on 
whether they will achieve it.
At present, G20 countries are collectively not on track 
to meet their unconditional NDCs for 2030. Based on 
an assessment of current policies, around half of G20 
members fall short of achieving their unconditional 
NDCs (Argentina, Australia, Canada, EU28, the Republic 
of Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the USA) (table 
2.1 and figure 2.4). Under current policies, three G20 
members (Brazil, China and Japan) are on track to meet 
their NDC targets, while emissions under current policies 
of three additional countries (India, Russia and Turkey) 
are projected to be more than 10 percent below their 
unconditional NDC targets. It is uncertain whether two 
countries (Indonesia and Mexico) are on track to meet 
their NDC targets in 2030 under current policies.
It is estimated that G20 members will need to implement 
additional policies to reduce GHG emissions further by 
about 2.5 GtCO2e/year to achieve their unconditional 
NDCs and 3.5 GtCO2e/year to achieve their conditional 
NDCs by 2030. The estimate of additional reductions 
needed has decreased by approximately 1 GtCO2e 
compared with 2017, due to lower projections of 
emission reductions under current policies in China, the 
EU28 and the USA.
It is important to note that a country likely to meet 
or exceed its NDCs based on current policies is not 
necessarily undertaking more stringent mitigation action 
than a country that is not on track. It can also indicate 
that the ambition of the current NDC could be enhanced. 
According to the Paris Agreement, countries are obliged 
to regularly update and strengthen their NDCs. The 
assessment conducted in this section is based on 
current NDCs, recognizing that they are to be revised and 
should be strengthened considerably by 2020 to reduce 
global emissions to levels consistent with limiting global 
warming to below 2°C or 1.5°C by 2030 (see chapter 3). 
Peaking of emissions and decarbonization rates
Countries that have historically peaked have a critical 
role to play in determining the timing and level of global 
emissions peaking, as each country’s decarbonization 
rate after peaking will be a defining factor for global 
cumulative emissions. Countries that have already 
peaked their GHG emissions have not reduced their 
emissions at fast enough rates since the peak year. For 
example, an 80 percent reduction of emissions between 
2005 and 2050 requires a constant annual reduction 
rate of 3.5 percent/year for the period. By contrast, the 
G20 members that have peaked show constant annual 
emission reduction rates ranging between 0.6 percent/
year (Canada) and 2.5 percent/year (Russia) up to 2016 
for all GHG emissions, including land use, land-use 
change and forestry (LULUCF) (table 2.1). Brazil, the only 
non-Annex I member of the G20 that has peaked its GHG 
emissions to date, showed an average reduction rate 
of 12 percent/year between 2004 and 2012 due to the 
large reductions in emissions from LULUCF. Brazil’s GHG 
emissions from non-LULUCF sectors have increased by 
2.4 percent/year on average (table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Overview of the status and progress of G20 members, including on Cancun pledges and NDC targets.
Country Share of 
global GHG 
emissions 
in 2017a
On track to meet the 
targets with current 
policies?
Unconditional NDC: per 
capitab GHG emissions
Emission peaking
Cancun 
pledges
Unconditional 
NDC
tCO2e/cap in 
2030c 
versus 2015 
levels
Peaking yeard Average 
annual growth 
after peakinge 
Argentina 0.8% No pledge No 9.8 -6% No 
commitment
to peak 
---
Australia 1.2% Yes No 15.4 -29% 2006 -1.6%/year 
Brazil 2.3% Yes Yes 5.3 -22% 2004 (2006–2016)
-12.0%/year 
(2004–2012)
(+2.4%/year 
excluding 
LULUCF)
Canada 1.6% No No 12.9 -33% 2007 -0.6%/year 
(2007–2016)
China 26.8% Yes Yes 10.0 +17% By 2030 (CO2 
only)
---
EU28 9.0% Yes No 6.1 -23% 1990 or earlier -1.1%/year 
(1990–2016)
India 7.0% Yes Yes* 3.5 +67% No 
commitment
to peak 
---
Indonesia 1.7% Uncertain Uncertain 6.9 +15% No 
commitment
to peak 
---
Japan 3.0% Yes Yes 8.6 -13% By 2020 ---
Mexico 1.5% Uncertain Uncertain 5.1 -2% By 2030 ---
Republic of 
Korea
1.6% No No 10.1 -21% By 2020 ---
Russian 
Federation
4.6% Yes Yes* 18.9 +33% 1990 or earlier 
(former Soviet 
republic) 
-2.5%/year 
(1990–2016)
+0.5%/year 
(2000–2016)
Saudi Arabia 1.5% No pledge No 23.1 +19% No 
commitment
to peak 
---
South Africa 1.1% Uncertain No 9.5 0% No 
commitment 
to peak
---
Turkey 1.2% No pledge Yes* 10.5 +102% No 
commitment
to peak 
---
United States 
of America
13.1% Uncertain No 14.0 (2025) -25% (2025) 2007 -1.5%/year 
(2007–2016)
Notes: 
a  Olivier et al. (2018), excluding LULUCF.
b  Population projections are based on the medium fertility variant of the United Nations World Population Prospects 2017 edition (UN DESA, 2017). 
c   The G20 average in 2015 was 7.5 tCO2e/cap (based on national GHG inventories and using the EDGAR GHG trend if emissions for the latest years were 
missing). Using EDGAR estimates only, the G20 average in 2015 was 8.0 tCO2e/cap (Olivier et al., 2017).
d   Given the unconditional pledges. Expected peak years are based only on commitments that countries have made and assume the achievement of such 
commitments.
e   Authors’ calculations based on UNFCCC (2018) data (including LULUCF). For Australia and Canada, the peak years based on 2018 GHG inventories were 
2007 and 2004 respectively, which differs from those assessed by Levin and Rich (2017), since they used older inventory data. Peak years reported by 
Levin and Rich (2017) are used here for the calculations. The average emission growth rates were -1.8 percent/year for Australia with 2007 as the peak 
year and -0.5 percent/year for Canada with 2004 as the peak year. 
*  Denotes that the current policy trajectory is more than 10 percent below the NDC target. 
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To assess whether the changes in emission-related 
indicators as a result of NDCs are both ambitious 
and fair (in line with the long-term goal of the Paris 
Agreement) would require a thorough evaluation of 
normative indicators of burden-sharing indicators, which 
is beyond the scope of this report. However, a number of 
recent peer-reviewed studies attempt this task, based on 
various effort-sharing considerations (Höhne et al., 2014; 
Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017; CAT, 2018a; 
Holz et al., 2018). 
Figure 2.4 provides a detailed comparison of 
estimated emissions under current policies and the full 
implementation of NDCs for all G20 members, mapping 
these against 1990 and 2010 emissions. For each of 
the G20 members, median GHG emission projections 
have been calculated for current policies and full 
implementation of the NDC, using information from a 
recently published study (den Elzen et al., forthcoming), 
which updates and expands the data sources covered in 
the 2017 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2017), using the 
Notes: 
For reporting reasons, the emission projections for China, the EU, India and the USA are shown in figure 2.4a with and the other 
countries shown in figure 2.4b, using 2 different vertical axes. 
As a conservative assumption, South Africa is not considered as having a firm commitment to peak, since there is no guarantee that 
the conditions upon which they made the pledge will be met.
*   For the USA, the unconditional NDC is for 2025.
**  South Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO2e 
including LULUCF over the 2025–2030 period.
Figure 2.4: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 and its individual members by 
2030 under different scenarios and compared with historical emissions.
Figure 2.4a.
  
Figure 2.4b.
most up-to-date data from countries’ recently published 
National Communications, 3rd biennial reports of 7 
G20 members, and several other new national studies 
for policies and NDC projections. The estimates draw 
on official country data and independent sources (see 
den Elzen et al. 2018 for further details). GHG emission 
projections under current policies from independent 
analyses presented in this chapter cover main energy and 
climate policies implemented by a recent cut-off date 
and do not consider prospective policies that are being 
debated or planned. Similarly, current policy and NDC 
estimates only partially cover commitments and actions 
made by non-state and subnational actors to date and 
do not fully reflect the implications of recent significant 
declines in the cost of renewable energy sources. The 
role and potential of non-state and subnational actors is 
assessed in chapter 5, while chapter 7 discusses the role 
of innovation policy and market creation. 
2.4.2  Emissions trends and targets of individual 
G20 members15 
Argentina’s revised NDC introduced at COP 22 in 2016 
presents an unconditional GHG emissions target of 483 
MtCO2e/year by 2030 and a further conditional target of 
369 MtCO2e/year (Government of Argentina, 2016). If the 
unconditional target is met, emissions would increase 
by 19 percent above 2010 levels in 2030. The current 
policies scenario projected by Climate Action Tracker for 
2030 (CAT, 2018b) was lowered by about 5 percent from 
its projection in 2016. Nevertheless, Argentina is likely 
to miss its NDC targets if it does not change its current 
policies (Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable 
Development Argentina, 2015). 
To help achieve its NDC targets, the Government of 
Argentina established a National Cabinet for Climate 
Change to facilitate discussions and agreements 
between 17 ministries on policies and measures to be 
implemented relating to the targets. These discussions 
have resulted in the development of mitigation action 
plans for the energy, forestry and transport sectors, 
with plans for industry, infrastructure and agriculture 
to be introduced shortly. The action on implementing 
renewable energy in Argentina’s energy mix is particularly 
notable and is supported by 2 laws, one promoting 
renewable energy and implemented primarily through 
the RenovAr programme (which auctions renewable 
power capacity) and the other introducing distributed 
generation (though implementation is pending detailed 
ruling). The entire package of unconditional actions 
in sectoral plans is expected to reduce emissions by 
approximately 110 MtCO2e/year by 2030 compared with 
the baseline. The success of these mitigation actions in 
achieving the 2030 unconditional NDC target depends on 
several factors, including the opposition of civil society 
to the construction of two mega hydroelectric dams in 
Patagonia and to two new nuclear power plants, and the 
country’s recurrent financial constraints to sustain the 
implementation of some actions, such as the RenovAr 
program.
15 For a more comprehensive assessment of climate change mitigation policies including sector- and technology-specific policies in G20 countries, see, for example, Climate 
Transparency (2017).  
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Under its Cancun pledge, Australia proposed 3 targets 
for 2020 with different conditions: 5 percent, 15 percent 
and 25 percent below emission levels in 2000. The goal 
of 5 percent currently stands as Australia’s unconditional 
pledge. In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, Australia 
uses a carbon budget approach that accounts for 
cumulative emissions between 2013 and 2020 in order 
to assess progress against its pledge. For the budget 
period, Australia is on track to overachieve its 2020 
target by 166 MtCO2e without including carry-over from 
the Kyoto Protocol’s 1st commitment period and by 294 
MtCO2e with carry-over (Department of the Environment 
and Energy, 2017b). Independent studies consider the 
year 2020 in isolation and find Australia’s current policy 
trajectory close to achieving its target.
In its NDC, Australia announced a 26–28 percent 
reduction below 2005 levels of GHG emissions by 2030 
(UNFCCC, 2016). There has been no improvement in 
Australia’s climate policy since 2017 and emission levels 
for 2030 are projected to be well above the NDC target. 
The latest projection published by the government shows 
that emissions would remain at high levels rather than 
reducing in line with the 2030 target (Department of 
the Environment and Energy, 2017a; CAT, 2018c). The 
Emissions Reduction Fund, which aims to purchase 
emissions reductions at the lowest available cost 
through auctions, and its safeguard mechanism are the 
main existing policies.
Brazil’s Cancun pledge aims to reduce GHG emissions 
in 2020 by 36.1–38.9 percent compared with business 
as usual and its NDC target aims to reduce emissions 
to 1.3 GtCO2e/year by 2025 with the emission level 
dropping to 1.2 GtCO2e/year by 2030 (37 percent and 
43 percent below 2005 levels respectively). Recent 
independent studies suggest that current policy scenario 
projections are well below the Cancun pledge level and in 
line with the NDC targets (Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi 
et al., 2017a; CAT, 2018d). GHG emission projections 
have been revised downward compared with previous 
year’s (referenced in the 2017 Emissions Gap Report). 
Uncertainty remains about the future of the country’s 
GHG emissions growth. For example, emissions from 
LULUCF reduced by 86 percent between 2005 and 2012 
(Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, 2016), 
but recent data and analyses suggest that the decreasing 
trend for deforestation and the resulting reductions in 
GHG emissions have slowed down or even stopped 
(Azevedo et al., 2018). In fact, the recent political crisis 
in the country has forced a weak government to concede 
reversals in environmental regulation as a bargaining 
chip to maintain power, which may potentially impact 
GHG emissions from land use as well as Brazil’s 
contribution towards global climate targets (Rochedo 
et al., 2018). The newly elected president of Brazil 
has indicated that he wants to limit environmental 
constraints on agriculture.
In February 2018, the National Congress approved 
the National Biofuels Policy (RenovaBio – Decree No. 
9.308), which seeks to boost the use of renewable 
fuels and expand its share in the energy mix. Recent 
electricity auctions have targeted solar energy, signalling 
a potential increase in solar capacity in the country in 
the coming years. Existing contracts for solar electricity 
in operation and under construction total around 4 GW 
nominal capacity (CCEE, 2018).
Canada pledged to reduce its economy-wide GHG 
emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 
and 30 percent by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2014; UNFCCC, 
2016). Canada could achieve its 2020 target under a 
low economic growth scenario, but it is not likely to 
achieve its NDC target (Government of Canada, 2017; 
CAT, 2018e). However, recent analysis suggests that 
Canada’s emissions will be 4–6 percent lower in 2030 
than projected in 2016, suggesting that progress is being 
made towards the target (Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi 
et al., 2017a; PBL, 2017; CAT, 2018e). In October 2017, 
Canada published regulations to phase down the 
production and consumption of HFCs in accordance 
with the Kigali Amendment. Canada is also planning 
a federal carbon pricing backstop system to enforce 
carbon pricing in provinces that have not implemented 
a provincial system by the end of 2018 (Government of 
Canada, 2017).
China pledged to reduce the intensity of CO2 emissions 
by 40–45 percent by 2020 and its NDC includes 4 major 
targets for 2030: (1) peak CO2 emissions around 2030, 
making best efforts to peak earlier; (2) reduce the carbon 
intensity of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 60–65 
percent from 2005 levels; (3) increase the share of non-
fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 
20 percent; and (4) increase the forest stock volume 
by around 4.5 billion m3 from 2005 levels. Independent 
studies, including those recently published (Sha et al., 
2015; den Elzen et al., 2016; IEA, 2017; CAT, 2018f), 
suggest that China will likely achieve emission level 
targets in line with its Cancun pledges and NDC targets. 
Recent independent studies (Kitous et al., 2017; 
Kuramochi et al., 2017a; CAT, 2018f) have revised their 
emissions projections down compared with previous 
years (UNEP, 2017), but do not strongly suggest that CO2 
emissions will peak before 2030. Contrastingly, other 
recent studies argue that recent structural shifts in the 
economy are likely to result in much steeper reductions 
in CO2 intensity of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Green 
and Stern (2017) provide an illustrative pathway in which 
intensity is halved from 2005 to 2020, resulting in peaked 
CO2 emissions between 2020 and 2025. Guan et al. 
(2018) also conclude that the decline of CO2 emissions in 
China is structural and is likely to be sustained if recently 
started transitions of industrial and energy systems 
continue.
China announced a new national emissions trading 
system in December 2017, which is expected to be 
fully operational by 2020. Initially, the system will apply 
only to the power sector, but may be expanded to other 
sectors in the future. The system’s overall impact on 
CO2 emissions is currently unclear, as many operational 
details are yet to be shared, including the start date and 
the level and distribution of emissions allowances. It is 
estimated that the full scheme will cover 5 GtCO2/year 
when it includes both the power and industrial sectors, 
and 3–3.5 GtCO2/year when only applied to the power 
sector as planned for the first few years (NewClimate 
Institute, PBL and IIASA, 2018). Further features of 
China’s national emissions trading system are described 
in Jotzo et al. (2018). The National Development and 
Reform Commission announced it will reduce steel 
capacity by around 30 million tonnes and coal output by 
about 150 million tonnes in 2018, thus achieving its Five-
Year Plan targets ahead of the original target year 2020. 
In its Cancun pledge, the EU28 committed to reducing 
GHG emissions by 20 percent below 1990 levels by 
2020, which it is expected to overachieve. In its NDC, 
the EU has put forward a binding, economy-wide target 
of reducing domestic GHG emissions by 40 percent 
below 1990 levels by 2030. Recent independent studies, 
including (CAT, 2018g), the European Environment 
Agency Trends and Projections Report (European 
Environment Agency, 2017) and the EU Reference 
Scenario (European Commission, 2016b), suggest that 
the EU will fall slightly short of its NDC target under 
existing policies. The EU recognizes that it is not on 
track to meet its 2030 target with current policies and 
has adopted a large package of measures aimed at 
accelerating the reduction of GHG emissions in different 
areas. The impact of these adopted measures is not 
included in the analysis of the studies cited above. More 
specifically, the revision of the EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) for 2021–2030 was adopted in March 
2018, encompassing 3 key elements: (1) reducing the 
cap at an annual rate of 2.2 percent from 2021 onwards; 
(2) doubling the Market Stability Reserve feeding rate 
between 2019 and 2023 to reduce surplus of allowances; 
and (3) invalidating allowances in the Market Stability 
Reserve exceeding the number of allowances auctioned 
in the previous year from 2023 onwards (Council of the 
European Union, 2017b). The provisionally agreed Effort 
Sharing Regulation applying to GHG emissions from 
sectors not covered by EU ETS (transport, buildings, 
agriculture and waste management) was adopted 
in May 2018. The overall targeted reduction in GHG 
emissions from these sectors is 30 percent by 2030, 
relative to 2005, which is to be achieved by legally 
binding annual emission limits for each Member State 
for the 2021–2030 period (Council of the European 
Union, 2017c). The EU has also adopted a regulation to 
integrate GHG emissions and removals from LULUCF 
into the 2030 climate and energy framework (European 
Parliament, 2018) and proposals to amend the Energy 
Efficiency Directive and the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive (European Commission, 2016a; 
Council of the European Union, 2017a). By June 2018, the 
Governance of the Energy Union Regulation was agreed, 
which sets out the trajectory and interim targets for 
achieving the recently agreed 2030 goals of 32 percent 
renewable energy and 32.5 percent energy savings and 
requirements for regular progress reports.
India’s Cancun pledge aims to reduce the emissions 
intensity of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 20–25 
percent below 2005 levels in 2020. In its NDC, India 
commits to reducing its emissions intensity of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by 33–35 percent below 2005 
levels by 2030, increasing the share of non-fossil energy 
in total power generation capacity to 40 percent (with 
help of international support), and creating an additional 
cumulative carbon sink of 2.5–3 GtCO2e through forest 
and tree cover. These translate into emission levels of 
4.4–7.5 GtCO2e/year and 4.2–5.9 GtCO2e/year in 2030 
for the unconditional and conditional NDCs respectively. 
With its currently implemented policies, India is likely to 
achieve its Cancun pledge and conditional NDC targets 
(IEA, 2017; Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2017a; 
Mitra et al., 2017; PBL, 2017; Vishwanathan and Garg, 
2017; CAT, 2018h; Dubash et al., 2018). Dubash et al. 
(2018) reviewed several studies and found that India’s 
NDC intensity pledge is consistent with current (circa 
2015) policies. Recent analysis by The Energy and 
Resources Institute (TERI) (COMMIT, 2018) indicates 
that India is also likely to meet and even overachieve its 
emissions intensity reduction target. 
Several recently proposed initiatives have the potential 
to contribute significantly towards this target. Of major 
relevance are the actions that are likely to be undertaken 
under the National Solar Mission, the programmes 
implemented under the National Mission for Enhanced 
Energy Efficiency such as the Perform, Achieve and 
Trade scheme and the Standards and Labelling scheme, 
and the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of (Hybrid 
&) Electric Vehicles initiative adopted in April 2018. 
However, there are considerable uncertainties regarding 
the scale and pace of adopting various technologies 
such as electric vehicles and renewable-based power 
generation. The scale-up and adoption of these options 
depends on how quickly technology and battery costs 
can attain commercial viability and become the preferred 
alternatives.
In its Cancun pledge, Indonesia pledges an unconditional 
26 percent and a conditional 41 percent reduction 
below business as usual GHG emissions by 2020. 
Similarly, its NDC sets an unconditional 29 percent and 
a conditional 41 percent (with sufficient international 
support) reduction target below business as usual for 
GHG emissions by 2030. The NDC includes emissions 
from deforestation and peat land destruction, which 
are the country’s largest sources of GHG emissions. 
There is large uncertainty on the GHG emission level of 
Indonesia’s Cancun pledge due to the business as usual 
emission data used. Studies, including those recently 
published (Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2017; CAT 
2018) do not agree on whether the Cancun pledge and 
NDC targets are likely to be met under policies currently 
implemented. Two recent studies (Kitous et al., 2017; 
CAT 2018i), both excluding LULUCF, suggest that the 
conditional NDC may be achieved, while Kuramochi et al. 
(2017) project that Indonesia will fall short of achieving 
its Cancun pledge and unconditional NDC target, partially 
due to large growth in emissions from LULUCF. 
Japan is committed to reducing its GHG emissions by 
3.8 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and 26 percent 
below 2013 levels by 2030. Recent studies (Kitous et 
al., 2017) project that Japan will overachieve its 2020 
pledge due to low growth in electricity demand since 
2012. Japan may reach its 2030 NDC target with existing 
policies, but uncertainty over future nuclear and coal 
power remains (CAT, 2018g). Compared with previous 
year’s projections, the 2017 update from the EU Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) (Kitous et al., 2017) projected 7.5 
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percent lower emissions in 2030, while latest projections 
from the Climate Action Tracker only changed marginally 
(CAT, 2018g). 
In July 2018, the new Basic Energy Plan was adopted 
by the Cabinet (METI, 2018). While the plan did not 
revise the electricity mix target underlying the NDC, it 
now refers to renewables as ‘main power sources’ of 
the future, which suggests a positive policy shift from 
the 2014 plan. Another positive sign from the new Basic 
Energy Plan is that for the first time it mentions phasing-
out old, inefficient coal-fired power plants, though it 
continues to promote high-efficiency coal-fired power 
plants. 
Mexico’s NDC makes an unconditional commitment to 
reduce GHG emissions by 22 percent below business as 
usual in 2030, implying a net emissions peak from 2026, 
and a conditional commitment to reduce emissions by 
36 percent below business as usual in 2030. Mexico’s 
NDC also addresses black carbon emissions (UNFCCC, 
2015). Studies disagree on whether Mexico is likely to 
meet its 2020 pledge (30 percent below business as 
usual) or NDC targets under current policies (Kuramochi 
et al., 2017a; CAT, 2018j). Recent Climate Action Tracker 
projections for 2030 are 1–4 percent lower than levels 
projected a year ago (CAT, 2018j). 
By the end of 2017, Mexico’s National Institute of 
Ecology and Climate Change (INECC) had assessed the 
advancement of the Special Climate Change Program 
2013–2018 (PECC by its Spanish acronym), which is the 
Mexican federal administration’s instrument for climate 
action. The assessment noted that only 43 percent of the 
programmed climate actions for the 2013–2018 period 
were completed (INECC, 2017) and that they reduced 
emissions by 30 MtCO2e, a third of what the government 
expected for the period. Furthermore, there are no 
mechanisms in place to effectively monitor mitigation 
actions of subnational governments and private sector 
companies, hindering the tracking of the climate efforts. 
Mexico updated its General Climate Change Law in late 
2017 to create a mandatory carbon market from 2018 
with a 3 year pilot phase (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente 
y Recursos Naturales, 2017). Moreover, the update also 
incorporated a mandate for the country to contribute to 
the fulfilment of the Paris Agreement.
The new federal government (2018–2024) has 
recognized the importance of the Paris Agreement and 
of increasing the proportion of renewable energy in 
the electricity mix. However, tensions are anticipated 
between the energy outlook (with a significant share of 
fossil fuels) and the expected emission reduction targets 
which will increase the NDC ambition.
In its NDC, the Republic of Korea has committed to 
reducing its GHG emissions by 37 percent below 
business as usual by 2030 (Ministry of Environment, 
2018). The Government of Korea set up a road map in 
2016 to achieve the national GHG emissions reduction 
target for 2030, which specifies emissions projections, 
reduction targets and major emission reduction plans 
for 8 sectors (Government of the Republic of Korea, 
2017), though there is limited information about the 
implementation status of these sector-level plans. 
In June 2018, the road map was amended to reduce 
reliance on overseas credits from 11.3 percent to 
4.5 percent (Ministry of Environment, 2018). Recent 
independent analyses (CAT, 2017a; PBL, 2017) indicate 
that the emission projections under current policies 
may fall short of the NDC emission level target. While 
the country has not rescinded its pledge to the UNFCCC 
for 2020, it has amended its Green Growth Basic Act to 
replace the 2020 pledge with the NDC target for 2030 
(National Law Information Center, 2016).
In 2017, President Moon Jae-in announced that the 
Republic of Korea will reduce its dependency on 
coal-fired and nuclear power generation (Cheong 
Wa Dae, 2017; MOTIE, MOE and MOLIT, 2017), while 
increasing renewable electricity. Following this, the 
government adopted a new Basic Plan for Long-Term 
Electricity Supply and Demand covering the next 15 
years, confirming the country intends to produce more 
electricity from renewable energy sources, while reducing 
its use of coal and nuclear power (CAT, 2018n; Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Energy, 2018). This plan may 
result in an electricity generation mix in 2030 that is 23.9 
percent nuclear, 36.1 percent coal, 18.8 percent natural 
gas and 20 percent renewable energy. Analysis indicates 
that these announcements, if fully implemented, together 
with the expected lower level of electricity demand, may 
lead to reductions of 53–69 MtCO2e/year (7–9 percent) 
below current policies scenario projections in 2030. 
However, this is not enough for the country to achieve its 
NDC target (CAT, 2018n). 
Russia pledged to limit GHG emissions by 15–25 
percent below 1990 levels by 2020 and proposed in its 
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) 
to reduce GHG emissions by 25–30 percent below 
1990 levels by 2030. Although Russia has reaffirmed 
its 2020 target in subsequently adopted policies, it had 
not ratified the Paris Agreement as at August 2018 and 
is the only major emitter that has not done so. While 
accounting of emissions from LULUCF remains unclear, 
provisions in the INDC suggest that its target includes 
these emissions. Recently published studies (Kuramochi 
et al., 2017a; CAT, 2018k) suggest that under current 
policies, Russia is likely to meet its 2020 pledge and 
reach the lower end of its 2030 INDC range. In July 2017, 
the Government of Russia introduced a plan to reform 
all existing federal laws concerning energy generation 
facilities to include renewable energy microgeneration 
for facilities with installed capacity up to 15 kW 
(Government of Russia, 2017; Ministry of Environment 
and Natural Resources, 2017). 
In its NDC, Saudi Arabia commits to reducing emissions 
by up to 130 MtCO2e/year by 2030 through actions that 
contribute to economic diversification and adaptation. 
The baseline for this NDC target has not been 
communicated as at August 2018, due to unresolved 
questions on the allocation of oil production to domestic 
consumption or export. Under current policies, Saudi 
Arabia is expected to achieve GHG emission levels 
of 1,115–1,175 MtCO2e/year by 2030 (CAT, 2018l). 
According to these projections, Saudi Arabia will clearly 
miss its NDC emissions levels of 940–1,120 MtCO2e/
year by 2030, quantified using a baseline range (the 
lower end based on European Commission’s Joint 
Research Center and the upper end based on King 
Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) 
(2014), see Kuramochi et al. (2017a)). Starting in January 
2018, Saudi Arabia implemented an economy-wide 5 
percent VAT on fossil fuels (Nereim, 2017). However, 
the government announced a delay in fossil fuel price 
reforms in December 2017 by slowing down the pace of 
energy subsidy cuts (Toumi, 2017). 
In its Cancun pledge, South Africa aims to reduce 
its GHG emissions by 34 percent below business as 
usual in 2020 and in its NDC commits to achieving a 
“peak, plateau and decline” of greenhouse emissions, 
peaking between 2020 and 2025 and plateauing at 
398–614 MtCO2e/year between 2025 and 2030. Recently 
published studies (Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi et al., 
2017a; CAT, 2018m) indicate that under current policies, 
South Africa may just meet the upper end of its Cancun 
pledge range, but will miss its NDC target by emitting 
650–770 MtCO2e/year in 2030. In February 2018, the 
proposed Carbon Tax Bill entered the parliamentary 
process after 2 years of consultations. After further 
parliamentary hearings and revisions, the final draft 
was expected to be completed by mid-2018 (EY, 2017; 
Republic of South Africa, 2017; Ensor, 2018), though 
it is yet to be released. The Department of Energy 
released its update of the Integrated Resource Plan 
(IRP) (Department of Energy, 2018) on future energy 
supply planning in August 2018 for public comments 
until November 2018. The plan’s update proposes to 
decommission 12 GW of old coal power plants by 2030, 
while increasing gas, wind and solar generation capacity. 
First estimates suggest that the proposed update, if 
implemented, would allow South Africa to meet the upper 
range of its NDC target by 2030 (CAT, 2018m).
Turkey submitted its INDC on 30 September 2015, with a 
target to reduce GHG emissions up to 21 percent below 
business as usual in 2030 (Republic of Turkey Ministry 
of Environment and Urbanization, 2016). With currently 
implemented policies, Turkey is expected to achieve 
GHG emission levels of 959–1,075 MtCO2e/year in 
2030 (excluding LULUCF). The lower estimate is based 
on both planned and current policies. According to an 
independent analysis based on government projections, 
current policies are insufficient to meet Turkey’s INDC 
and the country has an ongoing investment in expanding 
coal power production (CAT, 2017b). 
The United States of America set a 2020 target to  
reduce GHG emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels 
in 2020 (UNFCCC, 2014) and committed to reducing 
emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 
in its NDC (UNFCCC, 2016). However, under President 
Donald Trump, the USA has communicated its intent 
to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, unless it can 
identify suitable terms for reengagement, and to cease 
implementation of its NDC (The Representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations, 2017). In 
October 2017, the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) proposed to repeal the Clean Power Plan (US EPA, 
2017), which would have required states to meet CO2 
emission standards for electricity generation. In April 
2018, EPA announced that it would revise GHG emission 
standards for cars and light trucks (US EPA, 2018). 17 
states led by California have filed a lawsuit to prevent 
these rollbacks (State of California, 2018). In January 
2018, the USA increased tariffs on imported solar cells 
and modules by 30 percent (The Executive Office of the 
President 2018).
Under currently implemented policies, the USA is unlikely 
to meet its NDC target for 2025 and it is uncertain 
whether it will meet its 2020 target (Kuramochi et al., 
2017b; CAT, 2018o; Larsen et al., 2018), though action 
by non-state and subnational actors in the country could 
contribute significantly to reducing future emissions 
(Kuramochi et al., 2017c). A range of studies find 
that given policy rollbacks, GHG emissions in 2025 
will be between 0.8–1.9 GtCO2e/year higher than had 
the NDC been achieved (Fransen and Levin, 2017). 
However, despite federal efforts to weaken emission 
standards and other policies, recent analysis projects 
that GHG emissions in 2030 will be 3–8 percent lower 
than projections made in 2017 (Kitous et al., 2017; 
Kuramochi et al., 2017a; PBL, 2017; CAT, 2018o), partially 
due to a higher projected share of gas and renewables 
in electricity generation (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2018). There will be a time lag between 
policy rollbacks and their impact on emission levels.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an update of the emissions gap 
in 2030. In line with previous reports, the emissions 
gap is defined as the difference between where global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are heading under the 
current Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and 
where science indicates emissions should be in 2030 
to be on a least-cost path towards limiting warming to 
below 2°C or further to 1.5°C. The 2018 assessment 
draws on several new studies that present updated 
NDC estimates and additional low emission scenarios 
in line with achieving the climate objective of the Paris 
Agreement. 
The chapter starts with an introduction to the scenarios 
that have been used and the updates made (section 
3.2). This is followed by an updated assessment of the 
emissions gap in 2030 (section 3.3), which builds on an 
updated assessment of emission levels in 2030, under 
current policies, NDCs and emission levels consistent 
with least-cost mitigation pathways to below 2°C to 
1.5°C. The chapter then provides an update on the 
implications of temperatures projections anticipated 
under current NDCs (section 3.4), concluding with an 
analysis of the effects of higher or lower emissions in 
2030 (section 3.5)
3.2 Scenarios considered and updates made
The emissions gap assessment draws on three main 
types of scenarios of total global GHG emissions in 
the future: reference scenarios, NDC scenarios and 
least-cost mitigation scenarios consistent with specific 
temperature targets (see UNEP, 2016, 2017). Each of 
these scenarios and the updates made since the 2017 
Emissions Gap Report are described below.
3.2.1 Reference scenarios and updates
Reference scenarios are useful benchmarks against 
which progress in emission reductions can be tracked. 
Two reference scenarios are considered: the no-policy 
baseline and current policy scenarios. The no-policy 
baseline scenario explores the trend of global GHG 
emissions in the absence of climate policies post-
2005. It is based on mean projections of 179 baseline 
scenarios assessed in the 5th Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
(Clarke et al., 2014). Recently, new no-policy baselines 
have been published, though these have not resulted in 
significant changes to the no-policy baseline scenario 
estimates (Riahi et al., 2017; Luderer et al., 2018). 
The current policy scenario estimates future global GHG 
emissions, assuming that all currently adopted and 
implemented policies (defined as legislative decisions, 
executive orders or equivalent) have been realized and 
that no additional measures are to be undertaken. The 
scenario is based on the country analyses in chapter 
2 and updated global analyses that use new data from 
eight modelling groups. These include updated analyses 
from the four modelling groups considered in the 2017 
Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2017), namely, the Climate 
Action Tracker (CAT, 2018), the Joint Research Centre 
(Kitous et al., 2017), PBL Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (Kuramochi et al., 2017; PBL, 2018) 
and the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2017). 
3.2.2 NDC scenarios and updates
NDC scenarios are used to estimate what the total 
global GHG emissions would be in 2030 if countries 
fully implemented their pledged contributions. Following 
previous Emissions Gap Reports, two NDC scenarios 
are considered: the unconditional and conditional NDC 
scenarios.
Under the unconditional NDC scenario, it is assumed that 
countries only implement mitigation-related actions of 
their NDCs that have no conditions attached. Countries 
that do not have an NDC or have only included a 
conditional target are assumed to follow a current policy 
scenario instead. Under the conditional NDC scenario, it 
is assumed that countries implement both conditional 
and unconditional mitigation actions of their NDCs. 
Countries without an NDC are assumed to follow a 
current policy scenario and those without a conditional 
target follow the unconditional scenario.
Global emission projections from 15 modelling groups 
are considered for the two NDC scenarios. These 
projections include five new model estimates with full 
GHG coverage and 10 modelling groups from the 2017 
Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2017). Appendix A.1, which 
is available online, provides a full overview of the studies 
considered for the current policy and NDC scenarios.
3.2.3 Least-cost mitigation scenarios consistent 
with the Paris Agreement’s temperature 
limits and updates following the IPCC 
Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C
Compared with previous Emissions Gap Reports, two 
major changes have been made to the 2018 assessment 
of global GHG emission levels in 2030 that are in line 
with least-cost pathways to limit warming to below 2°C 
or 1.5°C. As section 3.3 shows, these updates have 
implications for the estimated emissions gap in 2030, 
particularly for the 1.5°C target.
The 2018 assessment builds on the new scenario 
database compiled in the context of the IPCC Special 
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (Huppmann et al., 
2018a, 2018b). Whereas 16 scenarios were available 
in 2017, 85 scenarios for 1.5°C and 2°C pathways are 
available this year.1 This expansion has enhanced the 
diversity of available scenarios that are consistent with 
the stringent temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. In 
particular, recent scenarios often set a lower maximum 
potential for carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which results 
in deeper emissions reductions over the next decades to 
stay within the same overall carbon budget (see section 
3.5.1)2.
The second major update concerns the method for 
grouping pathways. Previous Emissions Gap Reports 
used a simple climate model to estimate the temperature 
outcome of pathways, which were then used to group 
and describe various pathway classes. This year’s 
assessment still groups pathways as a function of their 
estimated temperature outcome, but uses the pathways’ 
cumulative CO2 emissions as a simpler proxy. The 
rationale behind this is that a nearly linear relationship 
exists between the total amount of anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions released into the atmosphere and the 
increase in global mean temperature (Allen et al., 2009; 
Matthews et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009; Zickfeld 
et al., 2009; Collins et al., 2013. See also UNEP, 2014), 
meaning that warming under a specific future pathway 
can be estimated from its cumulative CO2 emissions. 
Alternatively, if a certain temperature limit is set, a 
corresponding consistent carbon (CO2) budget can be 
calculated. The linear relationship also implies that CO2 
emissions need to become net zero at the global scale 
if warming is to be kept below any level (Matthews et 
al., 2012; Knutti and Rogelj, 2015). Achieving global net 
zero emissions means that CDR will compensate for any 
remaining human-related CO2 emissions. 
The use of the cumulative CO2 emission proxy for 
grouping pathways has the advantage of linking more 
directly to the discussions on emissions pathways under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). It also facilitates future updates 
and improvements in understanding how the climate 
responds to anthropogenic GHG emissions. 
Based on these updates, pathways are grouped in 
three temperature scenario groups, according to their 
maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018 
onwards. These three scenario groups provide a more 
nuanced overview of pathways that keep warming 
below 2°C to 1.5°C and also help to identify the 
consequences of strengthened action at various degrees 
of ambition: from limiting warming to 2°C, over potential 
interpretations of ‘well below 2°C’, to pursuits to limit 
warming to 1.5°C and the corresponding emission 
reductions (see table 3.1). Each scenario considers 
least-cost climate change mitigation pathways that start 
reductions from 2020 and follow the climate model and 
set-up used in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (see box 
3.1).
• Below 2°C scenario: This scenario limits 
maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018 
until the time net zero CO2 emissions are reached 
(or until 2100 if net -zero is not reached before) 
to between 900 and 1,300 GtCO2, and cumulative 
2018-2100 emissions to at most 1,200 GtCO2. It is 
consistent with limiting end-of-century warming 
to below about 2.0°C with about 66 percent or 
greater probability, while limiting peak global 
warming during the 21st century to below 2.1°C 
with about 66 percent or greater probability.
•  Below 1.8°C scenario: This scenario limits 
maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018 
until the time net zero CO2 emissions are reached 
(or until 2100 if net-zero is not reached before) 
to between 600 and 900 GtCO2, and cumulative 
2018-2100 emissions to at most 900 GtCO2. It is 
consistent with limiting peak and end-of-century 
warming to below about 1.8°C with about 66 
percent or greater probability. 
•  Below 1.5°C in 2100 scenario: This scenario 
limits maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 
2018 until the time net zero CO2 emissions are 
reached (all model realizations in this scenario 
reach net zero before 2100) to below 600 GtCO2, 
and cumulative 2018-2100 emissions to at most 
380 GtCO2, when net negative CO2 emissions in 
the second half of the century are included. It is 
consistent with limiting global warming to below 
1.5°C in 2100 with about 66 percent probability, 
while limiting peak global warming during the 21st 
century to between 1.6°C and 1.7°C with about 66 
percent or greater probability. This scenario group 
is consistent with scenarios in the IPCC Special 
Report that limit warming to 1.5°C with no or 
limited overshoot.
1 These include several model-intercomparison studies from the ADVANCE project (Luderer et al., 2018; Vrontisi et al., 2018), CD-LINKS (McCollum et al., 2018), EMF-33 (Bauer 
et al., 2018) and Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018), as well as a number of individual model studies focusing on various aspects 
of climate stabilization in the 1.5°C to 2°C range (Bertram et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018; Kriegler et al., 2018; Strefler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018).
2 For more information, see the Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018).
Box 3.1 Uncertainties surrounding 
carbon budgets and corresponding 
temperature limits
Carbon budgets in line with a specific 
temperature limit have an uncertainty 
range to which various factors contribute, 
including the proportionality factor between 
cumulative CO2 emissions and the increase in 
global mean temperature (Gillett et al., 2013; 
Matthews et al., 2017) and the contribution 
of non-CO2 forcers (Rogelj et al., 2016b). Due 
to this, IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report (IPCC, 
2014) indicated a variation in the carbon 
budget (from 1870 onwards) for limiting 
warming to 2°C of about 1,250 GtCO2 (range 
of 33–66 percent, with a median estimate 
of slightly above 3,000 GtCO2). As past and 
ongoing emissions continue reducing the 
remaining carbon budget, these uncertainties 
become more important in relative terms 
(Peters, 2018). 
Recent studies have attempted to reduce 
these uncertainties, for example, by using 
a more recent reference period to express 
carbon budget estimates, such as 2006–
2015 instead of pre-industrial times (see, 
for example, Millar et al., 2017; Tokarska 
and Gillett, 2018). Although this approach 
eliminates some uncertainties that have 
accumulated over the historical period, it 
comes with caveats and limitations, which 
result in higher carbon budgets compared 
with estimated provided in the IPCC 5th 
Assessment Report (Pfleiderer et al., 2018). 
The choice of method to estimate warming 
until the present is an important contributor 
to these higher budget estimates. Recent 
research also showed that Earth system 
feedbacks could cause additional warming, 
both during (Comyn-Platt et al., 2018; Lowe 
et al., 2018) and beyond the 21st century 
(Fischer et al., 2018). This new literature on 
additional feedbacks therefore suggests that 
carbon budgets consistent with warming of 
1.5°C or 2°C may be approximately 100 GtCO2 
smaller.
Although this report groups scenarios based 
on their cumulative CO2 emissions, it also 
uses the climate model and set-up used in the 
IPCC 5th Assessment Report (Meinshausen et 
al., 2011; Clarke et al., 2014) for comparability 
with earlier reports. 
Box 3.2 Technical comparison with 
the IPCC Special Report on Global 
Warming of 1.5°C
The analysis included in this chapter is 
consistent with the latest assessment of the 
IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 
1.5°C (IPCC, 2018). The range of Kyoto-GHG 
emissions in 2030 consistent with limiting 
warming to 1.5°C used in this report (24 
GtCO2e/year with a range of 22–30 GtCO2e/
year) is consistent with the 25–30 GtCO2e/
year range reported in the recent IPCC 
Special Report (IPCC, 2018) for scenarios 
limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or 
limited overshoot. Differences are attributed 
to the exclusive use of scenarios that start 
emissions reductions from 2020 onwards 
in this report, compared with a wider set in 
the IPCC Special Report. Overall, these minor 
changes do not affect the assessment of 
the adequacy of current NDCs for limiting 
warming to 1.5°C or well below 2°C.
From 2018 to the time of reaching net 
zero, the below 1.5°C by 2100 scenario has 
cumulative CO2 emissions of less than 600 
GtCO2. This broadly corresponds to the 
remaining carbon budget for limiting warming 
to 1.5°C with 50 percent probability (580 
GtCO2 from 2018 to the time of reaching net 
zero) of the IPCC Special Report, limiting 
temperature overshoot to less than 0.1°C. 
Cumulative CO2 emissions until the end of 
the century for any available below 1.5°C by 
2100 scenario are at most 380 GtCO2, which 
is less than the remaining carbon budget of 
420 GtCO2 for limiting warming to 1.5°C with 
66 percent probability of the IPCC Special 
Report. Maximum cumulative CO2 emissions 
for the below 1.8°C scenario are 900 GtCO2 
from 2018 to the time of reaching net zero. 
Using the IPCC Special Report assessment, 
this 900 GtCO2 equates to a 66 percent 
probability of limiting warming to about 
1.8°C. This also corresponds to about a 50 
percent probability of limiting warming to 
1.7°C. For the below 2°C scenario, maximum 
cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018 to the 
time of reaching net zero are 1,300 GtCO2 and 
from 2018 to 2100 are 1,200 GtCO2. Using the 
IPCC Special Report assessment, this 1,200 
GtCO2 equates to keeping warming below 2°C 
with at least 66 percent probability by 2100, 
though there is a slightly lower probability 
at peak warming during the century. This 
suggest that the probability of limiting 
warming to 1.9°C is about 50 percent.
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3.3 The emissions gap in 2030 
The emissions gap for 2030 is defined as the difference 
between global total GHG emissions from least-cost 
scenarios that are consistent with the 2°C and 1.5°C 
temperature limits and the estimated total global GHG 
emissions resulting from full implementation of NDCs. 
To allow for a more nuanced interpretation of the Paris 
Agreement’s temperature targets, this assessment 
includes a below 1.8°C scenario. This section updates 
the gap based on estimated levels of GHG emissions in 
2030 for the scenarios described in section 3.2. Table 3.1 
provides a full overview of 2030 emission levels for all 
seven scenarios considered in this assessment, as well 
as the resulting emissions gap. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
emissions gap in 2030.
Table 3.1 indicates that in the absence of further climate 
action since 2005, that is, under a no-policy baseline 
scenario, the total global GHG emissions in 2030 would 
be 65 GtCO2e (range of 60–70 GtCO2e). Current policies 
are estimated to reduce global emissions in 2030 by 
around 6 GtCO2e compared with the no-policy scenario. 
There are no substantive updates to these estimates 
compared with the 2017 assessment. The median 
current policy estimate for 2018 is roughly 0.5 GtCO2e 
lower than the 2017 estimate, which is within rounding 
precision. The lower and upper limit of the range for 
the current policy estimate has decreased by 2 GtCO2e 
and 1 GtCO2e respectively due to lower projections 
(see chapter 2, section 2.4). Overall, this implies that 
studies have not identified significant and unambiguous 
progress in the implementation of policies that would 
allow the NDCs to be achieved by 2030. However, 
the estimates of global emissions in 2030 under the 
current policy scenario have decreased slightly since 
2015, from 60 GtCO2e (range of 58–62 GtCO2e) (UNEP, 
2015) to 59 GtCO2e (range of 56–60 GtCO2e) in 2018, 
indicating that some studies show slight progress in 
policy implementation since the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement. 
Table 3.1: Total global greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile 
range), temperature implications and the resulting emissions gap.
Scenario
(rounded to 
the nearest 
gigatonne)
Number 
of 
scenarios 
in set
Global total 
emissions 
in 2030
[GtCO2e]
Estimated temperature outcomes Emissions Gap in 2030
[GtCO2e] 
50%  
chance
66%  
chance
90%  
chance
Below  
2°C 
Below 
1.8°C
Below 
1.5°C  
in 2100
No-policy 
baseline 179 65 (60–70)
Current policy 4 59 (56–60) 18 (16–20) 24 (22–25) 35 (32–36)
Unconditional 
NDCs 12 56 (52–58) 15 (12–17) 21 (17–23) 32 (28–34)
Conditional 
NDCs 10 53 (49–55) 13 (9–15) 19 (15–20) 29 (26–31)
Below 2.0°C  
(66% chance) 29 40 (38–45)
Peak: 
1.7–1.8°C
In 2100:  
1.6–1.7°C
Peak:
1.9–2.0°C
In 2100:
1.8–1.9°C
Peak:
2.4–2.6°C
In 2100:
2.3–2.5°C
Below 1.8°C  
(66% chance) 43 34 (30–40)
Peak:
1.6–1.7°C 
In 2100:
1.3–1.6°C
Peak:
1.7–1.8°C
In 2100:
1.5–1.7°C
Peak:
2.1–2.3°C
In 2100:
1.9–2.2°C
Below 1.5°C in 
2100  
(66% chance) 
13 24 (22–30)
Peak:
1.5–1.6°C 
In 2100:
1.2–1.3°C
Peak:
1.6–1.7°C
In 2100:
1.4–1.5°C
Peak:
2.0–2.1°C
In 2100:
1.8–1.9°C
Note: The gap numbers and ranges are calculated based on the original numbers (without rounding), which may differ from the rounded numbers (3rd 
column) in the table. Numbers are rounded to full GtCO2e. GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year global warming potential values of the IPCC 
2nd Assessment Report. The NDC and current policy emission projections may differ slightly from the presented numbers in Cross-Chapter box 11 of the 
IPCC Special Report (Bertoldi et al., 2018) due to the inclusion of new studies after the literature cut-off date set by the IPCC. Pathways were grouped in 
three categories depending on whether their maximum cumulative CO2 emissions were less than 600 GtCO2, between 600 and 900 GtCO2, or between 900 
and 1,300 GtCO2 from 2018 onwards until net zero CO2 emissions are reached, or until the end of the century if net zero is not reached before. Pathways 
assume limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation thereafter. Estimated temperature outcomes are based on the method used in the IPCC 5th 
Assessment Report.
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Full implementation of the unconditional and conditional 
NDCs is estimated to reduce global emissions in 2030 
by about 3 GtCO2e and 6 GtCO2e respectively, compared 
with the current policy scenario (table 3.1). Some of the 
new studies included in this year’s assessment have 
higher NDC estimates, resulting in a slight increase of 
1 GtCO2e in the median unconditional NDC estimate 
and an increase in the upper end of the range for the 
unconditional and conditional NDC estimates by 2 
GtCO2e and 1 GtCO2e respectively. 
Studies underlying the current policy trajectory scenario 
and the NDC scenario differ in various ways, such as 
their treatment of conditional versus unconditional NDCs 
and their assumptions regarding non-covered sectors 
and gases. These methodological differences cannot 
be fully harmonized, which leads to some uncertainty as 
indicated by the ranges around the median estimates 
(see table 3.1 and online appendix A.1). These 
differences and their implications are further described 
in online appendix A.2 and in the 2016 Emissions 
Gap Report (UNEP, 2016), which also provides a more 
complete discussion of the different types of scenarios. 
The major change compared with the 2017 Emissions 
Gap Report is in the assessment of 2030 GHG emission 
levels consistent with limiting global warming to 
below 2°C and lower. As discussed in section 3.2, the 
2018 assessment draws on numerous new 1.5°C and 
2°C-consistent least-cost emissions pathways that have 
become available in the context of the IPCC Special 
Report (Huppmann et al., 2018a, 2018b). Furthermore, 
the assessment adopts a new methodology, which 
groups pathways under three temperature scenarios 
based on their cumulative CO2 emissions. These 
updates result in target emission levels for 2030 that 
Figure 3.1: Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 
(median estimate and 10th to 90th percentile range).
differ from the ranges assessed in the 2017 report. 
Table 3.1 shows that in the below 2.0°C scenario 
(about 66 percent probability), which is consistent with 
maximum cumulative emissions of 900–1,300 GtCO2, 
GHG emission levels for 2030 are 40 GtCO2e (range of 
38–45 GtCO2e). This is around 2 GtCO2e lower than 2017 
estimates but well within the reported uncertainty range. 
For pathways with maximum cumulative emissions of 
600–900 GtCO2, which is consistent with keeping global 
warming below 1.8°C with about 66 percent probability, 
GHG emission levels for 2030 are 34 GtCO2e (range of 
30–40 GtCO2e). For the below 1.5°C in 2100 scenario, 
based on pathways where cumulated maximum CO2 
emissions from 2018 are below 600 GtCO2, emission 
levels in 2030 are as low as 24 GtCO2e (range of 22–30 
GtCO2e). This is 12 GtCO2e lower than the estimate in 
2017 of 36 GtCO2e (range of 32–38 GtCO2e), mainly 
because many recent studies assume that less negative 
emissions will be available over the course of this 
century, thus requiring steeper emission reductions in the 
next decades to keep peak warming as low as possible. 
The inclusion of pathways consistent with keeping global 
warming to below 1.8°C, combined with the indication of 
temperature outcomes for about a 50 percent, 90 percent 
and 66 percent probability, allow for a more nuanced 
interpretation and discussion of what ‘well below 2°C’ 
means and implies in terms of emission reductions 
required.
The emissions gap between estimated total global 
emissions in 2030 under the NDC scenarios and 
pathways limiting warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C is 
illustrated in fi gure 3.1, where the no-policy and current 
policy scenarios are also included. Full implementation 
of unconditional NDCs is estimated to result in a gap of 
15 GtCO2e (range of 12–17 GtCO2e) in 2030 compared 
with the below 2°C scenario. This is about 2 GtCO2e 
higher than the gap assessed in the 2017 report, due to 
the lower 2°C scenario estimate. If the conditional NDCs 
are also fully implemented, the gap reduces by about 
2 GtCO2e. The emissions gap between unconditional 
NDCs and below 1.5°C pathways is about 32 GtCO2e 
(range of 28–34 GtCO2e). This is about 13 GtCO2e higher 
than assessed in the 2017 report, due to the lower 1.5°C 
scenario estimates as explained above. Considering the 
full implementation of both unconditional and conditional 
NDCs would reduce this gap by roughly 3 GtCO2e. 
In summary, the assessment amplifi es concerns 
regarding both ambition and action compared with 
previous Emissions Gap Reports. According to the 
current policy and NDC scenarios, global emissions are 
not estimated to peak by 2030, let alone by 2020. The 
NDCs are estimated to reduce global emissions in 2030 
by a maximum 6 GtCO2e compared with a continuation 
of current policies. As the emissions gap assessment 
shows, reductions that are roughly 2 to 3 times higher are 
needed to bridge the gap between conditional NDCs and 
2°C pathways, and fi ve times higher to align emissions 
with 1.5°C pathways. 
3.4 Temperature implications of the NDCs
The implications for global warming by the end of the 
century can be estimated based on the 2030 level of 
GHG emissions resulting from full implementation of 
the NDCs. The Emissions Gap Reports use a method 
that builds on information from scenarios available in 
the peer-reviewed literature. Such scenarios provide 
internally consistent long-term emission projections 
and relate 2030 GHG emission levels to temperature 
outcomes throughout the 21st century (Rogelj et al., 
2016a). The method used in these reports has been 
assessed in a recent study (Jeffery et al., 2018) to 
provide consistent and useful results for a wide range of 
emissions reduction levels in 2030, in contrast to some 
of the other methods found in the literature consulted.
Assuming that climate action continues consistently 
throughout the 21st century, implementing the 
unconditional NDCs would lead to a mean global 
temperature of around 3.2°C (with a range of 2.9–3.4°C), 
relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100. Since these 
projections do not reach net zero CO2 emissions by 
2100, temperatures are further projected to increase 
thereafter. Full implementation of both unconditional and 
conditional NDCs would reduce these estimates by 0.2°C 
in 2100. These projections are identical to those made in 
2017, within rounding precision.
3.5 Implications of 2030 emission levels 
The large ranges in least-cost 2030 global GHG 
emissions reported in table 3.1 for limiting warming to 
below 2°C or 1.5°C not only refl ect variations between 
models, but also differences in societal choices that 
should be made to achieve desired climate outcomes. 
Such outcomes may include deciding the degree to 
which it is acceptable to rely on large-scale CDR after 
2050, how mitigation action should be spread over 
time or what an acceptable level of burden is for future 
generations. Recent studies allow these choices to 
be better understood by illustrating the implications 
associated with aiming to achieve the higher or lower 
end of the identifi ed ranges, or with missing them 
altogether. The recently approved IPCC Special Report 
on Global Warming of 1.5°C points out that the global 
emissions outcome from the aggregate effect of the 
NDCs is too high to prevent exceedance of the 1.5°C 
threshold (IPCC, 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). Here, the 
focus is on implications of 2030 emission level choices 
for (1) the future reliance and scale of CDR; (2) the 
simultaneous achievement of other sustainability 
objectives; and (3) lock-in of carbon-intensive 
infrastructure that makes future emission reductions 
more diffi  cult. 
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3.5.1 Limiting future reliance on carbon dioxide 
removal
Mitigation scenarios that stabilize global warming to 
well below 2°C or 1.5°C differ widely in their use of CDR 
(Rogelj et al., 2018b), which is associated with several 
environmental and social sustainability risks (Smith 
et al., 2016; Minx et al., 2018). CDR of some form will 
likely be required for these warming limits, especially 
the 1.5°C goal, though its extent may vary (Rogelj et al., 
2015; Luderer et al., 2018). A recent study (Strefler et al., 
2018) shows that strengthened action in the near future 
can significantly decrease CDR requirements for the 
remainder of the century. Reducing CO2 emissions by 
22–53 percent below current NDC levels in 2030, which 
would align emission levels with below 2°C and 1.5°C 
pathways, would substantially alleviate the trade-off 
between disruptive emission reduction requirements 
post-2030 and potentially unattainably and unsustainably 
high CDR deployment. The IPCC Special Report indicates 
that the CDR requirements to compensate for an 
overshoot of 0.2°C or larger during this century might not 
be achievable (IPCC, 2018). Furthermore, optimal 2030 
GHG emission levels depend strongly on the availability 
of CDR: below 1.8°C and below 1.5°C pathways with 
limited CDR have 7–12 GtCO2e less 2030 GHG emissions 
than corresponding pathways with a full technology 
portfolio. The six 1.5°C pathways available from the 
literature that limit the availability of biomass with carbon 
capture and storage technologies (Bauer et al., 2018; 
Bertram et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018; 
Kriegler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018) all have GHG 
emission levels of at most 25 GtCO2e in 2030.
3.5.2 Achieving sustainability
Numerous interactions and potential synergies and 
trade-offs between climate change mitigation and 
other sustainability objectives are highlighted in the 
recent literature (von Stechow et al., 2015; 2016; Jakob 
and Steckel, 2016; UNEP, 2016; Bertram et al., 2018; 
McCollum et al., 2018). Broad societal choices and 
developments regarding lifestyles and socioeconomics 
will determine the feasibility and effort required 
to simultaneously achieve the Paris Agreement’s 
objectives and the Sustainable Development Goals 
(Rogelj et al., 2018a). The literature also shows that 
stronger near-term emission reductions have the 
potential to increase mitigation co-benefits in both the 
coming decade and later in the century, for example, 
through reduced air pollution, lower water demand and 
decreased dependence on bioenergy (Bertram et al., 
2018; IPCC, 2018). For instance, Rao et al. (2016) show 
that combining deep decarbonization with stringent 
air pollution control policies can decrease the share of 
global population exposed to high particulate matter 
concentrations from 21 percent to 3 percent in 2050. 
Markandya et al. (2018) estimate that air pollution-
related mortality during the 2020–2050 period can be 
reduced by around one quarter compared with business 
as usual if CO2 emission reductions are in line with the 
Paris Agreement targets. In addition, dedicated policies 
for differentiated carbon pricing or energy efficiency 
regulation have been identified to effectively mitigate 
potential adverse side effects, such as exceedingly 
large land requirements for bioenergy (Bertram et al., 
2018) or impacts of climate policies on food and energy 
prices (Fujimori et al., 2018). Grubler et al. (2018) have 
shown that strong efforts towards improving energy 
efficiency lowers near-term GHG emissions, increases 
sustainability co-benefits and could keep the 1.5°C limit 
within reach with much lower CDR levels.
3.5.3 Avoiding lock-in of carbon-intensive 
infrastructure
Sociotechnical systems in general and energy systems 
in particular are characterized by inertia and path 
dependency due to long-lived capital stocks with slow 
turnover, infrastructure requirements, learning by doing 
and cultural practices. As noted in previous Emissions 
Gap Reports, these inertias give rise to the notion of 
carbon lock-in, which is large-scale committed emissions 
resulting from existing infrastructures (see also Unruh, 
2000; Davis et al., 2010). The scenario literature clearly 
demonstrates that weak near-term climate policy 
ambition increases the long-term emissions commitment 
from fossil-based infrastructures, decreases the 
economic mitigation potential (Bertram et al., 2015; 
Kriegler et al., 2015; Luderer et al., 2018) and greatly 
increases the risk of stranded assets when switching 
to a 2°C-consistent mitigation pathway (Johnson et al., 
2015; ; Riahi et al., 2015; Luderer et al., 2016). Attempting 
to hold the below 2°C limit from the 2030 emission 
levels implied by the NDCs would require rapid emission 
reductions after 2030, resulting in stranded assets 
of several hundred billion US$ from coal power alone 
(Johnson et al., 2015). Coal-based power is the most 
important cause of carbon lock-in today (Davis et al., 
2010; Bertram et al., 2015; UNEP, 2017), with all plants 
currently in operation committing the world to around 
190 GtCO2 (UNEP, 2017; Edenhofer et al., 2018). If all 
coal-fired power plants currently under construction go 
into operation and run until the end of their technical 
lifetime, the coal emissions commitment will increase by 
another 150 GtCO2, jeopardizing the achievement of NDC 
emission reduction targets and the Paris Agreement’s 
long-term warming limits (Edenhofer et al., 2018). 
Strengthening 2030 efforts beyond the NDCs will not only 
reduce near-term emissions, but also crucially reduce 
carbon lock-in, paving the way for the deep emission 
reductions required in the longer term.
Chapter 4.  
Bridging the gap:  
Strengthening NDCs and domestic policies
Authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute), Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute)
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapters of this report highlight the urgency 
of enhancing ambition and strengthening mitigation 
action without further delay. This chapter explores how 
countries can reflect increased mitigation ambition 
through enhanced Nationally Intended Contributions 
(NDCs) and strengthened domestic policies. 
Furthermore, it looks into the opportunities for bridging 
the emissions gap by delivering on enhanced ambition. 
This chapter first sets out the rationale and context 
for enhancing ambition in NDCs, including the legal 
context of the Paris Agreement, which requires regularly 
enhanced ambition through five-year cycles, as well 
as factors that facilitate greater ambition (section 
4.2). Next, it describes existing concepts of mitigation 
ambition in the context of NDCs, as well as options for 
them to reflect enhanced ambition in their NDCs (section 
4.3). Enhanced ambition sends an important signal to 
stakeholders regarding mitigation commitment both 
internationally and domestically. As domestic policies 
are crucial to translating mitigation ambition into action, 
this chapter subsequently explores the extent to which 
main policy types, focusing specifically on G20 members, 
cover key sectors (section 4.4). Finally, it summarizes 
the main insights into how much global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions could be reduced through enhanced 
ambition and action from different perspectives (section 
4.5), before highlighting the main conclusions (section 
4.6).
4.2 Rationale and context for enhancing 
Nationally Determined Contributions
To increase climate ambition over time, the Paris 
Agreement establishes a five-year pledge-and-review 
cycle. Under this cycle, Parties prepare and communicate 
successive NDCs every five years. Each successive 
NDC is to represent a progression beyond the Party’s 
current NDC, reflecting its highest possible ambition 
(UNFCCC, 2015). The Agreement notes that developed 
country Parties should continue taking the lead by 
setting economy-wide absolute emission reduction 
targets, while developing country Parties should continue 
enhancing their mitigation efforts, gradually moving 
towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation 
targets in light of their capabilities and different national 
circumstances. From 2023, a five-yearly1 ‘global 
stocktake’ will assess collective progress towards the 
Agreement’s long-term goals and inform the next round 
of NDCs. 
Prior to this, the Paris Decision invites those Parties with 
NDCs for 2025 to communicate a new NDC, and those 
with NDCs for 2030 to communicate or update their NDC, 
by 2020. This follows the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue to take 
stock of Parties’ collective efforts in relation to progress 
towards the Agreement’s long-term goals and to inform 
NDC preparation (see also chapter 1). The Decision also 
invites Parties to undertake mid-century, long-term, low-
GHG emission development strategies, which may in turn 
inform near-term NDCs and policies (UNFCCC, 2016).
A number of factors have changed since Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) were 
communicated in the lead-up to 2015, creating a new 
context in which Parties may consider communicating 
or updating their NDCs for 2020. For example, the Paris 
Agreement has been adopted and ratified, indicating 
the terms under which international climate policy 
will proceed, and a growing number of countries 
have adopted or strengthened their domestic policy 
frameworks for addressing climate change (Iacobuta et 
al., 2018). Furthermore, the price of renewable energy 
and other low-carbon solutions has continued to fall 
more rapidly than expected (IRENA, 2018), and countries 
are continuing to decouple economic growth from GHG 
emissions. The 2018 Global Climate Action Summit 
revealed new actions and commitments on the part of 
non-state actors.  
1 Unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
Box 4.1 Examples of enhanced 
mitigation ambition in NDCs
Several Parties have either enhanced the 
ambition of their NDCs relative to their 
INDCs or have articulated their intent to do 
so.2 For instance, Morocco has moved from 
a 13 percent to a 17 percent unconditional 
reduction in GHG emissions relative to a 
business-as-usual scenario by 2030, while 
increasing its conditional target from 31 to 
41 percent. Argentina and Indonesia have 
also adopted more modest increases in 
GHG target stringency. Likewise, Morocco, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uruguay have 
adopted new commitments and actions, 
while Mali has adopted an unconditional GHG 
target in addition to its existing conditional 
target (Fransen et al., 2017). 
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4.3 Options for Parties to enhance mitigation 
ambition
Chapters 2 and 3 presented detailed estimates of the 
level of GHG emissions that will occur in future years 
if a country implements its NDC, and if it continues 
to implement its current domestic policies. The two 
seldom match, for multiple reasons. First, countries may 
need time – often many years – to adopt and begin to 
implement the domestic policies necessary to achieving 
the targets contained in their NDCs. In the meantime, 
NDCs will refl ect a higher level of mitigation ambition 
(that is, lower future emissions) than current domestic 
policies. In other cases, countries may establish 
relatively conservative NDCs, and then, through domestic 
policies or other economic trends, fi nd themselves on 
track to over-deliver. In these cases, NDCs will refl ect a 
lower level of mitigation ambition (that is, higher future 
emissions) than will domestic policies. Finally, some 
Parties intend to purchase offsets to close any gap 
between their domestic policy ambition and their NDC 
commitments, in which case current policies would 
refl ect future emissions that were higher than NDC 
targets, but which would be offset.
Ultimately, as domestic policy has the power to control 
emissions, through regulation or economic incentives, 
ambitious NDC goals will be irrelevant unless domestic 
policy follows suit. Nevertheless, the ambition refl ected 
in NDCs is also important because it signals to the 
international community the contribution that the country 
intends to make to solve the global issue of climate 
change, and it delineates the commitments on which 
the country will report to the international community. 
This section therefore outlines options for increasing 
ambition both in NDCs and in domestic policy.
An NDC with enhanced mitigation ambition can be 
defi ned as an NDC that “if fully implemented, would 
result in lower cumulative [GHG] emissions than the 
fully implemented existing NDC” (Fransen et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, it is argued that “ambition should be viewed 
as a combination of target-setting, preparedness to 
implement, and a capacity to sustain further reductions 
over time” (Levaï and Baron, 2017). While both defi nitions 
consider the impact on cumulative emissions, the latter 
more explicitly considers a time frame to mid-century, as 
well as implementation capacity. 
There are a number of ways in which a country could 
refl ect enhanced mitigation ambition in its NDC: fi gure 
4.1 illustrates four categories of options for doing so 
(based on Fransen et al. (2017)). First, a country could 
strengthen its existing GHG target, for example by 
increasing its stringency, expanding the sectors and 
gases that it covers or strengthening its modalities, such 
as those related to land-sector accounting or market 
mechanisms. It could also adopt a new GHG target. 
Second, it could pursue similar options vis-à-vis sectoral 
non-GHG targets, such as those to enhance renewable 
energy or energy effi  ciency or to limit deforestation. 
Third, a country could opt to strengthen or expand the 
policies and actions mentioned in its NDC. At suffi  cient 
scale, this could enhance the NDC’s overall ambition, 
as well as providing confi dence in the country’s 
preparedness to implement. Finally, the country could 
commit to an implementation pathway that will sustain 
GHG reductions over the long term, limiting cumulative 
emissions.  
These options are not mutually exclusive and whether 
an NDC revision results in enhanced ambition according 
to the defi nitions above depends on the scale of the 
revision, rather than how it is articulated in the NDC. 
It is important for countries to consider a wide range 
of options, in order to identify those that are most 
meaningful and practical in their unique circumstances, 
and in order to enable deep emission reductions.  
2   https://www.wri.org/blog/2018/04/insider-whats-changing-countries-turn-indcs-ndcs-5-early-insights.
4.4 Strengthening domestic policies 
Domestic policies are critical for translating mitigation 
ambition into action. The suite of domestic policies to 
address climate change can be strengthened, both by 
expanding policy coverage to additional sectors and 
issues and by enhancing the stringency of existing 
policies. 
A number of studies and initiatives analyze the coverage 
and stringency of domestic policies in G20 member 
countries (see, for example, OECD, 2016; CD-LINKS, 2018; 
Climate Transparency, 2018). As described in chapter 2, 
these countries account for roughly 78 percent of global 
emissions. These studies fi nd that there is signifi cant 
scope for enhancing the ‘coverage’ of G20 members’ 
national policies – that is, the presence of a policy 
addressing a particular sector, without considering 
its stringency. Evaluation of the coverage of ‘good-
practice polices’ highlights that while policies to support, 
for example, renewables in the electricity sector are 
widespread (100 percent of G20 members), coverage is 
scattered in other areas. To illustrate (CD-LINKS, 2018):
• Reducing transport-related fossil fuel subsidies is 
covered by only 38 percent of G20 countries.
• Overarching carbon pricing for the electricity 
sector is covered by only 44 percent of G20 
members.
• Material effi  ciency measures in industry show 
38 percent coverage, while CH4 from oil and gas 
production have 38 percent coverage.
• Support schemes for using renewables in 
buildings’ heating and cooling systems are 
covered by only 19 percent of G20 members.
• Emission standards for heavy duty vehicles are 
covered by 56 percent, while e-mobility programs 
are covered by 31 percent of G20 members.
Figure 4.1: Typology of strengthening mitigation ambition of NDCs.
Strengthen or add a 
GHG target
Strengthen or add a 
sectoral non-GHG 
target
Strengthen or add
policies and actions
Align imlementation
of the existing NDC 
with long-term goals
Commit to achieving 
the existing NDC via 
policies and actions 
that support long-term 
decarbonization 
pathways
Strengthen existing 
policies and actions
Add new
policies and actions
Increase the stringency 
of a sectoral
non-GHG target
Advance the target
year of a sectoral 
non-GHG target
Declare an intent to 
overachieve a sectoral 
non-GHG target
Adopt a new sectoral 
non-GHG target
Increase the
stringency of an 
existing GHG target
Expand the scope
and coverage of an
existing GHG target
Change the
target period of an
existing GHG target
Declare an intent
to overachieve an
existing GHG target
Strengthen the 
modalities of an 
existing GHG target
Change the type of an 
existing GHG target
Adopt a
new GHG target
Source: adapted from Franzen et al., (2017)
Source: adapted from Fransen et al. (2017).
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Even if an area is covered by a policy instrument or policy 
package, the stringency of policies varies significantly 
between countries. Assessments of stringency are 
more challenging than those of coverage and direct 
comparison is difficult due to very different domestic 
circumstances and choices of policy instruments. 
Although methods to rate the stringency of policy 
packages are emerging, there are still relatively few. For 
example, the Allianz Climate & Energy Monitor (Allianz, 
2017) compares the stringency of a policy package 
to support renewables in the electricity sector of G20 
countries; the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI, 
2018) rates overall climate performance using expert 
surveys; and the OECD (2016) assesses and compares 
the stringency of environmental policies in OECD 
countries. A common insight from these initiatives is that 
there is significant potential to enhance the stringency of 
domestic policies in all countries, including in the area of 
carbon pricing, which is explored further in chapter 6. 
A few examples of policies that have had – or could have 
– a significant effect on reducing GHG emissions are 
given below (based on Fekete et al., 2015; Kriegler et al., 
2018; Roelfsema et al., 2018). These areas could be used 
as a starting point for countries to consider options to 
expand the coverage or stringency of their policies:
• Renewable electricity share in global total 
electricity generation has increased significantly 
in the EU-28 by, on average, 1.5 percentage 
points/year during 2005–2014 (IEA, 2016).  This 
increase is related to the Renewable Energy 
Directive (European Parliament, 2009), which is 
implemented in member states in various ways.
•  Phase-out of unabated coal-fired power plants 
(that is, without Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS)), is planned in a number of EU countries 
(Jones and Gutmann, 2015). At the subnational 
level, Alberta (Government of Alberta, no date) 
and Ontario in Canada phased them out in 2014 
(Harris et al., 2015), followed by South Australia 
in 2016 (Parkinson, 2016). Canada has a plan to 
phase out coal-fired power plants without CCS by 
2030 (Government of Canada, 2016). Meanwhile, 
India’s Electricity Plan (Central Electricity 
Authority, 2018) also projects significantly fewer 
new coal-fired power plants than previously 
planned.
•  In terms of industrial energy efficiency, there 
is only limited evidence that existing policies in 
major emitting countries have made significant 
impact well beyond business-as-usual. The 
literature suggests that autonomous energy 
efficiency improvement is about 1 percent 
annually (Blok, 2004; UNIDO, 2010) and an 
improvement of anywhere close to 2 percent 
annually is considered challenging, especially in 
developed economies (Blok, 2004).
•  In heating and cooling for new buildings, a 
particularly stringent example is the EU Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive (European 
Parliament, 2010), which calls for all new 
buildings to be nearly zero energy by 2020. The 
EU also has an encouraging national target to 
renovate 3 percent of all public buildings/year to 
increase their efficiency. Nevertheless, challenges 
remain in implementing these targets.
•  For electrical appliances and lighting, Japan’s 
Top Runner Program (METI, 2015) is worth 
mentioning. The energy efficiency improvement 
rates for 24 appliances (including heating and 
cooling as well as cooking appliances) over 
varying time periods of 4-9 years was, on average, 
0.9 percentage points/year higher than the 
targeted rates (Ibid.).
•  The  global market share for electric vehicles 
(EVs) is still small, with 3 million sales in 2017 
(IEA, 2018). In Norway, however, EVs (including 
plug-in hybrids) accounted for nearly 39 percent 
of new cars in 2017 (IEA, 2018) and even 
higher recently. A multi-layered policy package 
comprised of financial incentives and behavioral 
incentives (e.g. allowing EV drivers to use bus 
lanes and free public parking) contributed to 
these high EV sales (Figenbaum et al., 2015).
•  For fuel economy of new vehicles, the EU sets 
one of the strictest standards in the world (Yang 
and Bandivadekar, 2017), recognizing that there 
is a performance gap between test mode and 
real-world fuel-economy figures, estimated at 30 
percent (ICCT, 2016).
•  For freight transport, only Japan, the USA, Canada 
and China have CO2 or efficiency standards for 
heavy duty vehicles (Muncrief and Rodriguez, 
2017); the USA and Canada have separate engine 
standards in addition to full-vehicle regulations, 
including aerodynamic and rolling resistance 
to specifically drive improvements in engine 
efficiency.  
Gaps in coverage as well as stringency suggest that 
there is considerable scope for countries to strengthen 
their domestic policies and to achieve emission 
reductions that are considerably beyond the ambition 
reflected in current policies and NDCs.  
4.5 The scope for bridging the emissions gap 
through enhanced ambition and strengthened 
action
This section explores the answers to two central 
questions of the Emissions Gap Reports: Is it possible 
to bridge the emissions gap by 2030? What are the 
main opportunities? It summarizes the main insights 
into how much global GHG emissions could be reduced 
through enhanced ambition and action from different 
perspectives: by realizing the full technical potential 
for mitigation; applying existing good-practice policies 
universally; maximizing development benefits; and 
filling gaps in NDC coverage. These perspectives offer 
different, but not mutually exclusive, lenses through 
which to approach both domestic policies and NDC 
enhancement. 
3   An order of magnitude referred to by, for example, Stiglitz et al. (2017).
4.5.1 Technical mitigation potential in 2030
Estimates of the technical mitigation potential shed 
light on the upper limit for emission reductions in given 
future years. The 2017 edition of the Emissions Gap 
Report (UNEP, 2017) provided an updated assessment 
of the sectoral emission reduction potentials that 
are technically and economically feasible in 2030, 
considering prices up to US$100/tCO2e.
3 The 
assessment showed that, based on basic potentials, 
global emissions could be reduced by 33 (range of 30–
36) GtCO2e/year in 2030, compared to the current policy 
scenario of 59 GtCO2e/year (chapter 3). If, in addition, 
a number of newer and less certain mitigation options 
were included, the mitigation potential would increase 
to 38 (range of 35–41) GtCO2e. The emissions reduction 
potential is thus sufficient to bridge the gap in 2030. 
It is more than twice the size of the emissions gap for 
2°C and still sufficient to bring global emissions in 2030 
to a level consistent with least-cost 1.5°C pathways. 
However, the significantly higher 1.5°C gap estimated in 
this year’s report implies that there would be less leeway 
in delivering the required emissions reductions. 
Estimates of technical emission reduction potential 
differ significantly between studies and realizing the 
potentials assumes that all technologies available are 
fully deployed nationally and globally. The feasibility of 
this depends on removing various barriers, including 
technical, financial, capacity and political barriers. 
However, it is worth noting that around 40 percent of the 
technical mitigation potential is estimated to comprise 
measures in solar and wind energy, efficient appliances, 
efficient passenger cars, afforestation, and avoiding 
deforestation (UNEP, 2017). All these measures can 
be realized at low and, in some cases, net-negative 
incremental costs and primarily build on proven policies. 
While national circumstances determine the scope and 
appropriateness of specific measures, studies point to 
significant mitigation potential in all countries. 
4.5.2 Good-practice policies and their global 
application
Since 2012, the Emissions Gap Reports have provided 
examples of policies in key areas and sectors that 
have proven successful in reducing GHG emissions 
in countries and regions around the world, while 
contributing to national development goals (an overview 
of sectors and issues covered in previous Emissions 
Gap Reports is provided at the end of this report). 
Such policies have the potential to make a significant 
contribution to bridging the gap, if they are scaled up in 
terms of their ambition and geographical coverage.  
Several studies provide estimates of the global emission 
reductions that could be achieved, if existing good-
practice policies were replicated universally (see for 
example Afanador et al., 2015; Fekete et al., 2015; 
Kriegler et al., 2018; Roelfsema et al., 2018). The studies 
differ in assumptions, approaches and policies covered, 
and subsequently also in their estimates of global 
emission reduction potentials. However, they typically 
find that global emissions in 2030 could be reduced 
to levels of between 42–49 GtCO2e/year. The studies 
highlight that significant potential exists in all countries 
and that replication of proven good-practice policies 
could reduce global emissions considerably compared 
to the full implementation of the current NDCs, thereby 
narrowing the 2030 gap compared to a 2°C pathway. 
As studies of the global emission reduction potential 
from universal replication of existing good-practice 
policies do not consider the implementation of all 
technically feasible options, they arrive at lower reduction 
estimates than those based on total technical mitigation 
potential. On the other hand, their implementation may 
be more feasible as the policies considered have already 
been proven in some countries. However, they may not 
be directly applicable to all other countries.
4.5.3 Maximizing sustainable development 
benefits
National development priorities such as economic 
development, reduced air pollution, employment, and 
energy security are often the main drivers of domestic 
policies. However, as mentioned above, sound climate 
change policies will often contribute to national 
development goals and vice versa.    
A growing number of studies analyze how maximization 
of development benefits can reduce global GHG 
emissions significantly in the near future, thereby 
contributing to narrowing the gap. The New Climate 
Economy report of 2015 (The New Climate Economy, 
2015), for example, estimated that actions in eight focus 
areas could achieve significant economic benefits and 
reduce global GHG emissions by between 43–53 GtCO2e 
in 2030. The New Climate Economy report (2018) states 
that “low-carbon growth could deliver economic benefits 
of US$26 trillion to 2030”. Other studies find that meeting 
a trajectory compatible with the Paris Agreement’s long-
term goals can support the fulfilment of Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in terms of energy access, 
clean water, air pollution and food security (McCollum 
et al., 2018). The IEA World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2017) 
includes a sustainable development scenario, which 
meets the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals and 
achieves cleaner air and universal access to modern 
energy and reducing energy security risks.
4.5.4 Filling gaps in NDC coverage
One option for enhancing ambition in the NDCs is to 
expand them to cover all sectors and gases (see figure 
4.1). Previous studies have reviewed the emission 
reduction potential associated with expanding the 
coverage of current NDCs to all sectors and gases. 
Assuming that reductions achieved in the newly covered 
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sectors and gases are comparable with those in sectors 
and gases currently covered by NDCs, the global 
potential is limited to a few GtCO2e by 2030 (Rogelj et 
al., 2016). At the same time, countries could elect to go 
beyond the existing level of ambition in increasing their 
coverage. Ross et al. (2018) finds significant potential, 
including development benefits, in addressing short-lived 
climate pollutants. However, while some countries have 
important gaps to fill in sectors and gases, from a global 
perspective, the bulk of the mitigation potential lies in 
strengthening the emissions reductions from sectors 
and gases that are already covered by NDCs.
4.6 Summary
To bridge the 2030 emissions gap and ensure long-term 
decarbonization consistent with the Paris Agreement 
goals, countries must enhance their mitigation ambition. 
This chapter has illustrated how enhanced ambition 
can be reflected in revised NDCs as well as in domestic 
policies, each with unique value. NDCs establish 
international accountability and convey a direction of 
travel to both domestic and international stakeholders, 
while domestic policies directly incentivize actions to 
reduce emissions. 
When considering the mitigation ambition of either NDCs 
or domestic policies, it is important to consider the effect 
not only on the 2030 emissions gap, but also on long-
term emissions trajectories to mid-century.
There are a range of options for enhancing both the 
coverage and stringency of domestic policies, including 
of G20 members. While all G20 countries have policies 
to support renewables in the electricity sector, stringency 
of these policies can still be enhanced. Gaps in both 
coverage and stringency remain in, for example, fossil 
fuel subsidy reduction, material efficiency measures 
in industry, oil and gas methane, support schemes for 
renewables in heating and cooling, emission standards 
for heavy duty vehicles, and e-mobility programmes. 
Chapter 6 looks at the role that strengthened fiscal 
policies can play in creating stronger incentives for low-
carbon investments and for reducing GHG emissions, 
with a particular emphasis on carbon pricing.
The technical potential for reducing GHG emissions 
is significant and could be sufficient to bridge the 
emissions gap in 2030. Three broad areas have the 
largest potential: renewable energy from wind and 
solar power; energy-efficient appliances and cars; and 
afforestation and stopping deforestation.
In all countries, there is significant potential to realize 
a substantive part of the technical mitigation potential 
by replicating proven good-practice policies that 
can simultaneously contribute to key Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Realizing this potential 
would narrow the gap by 2030 significantly beyond 
current NDCs.
This chapter summarizes only an initial list of 
perspectives, leaving out a number of important 
perspectives and opportunities. Non-state and 
subnational actors in particular have the opportunity 
both to be part of implementing mitigation commitments 
made at the national level and to go beyond current 
pledges and create the space for, and the trust of, 
national governments to raise ambition. Chapter 5 
assesses the role of these actors in enhancing global 
climate ambition and bridging the emissions gap, based 
on the most recent literature. 
Another important issue is the role that accelerated 
innovation can play in bridging the emissions gap 
and realizing the longer-term emission reductions 
required to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement 
with global implications. Chapter 7 explores how 
combining innovation in behavior and in the use of 
existing technologies with promoting investment in new 
technologies and market inventions has the potential 
to radically transform societies and reduce global GHG 
emissions.
Chapter 5.  
Bridging the gap:  
The role of non-state and subnational actors 
Lead authors: Angel Hsu (Yale-NUS College/Data-Driven Yale), Oscar Widerberg (IVM, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Contributing authors: Amy Weinfurter (Data-Driven Yale), Sander Chan (German Development Institute), Mark Roelfsema 
(PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Katharina Lütkehermöller (NewClimate Institute), Fatemeh 
Bakhtiari (UNEP DTU Partnership)
5.1 Introduction
Global climate change governance is diversifying 
rapidly: in recent years, political attention has been 
acknowledging the increasingly important role of non-
state and subnational actors such as cities, states, 
regions, companies, investors, foundations, civil society 
organizations, and cooperative initiatives.
This chapter, assesses the role of non-state and 
subnational actors’ in enhancing global climate ambition 
and bridging the emissions gap, based on the most 
recent literature.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of the 
increasing engagement of non-state and subnational 
actors (NSAs) in the UNFCCC process (section 5.2), 
before examining the landscape and trends in terms 
of NSAs’ individual commitments and international 
cooperative initiatives (ICIs) (section 5.3). Section 5.4 
provides an assessment of the emission reduction 
potentials estimated by the latest studies and looks 
at non-quantifiable, roles of NSAs that have important 
implications for global climate change governance. The 
final section summarizes some of the key ways forward 
for harnessing the potential of NSAs’ climate action to 
bridge the emissions gap (section 5.5).
5.2 Non-state and subnational actors and  
climate change negotiations:  
from Paris to Katowice
The 2015 Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held 
in Paris showed an increased institutionalization of NSA 
processes and engagement (UNEP, 2016), paving the 
way for NSAs to play an increasingly prominent role in 
supporting Parties’ mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
Specifically, the Paris Agreement:
• Encourages Parties to work closely with non-Party 
stakeholders1 to catalyze efforts to strengthen 
mitigation and adaptation action (paragraph 118).
• Encourages non-Party stakeholders to register 
their climate actions in the Non- State Actor Zone 
for Climate Action platform (paragraph 117).
•  Convenes a high-level event building on the 
Lima–Paris Action Agenda during the period 
2016–2020 in conjunction with each session of 
the Conference of the Parties (paragraph 120).
•  Appoints two high-level champions on behalf of 
the President of the Conference of the Parties to 
catalyze NSAs (paragraph 121).
Following Paris, the first two high-level champions2 
launched the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate 
Action during the 2016 Conference of the Parties to 
continue mobilizing NSAs’ support of the Parties, and 
alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals (MP 
Work Programme 2017–2018). 
During the 2017 Conference of the Parties, the 
champions were asked to align the Marrakech 
Partnership with the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue that takes 
stock of Parties’ efforts towards the Paris Agreement 
goals and aims to inform the preparation of new or 
updated NDCs by 2020 (Decision 1/CP.23, Annex II). 
They also presented the first yearbook on climate action 
that reports on NSA actions and is expected to inform 
the Talanoa Dialogue. By April 2018, 109 NSA inputs 
had been registered with the Talanoa Dialogue, which 
will take place at the 24th Conference of the Parties in 
Katowice December 2018.
In parallel with the UNFCCC process, national and 
regional initiatives have emerged to stimulate and 
support NSAs in the European Union, Latin America and 
Asia, among others (Chan et al., 2018).
1 Non-Party Stakeholders is the term the UNFCCC uses for NSAs.
2 Dr. Laurence Tubiana (France) and Dr. Hakima El Haite (Morocco).
Box 5.1 Defining international 
cooperative initiatives
Although there is no single definition of an 
international cooperative initiative (ICI), a 
number of terms and common characteristics 
help characterize them. When non-state or 
subnational actors from at least two different 
countries “adhere to rules and practices that 
seek to steer behaviour towards shared, 
public goals” across borders (Andonova et al., 
2017), they engage in “transnational climate 
governance” (Andonova et al., 2009). Broader 
coalitions made up of countries, companies, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
academia, international organizations or 
subnational public actors, such as cities and 
regions, form cooperative initiatives (Blok 
et al., 2012). When these coalitions cross 
national borders they become “international 
cooperative initiatives” (Widerberg and 
Pattberg, 2015).
Box 5.2 Framing climate action  
in developing countries
Linking sustainable development and climate 
change provides a powerful rationale for 
climate action. Evidence suggests that 
citizens are more likely to take climate action, 
or to support government action on climate 
change, if the sustainable development 
benefits of these efforts are emphasized 
(Floater et al., 2016). Communicating the 
sustainable development gains that are often 
co-generated alongside climate mitigation 
or adaptation may be particularly important 
among NSAs in developing countries and the 
Global South.
One example is the Indian city of Rajkot, 
which “has emerged as a climate innovator” 
by focusing on projects that deliver urban 
development benefits, and support climate 
action as a supplementary goal or co-benefit. 
The political feasibility of climate action 
increases when connected to “more familiar, 
and often more immediate, urban priorities” 
(Bhardwaj and Khosla, 2017). 
However, if actions and policies that generate 
substantial mitigation or adaptation benefits 
are framed and registered according to their 
ability to reduce poverty, create jobs, foster 
economic growth, or protect public health, 
they may fall under the radar of climate 
accounting efforts. This might be one of the 
reasons for the lower representation of NSA 
climate action in developing countries and 
the Global South.
Table 5.1: Examples of the growth in individual NSA actor participation from 2015 to 2017.
Actor group 2015 2017
Cities
7,025 from 99 countries, 
representing 11 percent of 
the global population
7,378 from 133 countries, 
representing 16.9 percent of the 
global population
States and regions
116 regions from 20 
countries, representing 
11 percent of the global 
population
245 regions from 42 countries, 
representing 17.5 percent of the 
global population
Companies and investors
4,431 companies from 88 
countries and over 400 
investors, with more than 
US$25 trillion in assets under 
management
6,225 companies and investors 
from 120 countries, representing at 
least US$36.5 trillion in revenue
Banks 15 of the 20 largest banks
34 of the 57 largest banks, 
representing US$3.1 trillion in 
market capitalization
Higher education 
institutes Not assessed
700 colleges and universities in the 
United States of America, with a 
total student population nearing 1 
million and a collective endowment 
of over US$250 billion
Data source: Hsu et al., 2015b; Hsu et al., 2016, Hsu et al., 2017.
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In September 2018, the Global Climate Action Summit 
held in San Francisco, CA showcased climate actions 
by NSAs around the world, convening over 4,500 
local and regional governments and business leaders 
(Global Climate Action Summit, 2018). More than 500 
announcements were made, including:
•  A coalition of over 100 subnational leaders and 
CEOs committed to become carbon neutral by 
2050.
•  A 40 percent increase in the number of 
businesses committing to adopt ‘Science-based 
Targets’ in line with the Paris Agreement goals.
•  The launch of a forest, food and land-focused 
coalition aiming to deliver 30 percent of climate 
solutions needed by 2030.
•  A new waste initiative involving more than 20 
subnational governments committing to zero 
waste.
•  More ambitious NSA commitments, including 
California’s Governor committing to carbon 
neutrality by 2045 and a coalition of around 65 
members committed to full decarbonization in the 
‘Powering Past Coal Alliance’.
The outcomes of the Summit will inform the UN 2019 
Climate Summit, which will be convened by the UN 
Secretary General to challenge states, regions, cities, 
companies, investors and citizens to step up action in six 
key areas: energy transition, climate finance and carbon 
pricing, industry transition, nature-based solutions, cities 
and local action, and resilience.
5.3 Overview of cooperative initiatives and 
individual commitments by non-state and 
subnational actor
NSA climate action comes in many forms. This section 
focuses on two categories: individual NSA actions 
(section 5.3.1) and cooperative actions through 
international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) (section 5.3.2), 
both of which are on the rise. By 1 October 2018, just 
over 19,136 commitments to action had been recorded 
in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), 
the largest online platform showcasing climate efforts 
by subnational and non-state actors. Almost two-thirds 
of these commitments are by individual actors, while just 
over one-third are cooperative initiatives (including ICIs. 
See also box 5.1).
5.3.1 Individual commitments by non-state and 
subnational actors
Individual NSA climate actions are referred to as 
‘commitment’, ‘action’, ‘initiative’, and ‘target’ and include 
a “diverse set of governance activities taking place 
beyond strictly government and intergovernmental (or 
multilateral) settings” (Chan and Pauw, 2014).
NSAs often pledge climate action through networks 
that collate individual climate pledges and inventories 
(for example, C40 Cities for Climate Leadership) or 
reporting platforms such as the CDP (formerly known 
as the Carbon Disclosure Project). The criteria for 
participation within these networks and platforms 
vary: some networks require members to pledge 
specific commitments, such as greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission reduction targets, or to submit regular 
emissions inventories. Others emphasize peer-to-peer 
knowledge sharing and capacity-building, while some are 
membership-based networks that do not require actors 
to commit to specific goals.
While these networks capture many NSA climate actions, 
they do not comprehensively cover all NSA climate 
actions occurring globally.
For instance, national networks of NSAs and individual 
actions that are not reported in global climate action 
databases are not included in the analysis here (see also 
box 5.2). Analysis suggests, however, that individual 
NSA participation through these networks has increased 
since the 2015 Paris climate negotiations (table 5.1 - 
possible overlaps are not taken into account). These 
positive trends indicate the continued and growing role 
of NSAs in global climate governance. The following 
section captures an overview of some of these NSA 
constellations and their membership.
Source: Data-Driven Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL Netherlands (2018).
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Subnational governments 
– cities, states and regions
There are several networks connecting city, state 
and regional action on climate change. Figure 5.1 
illustrates the number of NSA city participants and 
their geographical distribution in some networks., 
including the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate 
& Energy, signed by 9,149 cities representing 780.8 
million people worldwide or just over 10 percent of 
the global population (Global Covenant of Mayors 
for Climate & Energy, 2018). The Global Covenant of 
Mayors for Climate & Energy includes the EU Covenant 
of Mayors for Climate & Energy that reports 7,755 
signatories with 252.6 million inhabitants within the 
EU (EU Covenant, 2018). All of these members commit 
to either submitting individual Sustainable Energy and 
Climate Action Plans or pledging a 40 percent reduction 
in carbon dioxide emissions by 2030. ICLEI, a global 
network of subnational governments, has developed the 
carbonn Climate Registry that includes more than 1,000 
cities, towns and regions, drawn from 89 countries and 
accounting for 9 percent of the world’s total population 
(ICLEI, 2018a).
In terms of state and regional governments taking action, 
the Compact of States and Regions (2017) includes 110 
regional governments from 36 countries, representing 
658 million people and 18 percent of the world 
economy and baseline emissions of 3.9 GtCO2e. These 
governments have committed to 290 climate actions 
focused on emissions reductions, renewable energy 
and energy effi  ciency that are estimated to result in 
total (cumulative) emissions reductions of 21.9 GtCO2e 
between 2010 and 2050, if climate targets are reached 
on time (The Climate Group, 2017).
Figure 5.1: Regional distribution of NSA city participants in carbonn, C40 Cities, CDP Cities, Global Covenant of Mayors 
for Climate & Energy, and Climate Mayors
Companies and investors
CDP reports that over 6,300 companies representing 
a combined purchasing power of over US$3 trillion 
responded to their climate change questionnaire, and 
that over 650 investors with assets of US$87 trillion 
participate (CDP, 2018). In 2017, CDP recorded primary 
data from over 4,800 companies, of which 47 percent 
noted an emissions reduction or renewable energy target 
(CDP, 2018).
A few reports detail fi nancial investors’ actions on 
climate change. The Climate Bonds Initiative’s 2018 
Green Bonds Summary found that US$74.6 billion in 
green bonds were issued during the fi rst half of 2018, by 
156 issuers from 31 countries (Climate Bonds Initiative, 
2018). The United States of America and China topped 
the list of countries where the most bonds were issued, 
and most proceeds support projects in the energy, 
buildings, and land-use sectors (Climate Bonds Initiative, 
2018). The Low Carbon Investment Registry currently 
includes 53 investors from 21 countries, with US$50 
billion in low-carbon assets (Global Investor Coalition 
on Climate Change, 2018) – a slight increase on the 
2014 assessment, which found 45 investors reporting 
investments valued at US$24 billion, most of which (44 
percent) focused on renewable energy (Global Investor 
Coalition on Climate Change, 2014).
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5.3.2 International cooperative initiatives
By engaging large and growing numbers of NSAs, 
international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) can lead to 
considerable emission reductions, provided that their 
stated goals are realized and emissions reductions do 
not displace action elsewhere (Blok et al., 2012; Hsu et 
al., 2015; UNEP, 2015; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015; 
Graichen et al., 2017; see also section 5.4).
In addition to direct emission reductions, ICIs can play 
a number of other important roles, including providing 
proofs of concept for low-emissions development 
strategies, spurring technology development and 
diffusion, and helping generate momentum for additional 
initiatives and activities (Weischer et al., 2012).
Several databases collect information on ICIs. They vary 
in number of initiatives, often due to different defi nitions 
of ICIs, purposes, focus areas, data collection methods 
and sources (UNEP, 2016; Widerberg and Stripple, 
2016). The summary of trends in this section focuses 
on mitigation-related ICIs and is based on data from the 
Climate Initiatives Platform, which is regularly updated, 
includes clear criteria for inclusion, and is publicly 
accessible.3
The main features of these ICIs are captured in fi gures 
5.2 and 5.3.
Trend in numbers of ICIs
The Climate Initiatives Platform currently records 244 
initiatives, of which 220 are mitigation- focused and 
are implemented in more than one country.4 Since the 
2016 UN Environment Emissions Gap Report, 17 new 
initiatives have been added to the platform.
Over the past two decades, the number of ICIs has grown 
signifi cantly, with peaks in launches of new initiatives 
3 The Climate Initiatives Platform is hosted by UN Environment and the UNEP DTU Partnership. 
It includes ICIs that fulfi l the following criteria:
• Includes several non-state actors taking voluntary action, and may also include states.
• Have an objective to reduce GHG emissions or to increase resilience, or could bring about GHG emission reductions or increased resilience.
• Have an international scope or the potential for signifi cant impact on a global scale.
• Have a focal point.
Source: http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Climate_Database:About.
4 As at 25 August 2018.
Figure 5.2: Number of international cooperative initiatives launched each year, between 2000 and 2018.
Source: Climate Initiatives Platform [accessed 1 July 2018].
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Figure 5.3: Overview of features of 220 mitigation-focused ICIs.
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around large climate events such as COP 15 in 2009, 
the United Nations Climate Action Summit convened 
by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 
2014, and COP 21 in 2015 (fi gure 5.2). The slowdown 
in the number of new initiatives in 2016, 2017 and 
2018 may refl ect a shift in focus towards implementing 
the initiatives created in earlier years, as well as the 
importance of global political forums in catalyzing the 
formation of ICIs.
Regional participation
As fi gure 5.3 illustrates, many initiatives operate in 
several regions. Although the overall increase in recorded 
mitigation-focused ICIs since 2016 is relatively limited, 
regional participation in ICIs has increased in nearly 
every region of the world. The biggest increase is in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, where the number of ICIs 
has increased from 6 in 2016 to 25 in 2018. In Western 
Europe, Asia and the Pacifi c, regional participation has 
roughly doubled compared with 2016. It is worth noting 
that global ICIs may be active in regions with relatively 
low participation in regional ICIs, such as South-Eastern 
Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, while ICI 
activities have been concentrated in high- and middle- 
income countries (Pattberg et al., 2012; Chan et al., 
2015; Chan et al., 2018), the number of ICIs operating in 
lower-income countries grew dramatically between 2015 
and 2017, rising by 56 percent in low-income countries, 
and 50 percent in lower-middle income countries (United 
Nations Climate Change Secretariat, 2017).5 Despite this 
progress, a sizeable North-South gap remains, with only 
22 percent of ICI participation and 23 percent of lead 
partners from non-OECD countries (ClimateSouth, 2018).
Sectors
Most ICIs (149 out of 220) cover multiple sectors, 
generally focusing on key sectors where the mitigation 
potential is signifi cantly higher than the emission 
reductions implied by current policies and NDCs: the 
energy, industry, forestry, transport, agriculture, and 
building sectors (UNEP, 2017). An ICI’s sectoral emphasis 
often shifts according to the needs and capacities of 
the regions where it is implemented. Actions focused 
on resilience and agriculture, for example, are most 
commonly implemented in low-income and middle-
income economies, while initiatives addressing the 
industrial sector are most prevalent in high-income or 
upper-middle income economies (Chan et al., 2018).
Setting goals and tracking progress
The percentage of ICIs that have set quantitative 
goals remains low, at around 22 percent. Quantitative 
goals – defi ned as a specifi c, measurable goal made 
either by an initiative or an initiative’s members – range 
from focusing on emissions reduction (for example, 
reduce emissions by a specifi c amount by a specifi c 
year), to fund-raising (for example, raise, distribute or 
invest a specifi c amount of funds), to capacity-building 
(for example, reach a specifi c number of people or 
communities). Similar low levels of quantitative goals are 
reported in other studies (Pattberg et al., 2012; Hsu et al., 
2015; Widerberg and Stripple, 2016; Graichen et al., 2017;  
Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2017; Chan et al., 2018).
Graichen et al. (2017) found that 75 percent of the 
174 ICIs they surveyed either did not include suffi  cient 
information about their targets, had unclear goals, or did 
not propose concrete actions. Focusing on emissions 
reduction targets, Hsu et al. (2015) found that just 8 out 
of 29 initiatives contained explicit emissions mitigation 
targets tied to a particular year. A study conducted by 
UNEP (2015) used a similar approach to narrow a list of 
184 initiatives down to 15. However, among initiatives 
with clear emissions reductions targets, many have 
made more ambitious emission reduction commitments 
than national governments (Graichen et al., 2017).
Monitoring, reporting, and verifi cation practices also 
remain weak across ICIs: just under 23 percent of ICIs on 
the Climate Initiatives Platform noted regular monitoring 
or reporting mechanisms. Other studies also report 
relatively low percentages of initiatives with established 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms, ranging from 31 
percent (Graichen et al. 2017), to 43 percent (Pattberg 
et al., 2012) or 44 percent (Chan et al. 2018). Hsu et 
al. (2015a) found that more than half (18) of 29 ICIs 
announced at the United Nations Climate Action Summit 
convened by United Nations Secretary-General Ban 
Ki- moon in 2014 included provisions for monitoring 
progress, but that very few of these identifi ed specifi c 
indicators to track performance. Bansard et al. (2016) 
likewise noted that the type and stringency of monitoring 
requirements varied widely among city-focused 
initiatives. Furthermore, many initiatives do not conduct 
or share cost estimates or feasibility studies, adding an 
additional barrier to efforts to assess the feasibility and 
identify potential barriers to initiatives (Roelfsema et 
al., 2015). Striving for “more and better” data collection 
(Widerberg and Stripple, 2016) from initiatives is 
required to facilitate efforts to assess ICIs’ progress 
and anticipate their contributions to climate action and 
sustainable development efforts (Roelfsema et al., 2015; 
Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015; Hsu et al., 2016). Some 
ICIs have developed approaches that demonstrate how 
this could be accomplished. The Bonn Challenge, for 
instance, maintains an interactive online dashboard 
tracking its signatories’ commitments, and their potential 
collective progress towards the initiative’s goal.6
5 Part of the increase may include adaptation-focused ICIs.
6 See http://www.bonnchallenge.org/.
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Lead organization and secretariat
The existence of a secretariat and a lead organization 
is likely to influence ICI performance (Pattberg and 
Widerberg, 2016). Initiatives with a permanent secretariat 
report both higher-than-average potential emission 
reduction contributions in 2020 and 2030, and higher 
indirect impacts, complementary goals and co-benefits, 
such as diffusion of information, political effects, 
technology development, reduced air pollution, improved 
health, and strengthened energy security and economic 
development (Graichen et al., 2017). Similarly, the active 
involvement of NGOs, as either leaders or ICI members, 
has been shown to be associated with higher potential 
emission reductions and potentially larger co-benefits 
(Graichen et al., 2017).
Almost all (217) of the ICIs included in CIP state that they 
have a secretariat, in many cases hosted by one of the 
larger organizations participating in the ICI, but it is not 
possible to assess how many of these secretariats are 
permanent. In fact, some studies suggest that most ICIs 
lack a permanent secretariat (Graichen et al., 2017; Chan, 
2018).
Functions
ICIs primarily provide information and knowledge-related 
services to their participants (figure 5.3). Although the 
distribution of functions has remained relatively stable 
over time, a few new functions have recently emerged, 
including financing and fund-raising. In a recent survey 
of 75 ICIs, funding was found to be the most common 
challenge, reported by approximately 30 percent of 
respondents (UNFCCC, 2017). Meanwhile, financial and 
organizational capacity tends to be associated with high-
performing ICIs (Biermann et al., 2007; Chan and Pauw, 
2014; Chan et al., 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell of 
Climate Actions, 2015; Widerberg and Pattberg 2015). 
The recent growth in ICIs’ fund-raising and financing 
activities is therefore promising and may suggest 
increased efforts to address the challenges reported.
5.4 The potential contribution of non-state and 
subnational actors to enhancing ambition and 
bridging the 2030 emissions gap
At the international level, there is particular interest 
in how much NSAs could contribute to global GHG 
emission reductions by 2030 and the extent to which 
these potential contributions are already included in 
national current policy and NDC estimates. Section 
5.4.1 assesses the most recent studies on these issues, 
while section 5.4.2 addresses the questions related to 
tracking the progress and results of NSA action. NSAs 
also play a number of critical roles that do not easily lend 
themselves to quantification, but may nevertheless be 
important to enhancing ambition and bridging the 2030 
emissions gap. Section 5.4.3 provides a brief overview of 
such roles.
5.4.1  Estimates of potential emission reductions 
in 2030 of non-state and subnational actors
The 2016 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP 2016) published 
an overview of quantitative analysis of the potential 
contribution of NSA actions to global emissions 
mitigation in 2030, illustrating a wide range of results. 
Since these estimates were published, the number of 
studies that quantify NSAs’ potential contribution to 
global climate action has grown, with more networks and 
researchers conducting analysis of aggregate impact of 
member groups on global emissions. These studies can 
be divided into three categories: 
1. Individual commitments: estimate the aggregate 
impact on emissions from pledges by individual 
cities, regions or business actors that commit to fully 
implement the targets they set themselves.
2. Single initiatives: estimate the potential impact on 
emissions from a single cooperative initiative goal, 
assuming this is implemented by all actors under 
the initiative. Often, individual actors subscribe to a 
collective cooperative initiative (which can be an ICI) 
that together sets a goal for the initiative. The single 
initiative studies assess the emission reductions 
Table 5.2: Potential greenhouse gas emission reductions of selected              individual commitments and initiatives (in MtCO2e/year in 2025/2030, by study).
Actors 
and 
sectors 
1) Individual commitments 2) Single initiatives 3) Scaled-up potential of multiple initiatives
CDP 
(2016)
ICLEI 
(2015)
Kura-
mochi et 
al. (2017)
Roelf-
sema 
(2017)
Data-
Driven 
Yale, New 
Climate 
Institute, 
and PBL 
(2018)
Ameri ca’s 
Pledge 
(2018)
Arup 
and C40 
Cities for 
Climate 
Leader- 
ship 
Network 
(2014)
The 
Climate 
Group 
and CDP, 
Compact 
of States 
and 
Regions 
(2017)
Compact 
of Mayors 
(2015)
Global 
Covenant 
of Mayors 
(2018)
CDP and 
We Mean 
Business 
(2016)
Roelfsema 
et al. 
(2018)
Graichen 
et al., 
(2017)
Erickson 
and 
Tempest 
(2014)
Data-
Driven 
Yale, New 
Climate 
Institute, 
and PBL 
(2018)
Cities and 
municipa- 
lities
179 by
2035
360–560 
by 2025
3–30 1,550–
2,200 
(current 
policy 
scenario 
1a);  
200–700 
(NDC
scenario 
1b)
500 in 
2025
402 740 1,400 3,700
Regions 550
Business 1,000 .026 in 
2025
3,200–
4,200
ICIs 5,500 5,000–
11,000
15,000–
23,000
Number of 
actors or 
initiatives 
quantified
1,089 
compa-
nies
116 cities 54 cities, 
22 
regions, 
250 
compa-
nies
25 cities 2,175 
compa-
nies,  
76 regions, 
5,910 
cities
155 
busines-
ses,  
115 
cities,  
20 states
228 cities 110 
regional 
govern-
ments
360 cities 9,149 
cities
5 ICIs 
including 
~ 300 
compa-
nies
11 ICIs 19 ICIs 600+ 
cities
21 ICIs
Baseline 
scenario of 
the study
Not 
specified 
- variable 
according 
to 
individual 
company 
actor
Not 
specified 
- variable 
according 
to 
individual 
city actor
Current 
national 
policies 
scenario
Current 
national 
policies + 
NDCs
Current 
policy 
scenario 
and NDCs 
scenario
Business 
as usual
Business 
as usual 
(no policy 
baseline)
Compared 
to 
‘reference 
technology 
scenario’ 
that 
includes 
current 
policies 
and the 
NDCs
Business 
as usual 
(no policy 
baseline)
Business 
as usual 
(no policy 
baseline)
Current 
national 
policies 
scenario
Counter-
factual 
(no policy 
baseline)
Current 
national 
policies 
scenario 
plus 
NDCs
Current 
policy 
scenario
Current 
policy 
scenario 
and NDCs 
Scenario
Overlaps 
quantified?
Note: This table only evaluates reports that include estimated impact in 2025/2030 and                    excludes those with pre-2025 or post-2030 assessment timeframes. Source: Adapted from Hsu et al. (forthcoming).
of the initiative’s goals, rather than pledges that 
individual actors take themselves. The estimated 
emission reductions subsequently involve some 
scaling up of the potential.
3. Scaled-up potential of multiple initiatives: estimate 
the potential emission reductions from several 
initiatives that would occur if the initiatives reached 
a transformative impact at the sector- or economy-
wide level. These studies apply a range of significant 
assumptions on how actions are expanded; from 
assuming that all members within a network will 
adopt an ICI’s ambitious emission reduction goal, 
to that membership will grow to a certain number 
of actors and cover a certain number of additional 
sectors. These studies therefore estimate greater 
reduction potential at the sector- or economy-wide 
level.
Table 5.2 provides an overview of available studies, 
organized according to these three categories. The table 
shows the wide range of potential emission reductions 
estimated in various studies – from companies based in 
the United States of America contributing 0.026 GtCO2e 
in 2025 (America’s Pledge 2018) to as much as 15-23 
GtCO2e in 2030 based on an evaluation of the scaled-up 
potential of 21 cross-sector, multi- actor ICIs (Data-Driven 
Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL, 2018).
Due to the variable baseline methodologies and 
assumptions adopted by each study, as well as different 
scopes in terms of actors and emissions covered, the 
wide range of overall impact assessment is unsurprising. 
Some studies focus on NSA impact in a single country, 
such as the United States of America (Roelfsema, 2017), 
while other single initiative studies evaluate emissions 
savings relative to business-as-usual scenarios for the 
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actor group, rather than comparing to a global scenario. 
Only some studies report a range of results that take into 
consideration assumptions such as a lower and upper 
range of results (We Mean Business, 2016; Graichen et 
al. 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2017; Roelfsema, 2017 and 
Data-Driven Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL, 2018), 
and even fewer conduct sensitivity analysis. 
Some reports, such as the U.S. Climate Alliance (2017) 
report analyzing 15 regions’ contributions to GHG 
reductions or the Nordic Council of Ministers’ report 
(Nordic Council of Ministers 2017), do not provide an 
aggregate quantifi ed assessment of impact. They are 
therefore not included in table 5.2.
Studies included in table 5.2 all assume various baseline 
scenarios against which they assess additional impact 
of NSAs. These baseline scenarios range from study-
specifi c “business as usual” or no-action scenarios, 
to “current policy scenarios” that take into account a 
range of existing government policies and pledges, to an 
“NDC scenario” that assumes that countries implement 
their NDCs under the Paris Agreement (table 5.2; Hsu 
et al., forthcoming). Consequently, it is challenging to 
compare the estimated impact across studies, although 
meta-analysis of methodologies applied in each study 
demonstrate similar approaches, including the use of 
the Greenhouse Gas Protocol standard for distinguishing 
between direct and indirect emissions (Hsu et al., 
forthcoming). Specifi cations of baseline scenarios by 
which to compare additional NSA contributions are also 
increasingly converging to common terminology and 
methods. 
A major question with respect to NSA climate mitigation 
contribution is the extent to which they lead to emission 
reductions that are not accounted for in current national 
policies or in the NDCs. A limited number of the available 
studies assess NSA mitigation impact relative to global 
current policy and NDCs based on an assessment of 
overlap scenarios (see table 5.2). These quantitative 
assessments of overlap determine the ambition level 
of NSA commitments vis-à-vis current policy scenarios 
and NDC scenarios by comparing the rate of emissions 
decline in actors’ targets (Kuramochi et al., 2017). For 
instance, if a city’s emission reduction target results in 
a steeper rate of decline in overall emissions compared 
to a national government’s NDC, a common assumption 
is to consider the emissions reductions that are beyond 
what a national actor has pledged as “additional” 
reductions.
One analysis focused on the United States of America 
(Kuramochi et al., 2017), found that 17 states and 54 
cities with recorded GHG mitigation commitments 
comprising 40 percent of national U.S. emissions were 
found to have the potential to meet almost half of the 
country’s NDC by 2025. Another study that quantifi ed 
nearly 6,000 subnational and over 2,000 business 
commitments determined that emissions would be 
0.2-0.7 GtCO2e/year lower in 2030 than with NDCs alone 
(Data-DrivenYale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL, 2018, 
Figure 5.4).
Figures 5.4a and 5.4b illustrates the wide range of 
potential emission reductions estimated in various 
studies. The fi gure includes the studies from table 
5.2 that have clear and comparable baseline scenario 
defi nitions by which to assess the magnitude of 
additional impact. An assessment of each of the 
studies’ baseline estimates was made to ensure their 
comparable to the Emissions Gap Report scenario 
values for 2030. Figure 5.4a includes estimates from 
studies that aggregate from a bottom-up method of 
pledged 2030 commitments made by individual actors. 
As this fi gure illustrates, the pledged 2030 contribution 
by NSAs, if fully realized, is estimated to lead to limited 
additional emission reductions (ranging from 3-700 
MtCO2e, as indicated in Table 5.2) compared to the full 
implementation of the unconditional NDCs.
Figure 5.4b includes estimates of scaled-up potential 
emission reductions based on an assessment of single 
initiative goals and multiple initiatives’ goals. These 
studies assume that all actors participating within 
their initiative fully implement and achieve the larger 
goal of an initiative and therefore represent “scaled-up” 
potential that is larger than the estimates in fi gure 5.4a. 
The studies behind the estimates in fi gure 5.4b apply 
a range of assumptions on how actions are expanded, 
from assuming that all members within a network will 
adopt an ICI’s ambitious emission reduction goal, to that 
membership will grow to a certain number of actors and 
cover a certain number of additional sectors.
The fi gure indicates that NSAs have the potential 
to contribute signifi cantly to bridging the 2030 
emissions gap, but that realizing this potential requires 
commitments and action that go far beyond current 
recorded and quantifi ed individual actor pledges as well 
as single initiatives.
5.4.2  Tracking progress and results of non-state 
and subnational actors
Data limitations and gaps
As the previous sections illustrate, limited availability, 
consistency and comparability of data pose signifi cant 
challenges to evaluating the potential NSA impact on 
climate mitigation and their other benefi ts. For instance, 
Bansard et al. (2016) found in their evaluation of cities 
participating in the C40 Cities for Climate Leadership 
Network that out of around 40 members evaluated, nine 
different base years with seven different target years 
were found, making an evaluation and comparison of 
targets and level of ambition diffi  cult.
Although Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action 
(NAZCA) acts as an umbrella for various NSA climate 
action repositories, no comprehensive database of NSA 
actions exists, with each NSA adopting various criteria 
for inclusion that are often unclear or opaque (Widerberg 
and Stripple, 2016). The reported data are often not 
suited to calculating emissions impact, estimating 
overlap, or comparing NSA mitigation potential to the 
emissions scenarios of other actors, such as national 
governments.
Key information, such as actors’ target and baseline 
emissions, emissions scopes (that is, direct or indirect), 
and inventory emissions with historic time-series 
available, are often inconsistently reported (if at all), with 
subnational actors from the European Union reporting 
the largest amount of data required for mitigation impact 
assessments and the greatest gaps found in emerging 
and developing countries (Hsu et al., 2018, forthcoming).
Finally, as the estimates and numbers in this report 
exclude national cooperative initiatives and networks, 
they underestimate the scale and spread of NSA climate 
actions, particularly in regions where actors have less 
access or capability to engage with transnational 
initiatives.
Some efforts under way to address data reporting and 
methodological consistency should help improve the 
future data landscape for analyzing NSAs’ contributions. 
For example, the World Resources Institute’s Greenhouse 
Gas Protocol Initiative released in 2015 (the Global 
Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Inventories (Fong et al., 2015)) and a consortium of non-
government institutes, through the Initiative for Climate 
Action Transparency (ICAT), are currently developing 
guidance for NSAs, national governments and other 
audiences to account for and measure NSA climate 
mitigation contributions (see also box 5.3). These and 
other efforts should help improve consistency among 
NSA-reported data.
Source: Based on data in table 5.2.
Note: a)  For studies that include ranges, median estimates are provided with ranges indicated in Figures 5.4a and 5.4b.
 b)  Studies that are cross-hatched evaluate single and multiple ICI goals rather than individual actors’ recorded and quantifi ed pledges. They rely on 
assumptions of future scaled-up impact and therefore represent potential rather than a quantifi ed analysis of individual actors’ NSA pledges.
 c)  Extrapolation of 2025 estimates has been made.
Figure 5.4: The range of estimated potential emission reductions in various NSA studies.
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Figure 5.4a: Emission reduction potential 
of pledged commitments by NSAs.
Figure 5.4b: Scaled up potential emission 
reductions based on single and multiple initiatives.
Box 5.3 Monitoring, reporting and 
verification success stories
Monitoring, reporting and verifying the 
emissions inventories and commitments of 
both national actors and NSAs is key to global 
climate change assessment and governance, 
as there is a risk that actors participate in 
transnational climate governance initiatives 
to “greenwash” or boost their reputations, 
without setting or implementing meaningful 
climate action targets (Okereke, 2007; 
Mayer and Gereffi, 2010; Hsu et al., 2016). 
Some NSAs, however, are making their 
emissions inventories more transparent and 
making progress on implementing climate 
actions. For example, Scotland, Wales, and 
the Australian Capital Territory all compile 
particularly comprehensive GHG emissions 
inventories, which account for the emissions 
of one or more GHGs from sources within a 
defined space and time. Each government 
also goes one step further, by having these 
inventories externally verified.
Box 5.4 Improving monitoring, 
reporting and verification in 
international cooperative initiatives
Many initiatives are improving their 
commitment pledging and evaluation 
process. For example, CDP is starting to 
collect this information through its Assessing 
Low-Carbon Transition (ACT) initiative that 
provides data, indicators and feedback 
for companies to align their targets with 
2ºC scenarios. An application of ACT is 
the Corporate Climate Action Benchmark 
(CCAB) developed by CDP and the World 
Benchmarking Alliance (WBA). From 2019 
onwards, the CCAB measures the climate 
action performance of high emitting 
companies on a yearly basis, allowing 
stakeholders to monitor progress. The aim of 
the CCAB is threefold: incentivize companies 
to align their strategies and operations with 
a well below 2ºC pathway, create a race to 
the top by rewarding companies that are best 
in class, and visualize progress of corporate 
climate action between 2020 and 2030. 
Some city networks, including ICLEI and the 
EU Covenant of Mayors, are reporting on 
their members’ progress, although currently 
only a fraction (1,743 out of more than 6,000 
members with action plans) list progress 
reports on their website. The Science-Based 
Targets initiative helps companies to set 
internal climate targets that are aligned with 
the long-term mitigation goals of the Paris 
Agreement. The initiative currently includes 
over 100 companies with science-based 
targets and over 300 companies wanting to 
develop such targets.
Box 5.5 Orchestration of non-state 
and subnational action around the 
world
Actors and networks in developed and 
developing countries are incentivizing NSAs 
to act, identifying and addressing possible 
barriers to them doing so, and supporting 
NSA capacity- building to tackle climate 
change.
ActionLAC
ActionLAC, a partnership set up by the 
Latin American Fundación Avina, aims to 
accelerate climate action and strengthen 
ambition in Latin America. Targeting actors 
such as community-based organizations, 
small enterprises, and local governments, 
this partnership fosters inclusive climate 
governance in Latin America. ActionLAC 
provides support throughout the “life-cycle 
of climate actions”, including elaborating, 
financing, implementing, evaluating and 
communicating climate action plans. 
Cities and Regions Talanoa Dialogues
ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, 
together with the Global Covenant of Mayors 
for Climate & Energy and UN-Habitat, are 
facilitating Cities and Regions Talanoa 
Dialogues around the world, in response 
to similar dialogues in the context of the 
UNFCCC. These dialogues – 50 of which have 
been scheduled throughout 2018 – engage 
actors that have often not been adequately 
involved in national climate efforts to date, 
and to advance the New Urban Agenda 
adopted in 2016. For instance, they explore 
pathways for actively engaging subnational 
governments in formulating national climate 
investment plans. So far, about half of the 
scheduled dialogues are in developing 
countries.
European Dialogue on Non-State Climate 
Action
The European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC), the EU advisory body 
comprising representatives from workers’ 
and employers’ organizations, established 
the European Dialogue on Non-State Climate 
Action (ED-NSCA). This dialogue aims to 
strengthen and increase the scope and 
scale of European-based non-state climate 
action among constituencies that are often 
not traditionally known as main actors in 
environment and climate change, including 
workers’ and employers’ organizations in the 
industrial, agricultural and transport sectors. 
The European Dialogue envisages supporting 
non-state climate action by assessing, 
recognizing, improving, accelerating and 
supporting actions.
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Tracking progress on NSA implementation 
achievement of targets
Although efforts to improve the monitoring, reporting 
and evaluation of NSA actions are increasing (see 
previous section and box 5.4), studies and information 
regarding NSA implementation – progress towards 
achieving targets and whether actors are meeting their 
goals – are still scarce (Chan et al., 2018; 2015). Part of 
the difficulty of tracking implementation is that ex-post 
measurement of results is largely lacking, given the 
nascent nature of many NSA climate actions. Therefore, 
most available studies quantifying the mitigation impact 
of NSAs assess their potential emission reductions, 
rather than ex-post or achieved results. An exception is 
ICLEI’s (2018b) report analyzing the drivers of emissions 
reductions based on 138 local governments submitting 
inventories and reporting on policy efforts. 
To bolster confidence in NSA contributions to bridging 
the 2030 emissions gap, data on implementation are 
critical to understanding whether current targets and 
goals are being reached and 2030 potentials are likely to 
be achieved.
Some studies question the extent to which NSA 
implementation and achievements to date have 
delivered real emission reductions (Chan et al., 2015; 
2018; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2017). One analysis 
found that out of more than 300 collaborative non-state 
partnerships announced at the 2002 World Sustainable 
Development Summit, nearly 65 percent were yet to be 
operationalized 10 years later (Pattberg et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, from the studies available, a number of 
aspects that are likely to influence the implementation 
and performance of NSA actions are emerging (see 
also section 5.3.2). Graichen et al., (2017); ICAT, (2018); 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa, (2017); Pattberg and 
Widerberg, (2016) show that these aspects include:
Note: This box draws on insights shared by The Climate Group’s Compact 
of States and Regions initiative.7
7 In particular, we thank Milimer Morgado and Jean-Charles Seghers for their help in compiling these examples.
• Leadership and permanent secretariat (for 
cooperative initiatives).
•  Target clarity and ownership.
•  The presence of monitoring and progress 
reporting mechanisms.
•  Past achievement of results, actors’ technical 
capacity.
•  Financial incentives and the availability of funding.
•  A commitment’s vulnerability to political 
considerations.
•  The presence of regulatory support.
It should be noted that while monitoring, reporting 
and verification procedures are important in terms 
of enabling learning and boosting credibility among 
individual actors and initiatives, they may dissuade new 
NSAs from taking climate action. In ICIs in particular, 
if the goals and monitoring, reporting and verification 
procedures are considered too much of an administrative 
burden, it could discourage their further expansion.
5.4.3  Contributions by non-state and subnational 
actors beyond direct emission reductions
NSAs’ contributions to climate change action go beyond 
their quantifiable potential emission reductions: they 
can play a key role in building government confidence 
in implementing climate policies and they can signal 
and push for greater ambition. Quantitative analysis 
that emphasize NSAs’ direct contributions to climate 
mitigation may overlook the critical other roles that 
they play in global climate change governance, such 
as capacity-building, knowledge transfer and coalition 
building, as these important NSA actions are difficult to 
quantify. Other examples include facilitative or catalytic 
actions, such as low or zero-carbon norm creation, 
or policy foundations, such as voluntary emissions 
registries, which may produce longer-term societal 
transitions towards decarbonization (van der Ven et al., 
2017).
Nevertheless, studies that analyze difficult to quantify 
NSA roles and functions in national and global climate 
change governance are emerging. These studies 
highlight three roles and functions as particularly 
important:
•  Facilitating catalytic linkages (for example, Betsill 
et al., 2015) with national actors that are often 
informal in nature, but allow for actors such as 
national governments to address underlying 
drivers of emissions, build capacity, or shape low-
carbon development contexts.
•  Acting as potential orchestrators (for example, 
Abbott et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2018) in climate 
policy implementation and coordination with 
national and intergovernmental actors.
•  Providing experimentation (for example, 
Hoffmann 2011; Bernstein and Hoffmann, 2018) 
for policy instruments or implementation deemed 
too risky or costly at the national level.
Box 5.5 provides examples of the orchestration role of 
NSAs.
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5.5  Opportunities for harnessing the potential of 
NSA climate action to enhance ambition and 
bridge the emissions gap
The previous sections illustrate the magnitude, 
diversity and potential contributions of NSAs to climate 
change action, forming the basis for a number of 
recommendations on how to further strengthen NSAs’ 
action to realize their emission reduction potential. These 
recommendations are briefl y summarized below.
First, more actors must engage in climate action. Scaling 
up individual and collaborative climate action to more 
geographic areas, sectors and types of actors could 
signifi cantly contribute to realizing the large mitigation 
potential of NSAs. NSAs from previously under-
represented regions of the world are starting to take 
action. Many regions, particularly in the Global South, 
are still under-represented in terms of participants, 
lead organizations, and the location of secretariats. 
Encouraging NSAs in developing countries to engage 
in initiatives would facilitate climate action in growing 
economies with potentially large and low-cost mitigation 
potentials. Scaling up also entails ensuring a broad range 
of sectors, including currently under- represented ones 
such as oil and gas.
Second, national governments can play a vital role by 
stimulating this growing movement, and can for example 
support non-state actors by providing collaboration 
platforms, capacity building and technical and fi nancial 
resources. Furthermore, national political institutions 
are crucial to transnational climate action (Andonova 
et al., 2017). Governments can also support the 
implementation of individual commitments. In order to 
support urban climate action, for example, governments 
could develop policies and approaches for enhancing 
the capacity of local governments, including providing 
fi nancial investments and enabling private investments 
to lower GHGs (Broekhoff et al., 2018).
Third, transparency is critical to assessing NSA 
actions and tracking their implementation. This report 
clearly shows that although progress is being made, 
transparency and related monitoring, reporting and 
verifi cation standards require improvement at all 
levels: individual, cooperative initiative, and global. 
Commitments are often vague in terms of goals, 
language and enforcement mechanisms, while different 
baselines, timelines and assessment frameworks 
are used to report on progress. Implementing 
monitoring, reporting and verifi cation mechanisms 
for cooperative initiatives is particularly important, 
in order to document tangible results, NSA climate 
actions could gain credibility among the broader public 
and decision makers. These mechanisms would also 
facilitate learning, allowing the organization to assess 
performance on an ongoing basis and to experiment with 
new approaches.
Data collection and reporting efforts are starting to 
enable more sophisticated analysis on the potential 
for NSA climate action to contribute additional GHG 
reductions beyond national governments commitments. 
However, data gaps (particularly in high-emitting 
sectors and developing countries) limit these analysis, 
meaning they do not necessarily capture the diversity 
of the NSA climate action taking place. Particularly 
where sustainable economic development is a pressing 
concern, NSA climate action takes on different forms 
besides participation in transnational climate action 
networks, focusing also on adaptation, capacity- building 
and resilience functions that are more diffi  cult to quantify 
and aggregate on a global scale.
Finally, NSAs play different important roles and 
functions and their contribution to global climate change 
governance goes beyond what can be measured in terms 
of direct emission reductions. These aspects – including 
orchestration, catalytic effects, and experimentation –
should therefore be kept in mind.
Chapter 6. 
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6.1 Introduction
Fiscal policies can affect fossil fuel prices and therefore 
infl uence carbon emissions and investments in the 
energy sector. However, current price signals from excise 
taxes and carbon pricing are too low and inconsistent to 
encourage strong and cost-effective mitigation. In some 
countries, and for some fuels, carbon prices are even 
negative due to high fi nancial support for fossil fuels. 
This chapter assesses the fi scal policy gap between 
current fi scal policy and its potential for reducing carbon 
emissions and collecting public revenue. It provides 
country examples and further considerations of how to 
overcome this gap. 
6.2 The current state of fi scal policies 
and their potential for the 
low-carbon transition 
6.2.1 Carbon pricing
Increasing the price of carbon emissions 
through carbon taxes or emissions trading 
systems (ETS) is a core element of climate 
policy. Before 2005, hardly any emissions 
were covered by carbon taxes or trading 
systems (World Bank and Ecofys, 2018). 
Coverage increased to about 5 percent of 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
between 2005 and 2010, primarily because of 
the introduction of the European Union’s ETS. 
Between 2010 and 2018, coverage has risen 
to about 15 percent of global emissions, with 
51 carbon pricing initiatives now installed 
or scheduled. If China implements carbon 
pricing as announced, coverage would rise to 
about 20 percent of global GHG emissions. 
While coverage, price levels, and coordination and 
cooperation efforts are increasing, carbon prices are 
often low and inconsistent, as illustrated in fi gure 6.1. 
This depicts the distribution of carbon rates for energy 
use across all sectors and fuels for 42 Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
G20 countries, which together represent 80 percent of 
global CO2 emissions from energy use (OECD, 2018b). 
Effective carbon rates are policy-induced increases in 
(relative) fossil fuel prices, expressed per tonne of CO2. 
They include carbon taxes and permit prices related to 
existing ETS, as well as excise taxes on energy. 
1 Opinions expressed are those of the authors and not of the institutions that they are affi  liated with. We would like to thank Assia Elgouacem (OECD), Ottmar Edenhofer (MCC), 
Michael Jakob (MCC) and Ian Parry (IMF) for their input and comments. We would also like to thank Sarah Beyer and Zeljana Ana Grulovic for their assistance. 
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Excise taxes are by far the largest component of the 
overall carbon price, although ETS constitute a large 
share in the electricity sector in most jurisdictions 
where such systems are in place. Accordingly, revenues 
from carbon taxes and ETS (US$33 billion [€28 billion]2 
in 2017)3 remain much smaller than those of excise 
taxes on energy use (ca €421 billion in OECD and G20 
countries – Marten and Van Dender, forthcoming). 
However, excise sales taxes on energy use are often 
poorly aligned with the carbon content of the tax base. 
Coal – the most carbon-intensive energy source, and 
one that also causes signifi cant local environmental 
damage – is untaxed in most large economies and 
therefore priced at production cost (Coady et al., 2018). 
Effective carbon rates tend to be higher for oil products 
than for other fuels, and they are signifi cantly higher in 
road transport than in all other sectors.4 Fuel prices in 
the European countries with the highest fuel taxes may 
be high enough to cover non-climate externalities in 
road transport, including local air pollution, congestion, 
noise, casualties, and road wear and tear (Santos, 2017; 
Coady et al., 2018; OECD, 2018a), but they remain too low 
elsewhere.
Current carbon prices fall short of the levels needed for 
meeting the targets of the Paris Agreement. The High-
Level Commission on Carbon Prices (2017) concludes 
that the explicit carbon price level consistent with the 2°C 
target is at least US$40–80/tCO2 [€34–68/tCO2] by 2020 
and US$50–100/tCO2 [€43–86/tCO2] by 2030. Hence, 
the lower end of this range indicates the minimum price 
level needed to close the emissions gap in order to reach 
the 2°C target. Figure 6.1 shows that approximately 
90 percent of the CO2 emissions from energy use are 
priced at rates below the lower end: half of the emissions 
are not priced at all, and an additional 40 percent of 
emissions are priced at rates below the minimum price 
level of €34/tCO2. 
Major efforts are needed to increase carbon prices. 
However, in recent years, progress has been slow, as can 
be seen from the ‘carbon pricing gap’ indicator (OECD, 
2016 and 2018b). The carbon pricing gap measures 
the positive differences between a €30 carbon rate and 
applicable rates across all energy use, as a percentage, 
and therefore considers the extent of emissions priced 
below €30. Against this rate, the gap is estimated to be 
77 percent in 2018, which is approximately 6 percentage 
points lower than in 2012 and 3 percentage points 
lower than in 2015. The rate of reduction needs to be 
much faster to ensure that carbon rates align with the 
Paris Agreement targets. The signifi cant carbon pricing 
gap and the slow progress is partly related to political 
economy issues, i.e. the distribution of climate policy 
costs and political and behavioural barriers to fi scal 
reforms. Section 6.3 will discuss the major obstacles and 
how to address and overcome these. 
6.2.2 Fossil fuel subsidies
Budgetary support for fossil fuels usually reduces prices 
and can create negative carbon prices. This leads to 
higher fuel use, GHG emissions and local air pollution. 
Support includes the direct transfer of funds, market 
price support (e.g. setting prices that are different from 
market rates), tax concessions (e.g. exemptions or 
reductions), in-kind support (e.g. building a railway from 
a coal mine to a port), credit support (e.g. favourable 
loans or loan guarantees), below-market insurance 
rates and caps on liability or preferential government 
procurement (Steenblik, 2008). Consumer subsidies are 
mostly used in developing and resource-rich countries. 
Producer subsidies are found in both developed and 
developing countries (Bast et al., 2015). 
Estimates of fossil fuel subsidy levels differ due to 
varying coverage and methodologies. In an effort to 
provide a consistent fi gure, the International Energy 
Agency and OECD estimate that subsidies for oil, natural 
gas and coal amounted to US$373 billion [€319 billion] 
in 2015, which is 0.5 percent of global gross domestic 
product (GDP) (OECD, 2018c). Total consumer subsidies 
declined by 15 percent in 2016 and are currently given to 
petroleum products (40 percent), electricity (41 percent), 
natural gas (19 percent) and coal (less than 1 percent) 
(IEA, 2017). The recent decrease in support is the 
result of reform efforts and declining global fuel prices. 
However, this downward trend does not apply to all 
countries and energy sources; subsidies are increasing 
for electricity consumption in particular, and in countries 
including Angola, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, 
Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa (IEA, 2017). Rising 
crude oil prices could drive up subsidies and reverse 
some reforms. 
Reforming fossil fuel subsidies can yield signifi cant 
public savings. In the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, fossil fuel subsidies averaged 
almost 20 percent of total government spending in 
the 2013/2014 fi nancial year (El-Katiri and Fattouh, 
2017). Similarly, before recent reforms, the share of 
Indonesia’s government expenditure dedicated to 
fossil fuel subsidies hovered just below 30 percent, 
and subsequently dropped to 6 percent (NCE, 2018). 
Fossil fuel consumer price support disproportionally 
benefi ts richer households—the top income quintile on 
average receives six times more in subsidies than the 
bottom quintile (Coady et al., 2015). Reducing fossil fuel 
subsidies therefore leads to more equitable distributional 
outcomes. Moreover, reducing fossil fuel use by reducing 
fuel subsidies can improve air quality, public health and 
economic effi  ciency. 
6.2.3 Emissions reduction potential
Better alignment of energy taxes across the carbon 
content of fuels and increases in carbon prices would, 
over time, reduce demand for fossil fuels. Strong 
commitment to announced price paths allows investors 
to make low-carbon investments with suffi  cient 
confi dence. For example, the Canadian province of 
British Columbia implemented a schedule to increase 
carbon taxes by C$5 [€3] per tCO2 per year as of April 
2018, increasing from C$35 to C$50 [€24 to €34] per 
2 For converting currencies into euros, in this chapter we use the average exchange rate between 2014 and 2017 provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
3 The revenue is lower than the value of the carbon pricing systems (ca US$82 billion [€70 billion]) because substantial shares of tradable permits are allocated for free.
4 The right tail of the distribution curve in fi gure 6.1 consists almost entirely of road transport rates.
Figure 6.2: CO2 reductions (relative to baseline) and revenues (relative to gross domestic product (GDP)) generated from 
additional carbon taxes of €30/tCO2 and €60/tCO2, 2030.
Source: Parry et al. (2018).
Note: Calculations assume that carbon prices are implemented in addition to existing measures. Revenue calculations account for induced changes in 
revenues from pre-existing excise taxes, but not from the broader fi scal system (i.e. income taxes). The original paper refers to carbon taxes of US$35/tCO2 
[€30/tCO2] and US$70/tCO2 [€60/tCO2]. For comparability with section 6.2, these prices were converted to Euros. 
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tCO2 by 2021. Other countries have also substantially 
increased carbon taxes over time: the carbon tax in 
France amounts to €44.60 per tCO2 and is set to rise 
considerably; Sweden has increased rates to €120 per 
tCO2 in 2018 and is also abolishing non-European Union 
ETS industry exemptions this year; and Switzerland has 
increased rates to CHF96 [€85] per tCO2 in 2018). Future 
price increases could also be rule-based, with carbon 
prices increasing more signifi cantly if emissions turn out 
to be higher compared with a benchmark (Murray et al., 
2017; Hafstead et al., 2017). Energy taxes can also help 
refl ect other external costs, including air pollution and, to 
some extent, traffi  c congestion. 
Based on International Monetary Fund estimates (Parry 
et al., 2018), an additional carbon price of €30/tCO2 by 
2030 could lead to emission reductions of more than 10 
percent in many countries. According to the High-Level 
Commission on Carbon Prices (2017), a carbon price of 
€60/tCO2 by 2030 is at the lower end of the spectrum 
in terms of prices needed to close the emissions gap 
in order to meet the 2°C target. A price of €60/tCO2 is 
estimated to cut emissions by just over 10 percent to 
more than 40 percent, depending on the country (fi gure 
6.2). 
As the presence of fossil fuel subsidies can undermine 
carbon pricing efforts, subsidy reform is an important 
complement to carbon pricing. Phasing out fossil fuel 
support could reduce global emissions by between 
1 percent and 11 percent by 2020–2030, although 
regional emissions reductions, e.g. for the Middle 
East and North Africa, may be substantially larger 
(Burniaux and Chateau, 2014;  IEA, 2015; Merrill et al., 
2015; Gerasimchuk et al., 2017; Jewell et al., 2018). 
Emission reductions are strongest for oil and natural 
gas use. Since fi nancial support for coal use is relatively 
low, subsidy removal has only a small impact on coal 
consumption, which would be more strongly affected by 
carbon pricing.
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6.3 The political economy of green fi scal reform 
and carbon taxes: lessons learned 
Public support for carbon pricing or the phasing-out of 
fossil fuel subsidies is often limited, in part because 
politicians have failed to communicate a clear narrative 
on how and why this would benefi t consumers and the 
local economy. Key concerns relate to (i) the distribution 
of costs between households and fi rms, (ii) limited 
environmental effectiveness due to leakage of emissions 
to other jurisdictions and (iii) broader behavioural 
and political factors. Concerns about reduced 
competitiveness and relocation of economic activity 
due to domestic policy can be separated into costs for 
fi rms, employment effects and emission leakage, and 
are therefore covered by (i) and (ii). Figure 6.3 gives an 
overview of the key issues and proposed measures to 
address them. As fi scal policies create revenue, they 
can provide additional space for compensation or other 
forms of spending to help make carbon pricing more 
appealing.
6.3.1 Distribution of costs
Carbon taxes and energy subsidies affect prices of 
production factors, goods and services, so the costs 
of fi scal policy affect many fi rms and households 
(Fullerton, 2011). Addressing the economic costs 
borne by politically powerful groups can encourage 
support for reform. Equally, compensating vulnerable 
and highly disadvantaged groups is important for social 
inclusiveness and fairness (i.e. reducing poverty and 
inequality). Higher energy and carbon taxes have a 
particularly negative effect on:
Figure 6.3: Key issues for making fi scal reforms politically viable (upper part) and solutions and measures to address 
them (lower part). Measures related to fi nancial fl ows are marked with a green mark in the bottom corner. Table 6.1 gives 
country examples of the political and behavioural factors (listed in the third column) while table 6.2 shows different ways 
to use revenues (green arrows). 
1. Owners of carbon-intensive businesses (fossil fuel 
fi rms, the steel and cement industries) that have 
excess or idle production capacity, leading to lower-
than-expected returns.
2. Workers in energy-intensive industries who might 
lose jobs or face lower wages.
3. Owners of fossil resources in situ, who may not be 
able to extract and sell their products due to lower 
demand or lower market prices.
4. Households and consumers who spend a relatively 
high share of their income on energy-intensive goods 
and services. 
The cost for fi rms often plays a prominent role in public 
debate about carbon pricing, prompted by their concerns 
over maintaining global competitiveness, since unilateral 
policy puts additional costs on domestic business, 
potentially affecting profi ts and employment (the impact 
on relocation of emissions, i.e. leakage, is discussed 
below). However, the cost to capital owners and workers 
is only transitory as investment and employment adjust 
in the long run, without substantial costs resulting from 
depreciation (capital) and retirement (employment). 
While costs for fi rms have been found, on average, to be 
rather low (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017), they can be 
high in carbon-intensive fi rms that would be particularly 
affected by phasing out fossil fuel subsidies or by higher 
carbon prices (Jenkins, 2014; Aldy and Pizer, 2015; 
OECD, 2015, Rentschler et al., 2017). If fi rms face strong 
international competition, their ability to pass on higher 
energy costs to consumers is limited, and this increases 
their compliance costs. 
A common compensation approach is to grant support 
that is both targeted and time-limited, e.g. exemptions 
or transfers (Aldy and Pizer, 2015). Allocating permits 
based on past emissions (known as ‘grandfathering’) 
in trading systems, as occurs in the European Union 
ETS, can mitigate economic losses and prevent 
industry relocation. However, it also undermines policy 
effectiveness (Flues and Van Dender, 2017a) and can 
result in substantial overcompensation for a given 
carbon leakage risk, as Martin et al. (2014) show for 
the European Union ETS. Reduced corporate income 
or capital taxes as part of broader fi scal reforms can 
reduce or even offset the carbon pricing burden on 
fi rms (Carbone et al., 2013; Goulder and Hafstead, 
2013; Williams III et al., 2014; Rausch and Reilly, 2015). 
Providing additional training and transitional benefi ts for 
workers of affected industries is a more cost-effective 
way of compensating them than providing direct support 
to employers, in the longer term (Frondel et al., 2007). 
Losses for fossil fuel resource owners due to long-
term carbon pricing represent a permanent wealth loss 
and can be substantial. Ambitious mitigation policies 
consistent with the 2°C target are estimated to reduce 
discounted fossil resource rents by roughly 40 percent, 
compared with a no climate policy scenario (Bauer et 
al., 2016). However, state revenues from carbon pricing 
would likely outweigh the losses for fossil resource 
owners (Kalkuhl and Brecha, 2013; Bauer et al., 2016).
Higher energy prices can affect lower-income or rural 
households disproportionally (Flues and Thomas, 2015; 
Levinson and O’Brien, 2018) and may increase energy-
poverty risk (Flues and Van Dender, 2017b; Atansah 
et al., 2017). Carbon pricing tends to be progressive 
in developing countries, while it is more likely to be 
regressive in middle- and high-income countries 
as relatively low-income households have higher 
expenditure shares on energy-intensive goods and 
services (Dorband et al., 2018; Ohlendorf et al., 2018). 
However, middle and high-income countries often have 
the institutional capacities to overcome these adverse 
effects by pursuing compensation policies. Transfers on 
an equal per capita basis are highly benefi cial for poor 
households (Klenert and Mattauch, 2016), but targeted 
transfers leave more revenue for other purposes. 
Targeted investment in low-income neighbourhoods (e.g. 
in public transport, access to clean energy or income 
tax reductions for poorer households) can mitigate 
adverse equity effects (Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha, 
2014; Edenhofer et al., 2017; OECD, 2017; Klenert et al., 
2018b). Table 6.1 lists examples of measures that have 
been successfully implemented to protect the poorest 
households.
6.3.2  Carbon leakage under unilateral policies 
A country that unilaterally increases the price of 
carbon could see emission-intensive production 
relocate to other countries, which would undermine the 
effectiveness of carbon pricing (World Bank, 2015). This 
is known as carbon leakage, which can be fi xed by trade 
and non-trade measures (Jakob et al., 2014). These 
trade measures include tariffs or charges imposed on 
countries that do not have comparable carbon prices 
(‘carbon tariffs’). Trade policies can be used strategically 
to incentivize trade partners to adopt domestic climate 
policy measures or to increase or maintain a coalition 
of countries with ambitious climate policies (Barrett, 
1997; Lessmann et al., 2009; Nordhaus, 2015). Non-trade 
policies to reduce the risk of carbon leakage include the 
grandfathering of emission permits and output-based 
rebates to energy-intensive and trade-exposed fi rms.
Border carbon adjustments are a specifi c form of carbon 
tariff that involve levying taxes on imported goods 
according to their carbon footprint and removing the 
carbon price component of exported goods. Border 
carbon adjustments aim to level the playing fi eld 
between domestic and foreign fi rms by imposing the 
same economic burden on emissions (Mehling et al., 
2018). Introducing border carbon adjustments to carbon 
prices on domestic emissions is a consumption-based 
method for pricing emissions. However, implementing 
border carbon adjustments requires substantial (and 
accurate) information on production-side emissions 
and on the direct or implicit carbon prices in exporting 
countries. Improved monitoring, reporting and 
verifi cation systems can therefore help make border 
carbon adjustments more accurate. Moreover, the impact 
of border carbon adjustments on reducing leakage can 
be weakened through induced changes in trade and 
production patterns (Jakob and Marschinski, 2013). 
Ensure equitable distribution
of costs: 
Support households and firms
Alleviate effect of 
unilateral policies: 
Tackle carbon leakage
Foster public support:
Political and behavioral enablers to 
higher energy prices or taxes
Use revenues appropriately
Affected industry support: 
trade-exposed
industries
Carbon tariffs and 
border-carbon 
adjustment (BCA)
Key issues
Solutions
and
measures
Cash transfers for
households/consumers
Establish trust
in governments 
Investments fostering 
structural change
(energy, infrastructure)
Affected industry support:
targeted compensation 
(firms & workers)
Information and 
communication about 
impacts 
Reduce income taxes
Consider wording
and framing
Appropriate timing
and sequencing
Avoid solution aversion
Climate projects, low- 
carbon investment
Table 6.1: Behavioural and political success factors.
Success factor Example(s)
Directly 
addressing 
distributional 
impacts
• LPG price increases in Brazil and Mexico were combined with existing social welfare 
mechanisms to mitigate the effects of higher prices (Adeoti et al., 2016; Toft et al., 2016).
• Kerosene subsidy reforms in Indonesia and Yemen were accompanied by measures 
promoting the use of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as a household cooking fuel 
(Clements et al., 2013).
• In Indonesia, social assistance programmes enabled the government to reform fossil 
fuel subsidies in the mid-2000s (Chelminski, 2018), while India and Iran provided some 
form of cash transfer to compensate households (Rentschler and Bazilian, 2017a; Jain et 
al., 2018).
• Switzerland, Alberta and British Columbia (see table 6.2) have used revenues from 
carbon pricing to compensate households and, to a degree, firms.
Establishing 
trust in 
governments
• Countries with relatively high levels of trust and low levels of perceived corruption, such 
as Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, tend to have higher carbon prices (Rafaty, 
2018).
• Subsidy reform in Indonesia had previously been difficult due to public distrust in the 
government; however, more recently, reforms have been accompanied by measures 
tackling corruption in the oil and gas sector (Chelminski, 2018).
• Jordan’s 2008 subsidy reforms were introduced following consultations with a wide array 
of stakeholders (Whitley and van der Burg, 2015).
Avoiding solution 
aversion
• Proposed carbon pricing reforms for the USA as a whole, or for individual USA states, are 
often designed to accommodate less interventionist world views. This is accomplished 
by minimizing the State’s role in the carbon pricing reform, in part by returning a large 
portion of the revenue to its citizens (Nature Editorial, 2017). Further examples are the 
Massachusetts Bill H.1726—which also features a carbon dividend—that passed the 
state senate in June 2018 (DeMarco, 2018) or the reform of the Californian Cap and 
Trade system (CAB, 2017) and the ‘fee and rebate’ proposal in Washington DC, both of 
which are focused to some degree on revenue neutrality (Dysen, 2018).
Information and 
communication 
about the 
impacts
• The successful fossil fuel subsidy reform in Iran was carefully prepared by clear 
government communication through various channels, such as websites and hotlines 
to answer questions about the reform. The government also proactively consulted the 
private sector to discuss potential concerns about the policy reform (Atansah et al., 
2017).
• The Government of Malaysia used multiple channels (including a public forum, YouTube 
and Twitter) to communicate fossil fuel subsidy reform in 2013 (Fay et al., 2015).
Getting the 
timing and 
sequencing right
• Gradual fossil fuel subsidy reform in Iran helped with gaining public acceptance and 
reducing adverse effects (Rentschler and Bazilian, 2017b).
• Sudden and drastic price increases, by contrast, may spark public protests, as was the 
case for subsidy reforms in Bolivia and Nigeria (Beaton et al., 2013).
• Subsidy reform in Egypt in 2014 was possible during the ‘honeymoon period’ of the new 
el-Sisi Government (Moerenhout, 2018).
Considering 
wording and 
framing 
• The Government of India successfully framed its Direct Benefit Transfer for LPG scheme 
as a means of addressing inefficient service delivery (Jain et al., 2018).
• In the carbon pricing schemes in Alberta and Switzerland, carbon prices are labelled as 
‘levies’ (FOEN, 2017; Government of Alberta, 2018).
Using revenues 
appropriately
See details and examples in table 6.2.
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Focusing on particularly carbon-intensive goods (e.g. 
cement and steel) and conducting an ex ante evaluation 
on trade impacts can help overcome these downsides 
and make border carbon adjustments more effective in 
reducing carbon leakage.
Carbon tariffs are not necessarily compatible with 
World Trade Organization rules, although they could 
be covered by Article XX of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which stipulates that trade 
policies can be used for achieving environmental goals 
if no other policies are feasible that are less distortive to 
trade (Cosbey et al., 2012). Even so, retaliation can pose 
an economic risk if carbon tariffs are implemented by 
countries with a small share on the international market 
(Hagen and Schneider, 2017; Böhringer and Rutherford, 
2017). 
6.3.3 Political and behavioural factors
Ensuring broad and stable support for carbon pricing 
and the phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies requires 
more than addressing distributional, competitiveness 
and leakage impacts. A number of additional success 
factors can be identified (Klenert et al., 2018a) and 
table 6.1 provides country examples for addressing 
these. The challenge is particularly significant where 
trust in government is limited (Klenert et al., 2018a; 
Rafaty, 2018). And yet, where trust is strong, there 
is a tendency for citizens to question problems if 
policy solutions challenge their world views, e.g. on 
the State’s role in the economy (“solution aversion”) 
(Campbell and Kay, 2014; Cherry et al., 2017). Designing 
policies that are consistent with the prevailing world 
views of specific societal groups therefore requires 
extensive communication and consultation prior to 
implementation.
To secure popular support for carbon pricing, the 
public needs to be informed about its positive effect on 
emissions reduction targets, as well as the co-benefits 
of cleaner air, health and fiscal sustainability (Hsu et 
al., 2008; Bristow et al., 2010; Kallbekken et al., 2011; 
Baranzini et al., 2014; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017). 
Timing is also important: a gradual reform is more 
likely to be successful than sudden and drastic price 
increases. Similarly, if several fossil fuel subsidies are 
being reformed, this can best be done by sequencing 
the reforms (Beaton et al., 2013; Rentschler and Bazilian, 
2017b). Language matters too, with terms such as ‘fee’ 
or ‘contribution’ likely to meet with popular support 
compared with ‘tax’ (Kallbekken et al., 2011; Drews and 
van den Bergh, 2016; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017). 
Carbon pricing and fossil fuel subsidy reform generate 
public revenues, the use of which can strongly impact 
support for carbon pricing. This is discussed in the 
section 6.3.4.
6.3.4 Use revenues from carbon pricing to foster 
sustainable development
Raising revenue through energy tax reforms relaxes 
constraints on broader fiscal policy, creating 
opportunities to stimulate more productive and socially 
inclusive economic development. With respect to carbon 
pricing, its potential for contributing to public budgets 
is illustrated in figure 6.2b. In developing and emerging 
economies, where tax revenue-to-gross domestic product 
(GDP) ratios rarely exceed 20 percent, an additional €60/
tCO2 carbon price on top of existing measures would 
generate revenues worth more than 2 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP). These revenues would not be 
available under non-fiscal climate policies like emission 
standards or ETS that do not auction permits. 
The way these new revenues are used has an effect on 
the economy and equity, and therefore relates directly 
to the economic and political arguments for tax-based 
environment policy. Revenues can be deployed in 
various ways. Policy packages that combine carbon 
pricing with political or legal commitments to particular 
forms of spending have been found to increase the 
political appeal of, and public support for, fiscal reforms. 
However, because revenues from environmental taxes 
might be insufficient or too high for a specific spending 
objective, legal earmarking of these revenue sources for 
particular spending items increases the risk of inefficient 
tax and spending patterns. Maintaining some flexibility 
for adjusting spending decisions, e.g. through political 
commitment to policy packages, is therefore important. 
Options for such policy packages include: 
1. Cutting personal or corporate income taxes.
2. Cash transfers.
3. Investment projects aimed at poor or disadvantaged 
regions or neighbourhoods, or regions traditionally 
dependent on fossil resource extraction (e.g. coal). 
4. Temporarily assisting energy-intensive industries 
facing strong international competition.
5. Supporting low-carbon technologies or spending that 
increases environmental quality.
Table 6.2 gives an overview of spending options, 
including some country-specific examples. Choosing 
a particular option should be guided by the economic 
circumstances and political and social priorities of the 
respective jurisdiction. Some countries, such as Chile, 
Mexico and Viet Nam, have not earmarked environmental 
tax revenues or committed to simultaneous tax cuts. 
Sweden used a soft earmarking approach, reflecting a 
political commitment to reduce other taxes, in particular 
labour taxes. The revenue from ETS is more often 
allocated to green spending than that of carbon taxes 
and excise taxes and discussions on carbon taxes and 
excise taxes are more often embedded in broader tax 
policy reform efforts. 
Table 6.2: Options for revenue recycling.
Recycling option Objective(s) Example(s)
Reduce income 
taxes
Growth, 
employment
• Germany (energy tax reform): A 1.7-percentage point reduction in 
compulsory public pension contributions increased employment 
by 0.6 percent (Bach et al., 2002; Welsch and Ehrenheim, 2004).
• Sweden (energy tax; carbon tax of €120): Revenues led to 
continued reductions of labour taxes; tax revenues comprise 
1.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 3.6 percent of 
national tax revenues.
Cash transfers Equity, popular 
support
• British Columbia, Canada (carbon tax of C$35 [€24] in 2018): up 
to C$135 [€92] per adult and C$40 [€27] per child in 2018.
• Alberta, Canada (carbon levy of C$30 [€21] in 2018): tax rebate 
(on average C$135 [€92] per inhabitant in 2018, dependent on 
income and family status).
• Switzerland (CO2 levy of CHF96 [€85] in 2018): Majority of 
revenues recycled to citizens as a uniform transfer (CHF88 [€78] 
in 2018).
Investments, 
fostering structural 
change
Growth, 
equity, popular 
support
• Alberta, Canada (carbon levy of C$30 [€21] in 2018): Revenues 
spent on infrastructure, public transit and energy efficiency. 
Affected industry 
support
Industry 
support, 
leakage 
avoidance, 
employment
• Sweden (energy tax; carbon and energy tax of €120): Lower tax 
rate for industry, but tax reduction phased out over time and 
abolished in 2018.
• Switzerland (CO2 levy of CHF96 [€85] in 2018): subsidy for 
employed workers.
Climate projects 
and low-carbon 
investment
Popular 
support, 
sustainability
• Germany (energy tax reform): support of renewable energy and 
housing sector.
• Switzerland (CO2 levy of CHF96 [€85] in 2018): One third of 
the revenues were allocated to helping reduce housing sector 
emissions and financing a low-carbon technology fund.
• British Columbia, Canada (carbon tax of C$35 [€24] in 2018): 
Used to finance a Clean Energy Fund and provide investment 
support for emission reductions projects.
• India (coal tax of INR400 [€5] per tonne of coal, approx.  
€2/tCO2): Part of revenues used for clean energy and 
environment fund.
• Colombia (carbon tax of US$5 [€4]): Revenues spent on 
environmental and natural conservation projects.
Note: Carbon prices are per metric tonne of CO2. 
Source: Own elaboration, based on information from ministries.
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If revenues from carbon taxes are used to reduce other 
pre-existing taxes, such as income tax, the overall 
costs of carbon pricing are lower than if revenues are 
transferred lump-sum to firms or households (Goulder, 
1995; Bovenberg, 1999). Detailed analyses that take 
into account the full range of existing tax distortions 
suggest that a green fiscal reform might even create 
economic gains (see, e.g., Parry and Bento, 2000; 
Parry et al., 2014).5 Such gains may also arise when 
countries harbour a large informal economy, prone to 
tax evasion. Energy taxation and environmental fiscal 
reform are particularly appealing in low- and middle-
income countries where substantial informal economies 
make relying on corporate and personal income tax 
more difficult, and where administrative capacity is weak 
(Besley and Persson, 2014). In such countries, income 
taxes tend to encourage informal activities, so reducing 
income taxes and raising more revenue from energy 
taxes can increase economic efficiency (Bento et al., 
2018). 
6.4 Addressing the broader fiscal policy 
framework: policy packages, coordination and 
alignment 
The effectiveness of fiscal policies in the energy sector 
can be increased if other market failures and barriers 
are addressed by complementary policies. For example, 
capital markets, innovation and network externalities 
are typically larger for new and emerging technologies, 
including low-carbon technologies. As upfront capital 
costs are often higher for renewable than for fossil 
projects, low-carbon investment in developing countries 
is particularly affected by macroeconomic and policy 
risks (Waissbein et al., 2013; Hirth and Steckel, 2016; 
Rodríguez-Manotas et al., 2018). Technology support, 
innovation and de-risking policies can address these 
barriers and strengthen the environmental impact of 
carbon pricing (Kalkuhl et al., 2012; Schmidt, 2014; 
Dressler et al., 2018; see also Chapter 7). 
Better alignment of broad tax policy can help reduce 
carbon emissions. Subsidies or tax deductions related 
to commuting (Su and DeSalvo, 2008), company cars 
(Harding, 2014) and the aviation sector (Gössling et al., 
2017) are common in many developed countries and 
tend to encourage carbon-intensive transport choices. 
Replacing property taxes with land value taxes can 
reduce urban sprawl and increase housing density, which 
in turn reduces the need for longer commutes (Banzhaf 
and Lavery, 2010). 
Policy coordination extends across sectors. Increasing 
carbon prices in the energy sector can increase 
emissions from land-use change due to increased 
bioenergy production, if the associated emissions are not 
properly accounted for (Searchinger et al., 2009; Haberl 
et al., 2012). Consistent policies and price signals across 
sectors can significantly mitigate GHG emissions and 
help manage future risks associated with rising carbon 
prices (Golub et al., 2017; 2018 and Lubowski and Piris-
Cabezas, 2017). Fiscal policies such as ecological fiscal 
transfers, contingent on environmental performance, 
can also play a role in the land-use sector. They could 
be a way to implement REDD+6 when international 
pay-for-performance or carbon market finance flows 
to the national or state government level (Loft et al., 
2016). There is growing experience with ecological 
fiscal transfers, including transfers of tax revenues to 
support protected areas and forests in Portugal (Santos 
et al., 2012), several Brazilian states (May et al., 2011) 
and India (Busch and Mukherjee, 2018). Land taxes on 
agricultural land can also help reduce agricultural land 
use and deforestation (Kalkuhl and Edenhofer, 2017).
6.5  Conclusion
This chapter provides two important insights. Firstly, 
while governments frequently use excise taxes on energy 
and fuels for raising public revenues, fiscal policy in 
most countries is currently not geared towards delivering 
the transition to a low-carbon economy. Core climate 
policies are not in place, existing carbon rates are too low 
and inconsistent, and broad fiscal systems are not well 
aligned with decarbonization. Secondly, this need not be 
the case. Increasing the costs of carbon-intensive energy 
to steer investment and behaviour towards low-carbon 
options and allocating carbon tax revenues to create 
a fiscal system that supports inclusive sustainable 
development are entirely within reach. Decisions on how 
to use revenue are critical to building public support and 
harnessing the full power of price-based policy to cut 
carbon emissions.
5 The first case, where costs of climate policy are reduced when revenues from carbon pricing are used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, is called ‘weak double 
dividend’. The second case, where climate policy creates economic gains through reduction of distortionary taxes, even when the environmental effects are not accounted 
for, is called ‘strong double dividend’.
6 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, as well as conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
Box 7.1 Electric vehicle innovation policy across the innovation chain in China
China’s efforts to innovate in electric vehicles (EVs) are a clear example of a governmental attempt to 
coordinate both supply-side (push) and demand-side (pull) measures in order to achieve specific goals. 
Policies involve a combination of investments in R&D, the creation of multiple demonstration zones 
for the purposes of experimentation, policies to spur industrial development, deployment subsidies for 
manufacturers, favourable tax- and fee-based incentives for consumers, and the provision of necessary 
infrastructure. 
China’s supply-side policies started during its 8th five-year plan (1991–1995), when public R&D funds were 
first allocated to EV technology. This supply-side support has continued and increased, taking different forms 
during subsequent five-year plans (Zheng et al., 2012; Hou et al., 2012). Most recently, the Ministry of Science 
and Technology issued a National Key R&D Programme for EV for 2016–2018, which is the most influential 
public R&D programme in China. There has been continuous and strengthening complementary supply-side 
support. 
Industrial policy for EVs lagged behind these early investments in R&D, largely because industrial policy 
dating from the first auto-industry policy in 1994 originally aimed to establish a domestically competitive 
conventional automobile industry through a joint-venture formation strategy (Gallagher, 2006). In 2009, 
however, there was a strategic move to the new-energy vehicle industry, which was listed as one of seven 
strategic emerging industries in 2010, and later as one of 10 key fields in the Made in China 2025 plan. A 
combination of policy instruments has been applied, including demonstration programmes, finance and 
taxation measures, and administrative regulations. An influential regulation was recently issued, under which 
vehicle manufacturers will face compulsory production targets for new-energy vehicles starting in April 2018. 
If they fail to meet the targets, they will either need to purchase credits from other manufacturers or pay a 
fine (Lu, 2018). The emphasis on new-energy vehicle is therefore becoming increasingly explicit in industrial 
policy. 
Demand-side policies also commenced in 2009 with subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles. In 2016, 
these subsidies were renewed for up to US$8,736 per electric vehicle, although they are scheduled to be 
phased out by 2020. Other purchase incentives include exemptions from purchase tax, travel tax and import 
tax for selected EV original equipment manufacturers. In some of the pilot cities, EVs are also exempt from 
the licence plate lottery system and the restricted land access applied to conventional vehicles (Harrysson 
et al., 2015; Du and Ouyang, 2017). Moreover, EVs enjoy waived or reduced parking fees and highway tolls in 
some pilot cities (Gao et al., 2015). The state government has also issued a series of policies and standards 
for the construction of charging infrastructure (aiming to build 12,000 charging stations by 2020) and many 
pilot cities also employ subsidies (Du and Ouyang, 2017; Lu, 2018).
Alongside these supporting policies, clear objectives for industry development and market creation have been 
set out. By 2020, EV production capacity (including plug-in hybrids) will reach two million, and EV stocks will 
exceed five million. Moreover, the fuel efficiency standard for average fuel consumption of all passenger cars 
produced in 2020 is set at 5 litres/100km, down from 6.65 litres/100km in 2015 (The State Council, 2012; 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2016). 
With this constellation of policies rolled out from 1991, the Chinese Government has pushed and pulled 
electric vehicles into the marketplace. China’s stock of EVs grew at an average rate of 69 percent between 
2013 and 2017, and the country was home to almost 40 percent of the world’s EVs in 2017. 
Table 7.1: China’s EV (including plug-in hybrid) stock from 2009 to 2017 (in thousands)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
China 0.5 2 7 17 32 105 313 649 1228
World 7 14 61 179 381 704 1239 1982 3109
China’s share 7% 14% 11% 9% 8% 15% 25% 33% 39%
Source: IEA, 2018b
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Chapter 7.  
Bridging the gap:  
The role of innovation policy and market creation 
Lead authors: Mariana Mazzucato (University College London - Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose) and Gregor 
Semieniuk (SOAS University of London)
Contributing authors: Anna Geddes (ETH Zurich), Ping Huang (Tufts University), Friedemann Polzin (Universiteit Utrecht), 
Kelly Sims Gallagher (Tufts University), Clare Shakya (International Institute for Environment and Development), Bjarne 
Steffen (ETH Zurich) and Hermann Tribukait (Mexico Energy Innovation Funds)
7.1 Introduction
By pairing innovation in the use of existing technologies 
and in behaviour with new technologies, directed 
innovation has the potential to radically transform 
societies and reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Therefore, accelerating innovation is a key 
component of any attempt to close the emissions gap, 
but it will not happen by itself. 
As innovation is inherently uncertain and often costly, 
it requires access to substantial amounts of finance 
as well as acceptance of inevitable failures and losses 
across the innovation landscape. This landscape covers 
everything from basic to applied research, and from 
demonstration to scale-up, deployment and diffusion, 
with feedback effects between the various stages, 
meaning that funding requirements can escalate quickly. 
Moreover, as there are often long lead times from 
the invention of a sophisticated GHG-saving process 
or material to its transformation into a commercial 
product and its diffusion through newly created markets, 
innovators require extraordinary patience. 
Well-crafted innovation policy that kickstarts and 
steadies innovation across the landscape can make 
a significant contribution to closing the financing gap, 
and in this case the emissions gap. This means that 
the public sector must often lead in terms of taking 
risks through ambitious innovation policy. Such policy 
requires more considerations to co-create and shape 
markets than simply fixing market failures. In other 
words, the public sector plays a crucial role in directing 
the innovation process rather than just filling the 
gaps. In the past, direction has been shaped through a 
mission-oriented approach: framing and solving societal 
problems and using all available levers to crowd-in 
other sources (Mazzucato, 2017; 2018a). This includes 
sustaining and accelerating innovation, not just in 
research and development (R&D) but across the entire 
innovation landscape, such as by providing patient 
finance that risk-averse actors are not willing to provide. 
No other actor can replace the public sector.
This chapter explores the type of policies that can 
accelerate low-carbon innovation for closing the 
emissions gap, and barriers to implementing them. 
Section 7.2 discusses what we regard as the four policy 
principles to drive additional investment, while section 
7.3 illustrates how these principles have been crucial 
to the success of solar photovoltaic (PV). Section 7.4 
discusses barriers to implementing active policies, 
before section 7.5 concludes by highlighting challenges 
and opportunities for accelerating low-carbon innovation 
through policy.  
7.2 Innovation policies 
7.2.1 Risk-taking across the innovation landscape
Innovation policy requires attention to be paid to the 
entire innovation chain: from the supply side (from basic 
and applied R&D to demonstration) to the demand side 
(regulations, subsidies and taxes, procurement, and 
significant changes in consumption patterns) (Polzin, 
2017; Mazzucato, Semieniuk and Watson, 2015). In 
low-carbon sectors, in addition to grant funding, an 
important share of research, development and venture 
capital funding comes from public sources (Mazzucato 
and Semieniuk, 2017) and almost half of the investments 
into demonstration projects originate in public innovation 
institutions (Nemet et al., 2018). Similarly, governments 
are highly active on the demand side with subsidies — 
whether set administratively (such as feed-in tariffs) 
or through auctions — loan guarantees and significant 
direct investment (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017). 
Public procurement can also help spur innovation by 
favouring low-carbon technologies (Edler and Georghiou, 
2007, see also online appendix A.3) and regulation must 
be conducive to innovation, which includes avoiding 
over-regulation while new business models are still 
forming. Successful innovation is often accompanied by 
the public sector’s lead on taking risks at all stages of the 
innovation chain.
Source: Mazzucato and Semieniuk (2018).
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Policy coordination is as important as attention to the 
whole landscape. For example, procurement policies 
cannot work unless the demanded products have been 
developed and demonstrated, but the dependence runs 
both ways: feedback effects from deployment and 
diffusion stimulate new product development and enable 
cost reductions through learning by doing (Lundvall, 
1992; Freeman, 1995; Gallagher et al., 2012). This 
dependence also extends to consumer attitudes and 
their defi nition of the ‘good life’, with consumer demand 
for low-carbon products having the potential to drive 
innovation (Perez, 2017). By developing a coordinated 
policy that heeds these interdependencies, the public 
sector can not only fi x market failures, but also create 
and shape markets for new innovative technologies 
(Mazzucato, 2018b). 
7.2.2 Patient strategic fi nance
Innovation policy across the innovation chain is 
most effective when it involves patient fi nance for 
direct investments from public organizations placed 
strategically at all stages of the innovation process. 
Private investors often perceive new technologies 
as risky and are unwilling to provide capital at scale, 
especially given the long lead times (CPI 2013; Schmidt, 
2014; Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017). However, 
innovation feeds off patient fi nance that is looking for 
Figure 7.1: Average relative risk exposure on a 0–1 scale of public and private investors in renewable energy assets 
2004–2014 globally, excluding investments made in China.
1 The public share of fi nance in directed historical energy transitions was often even higher (Semieniuk and Mazzucato, 2018).
2 Crowding in is a word play on the idea of debt-fi nanced government spending replacing or ‘crowding out’ private investment. In innovative products, as this chapter shows, 
government fi nance (whether itself debt fi nanced or not) may be necessary to mobilise private fi nance in the fi rst place. (See also online appendix A.4 on state investment 
banks’ crowding in of private investors).
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long-term returns. As with any venture, such fi nance 
must also welcome risk and endure the failure of several 
projects (Mazzucato, 2018b). By being patient, such 
fi nance becomes strategic and supports innovation 
programmes until they reach their goal (Chan et al., 
2017). The high-risk, long-term and capital-intensive 
character of the demonstration and deployment stages 
of innovation makes public investment in this area key. 
The growth of renewable energy markets illustrates the 
importance of public strategic fi nance. Financing the 
bulk of the US$120 trillion needed to steer the energy 
sector onto a low-carbon path by 2050 (IEA and IRENA, 
2017) will require considerable public investments. 
Individual projects are often very capital-intensive; even 
early-stage demonstrations in energy and manufacturing 
sectors may require investments exceeding US$1 billion, 
while the pathway to profi tability may take many years 
(Lester, 2014). Almost half of global investments in 
the renewable energy sector are now being fi nanced 
by public agencies and state-controlled enterprises, as 
private fi nancing has stagnated in absolute terms since 
around 2008.1 Public money has been disproportionately 
directed to high-risk projects, mobilizing, or ‘crowding in’2, 
additional private business and leaving lower-risk 
technologies such as onshore wind mainly to private 
actors, as fi gure 7.1 illustrates (Mazzucato and 
Semieniuk, 2018).
One of the most important policy vehicles for strategic 
fi nance and ‘crowding in’ private investors are state 
investment banks (SIBs). Several national and 
subnational governments have founded green state 
investment banks (such as Australia’s Clean Energy 
Finance Corporation) or mandated existing SIBs to 
support low-carbon technologies (such as the Brazilian 
Development Bank) (NRDC et al., 2016; OECD, 2017). 
In addition, multilateral development banks (such as 
the World Bank) have pledged to green their portfolios 
(Steffen and Schmidt, 2017). Geddes et al. (2018) 
identify fi ve functions through which these SIBs have 
been able to leverage private capital: the provision of 
capital, de-risking, awareness-raising among investors, 
market signalling (where an SIB’s endorsement improves 
a technology’s reputation) and by providing a crucial 
early-mover function. These functions are detailed in 
online appendix A.4.
Together, these fi ve functions can help overcome private 
investors’ initial aversion towards new technology and 
project types. The de-risking, signalling, and early-mover 
functions are particularly important for projects that 
contain non-incremental technological innovation. As 
SIBs take a fi nancial position in such projects, they can 
also incur fi nancial losses when a project fails. They 
therefore need performance criteria (such as portfolio 
benchmark return or leveraged private fi nance target) 
and a capital base that allows them to invest in higher 
risk immature technologies. Defi ning the risk exposure 
that a SIB can take is an important part of their mandate, 
and should be aligned with the overall ambition of 
innovation policy, as discussed next.
7.2.3 Directed portfolios
Innovation policy is most effective when it sets ambitious 
directions, rather than aiming to simply ‘level the playing 
fi eld’. Steering towards a low-carbon economy is one 
broad direction that involves additional choices as 
to which set of technologies should receive funding 
and how much. Unless the public sector sets such 
directions, private actors’ choices will unintentionally 
create directions, which may be into high-carbon sectors 
(Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012). Due to the long-
lived nature of many assets created today, this carries 
the risk of locking the economy into a high-carbon path 
(Unruh, 2000). To avoid doing so, investments into 
low-carbon innovation must be directed boldly towards 
several strategically selected sectors within the low-
carbon area (Mazzucato, 2017). This portfolio approach 
preserves multiple pathways, meaning that if one 
path fails, others are available and some will succeed 
(Schmidt et al., 2016). 
A number of developing countries have highly 
constrained national budgets that limit their ability to 
fi nance a policy portfolio that goes beyond immediate 
needs, such as national security, health care, education, 
other infrastructure, and energy access and security. 
Nevertheless, several funding mechanisms have the 
potential to boost countries’ fi nance for innovative 
projects, such as the Green Climate Fund. This United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) entity catalyses climate fi nance from both 
public and private sources to provide investment support 
to developing countries. Countries retain ownership 
of where the fund’s resources are invested, as such 
investments are made in the context of their national 
climate strategies and plans. They can also use the 
UNFCCC’s Technology Mechanism to help develop 
relevant strategies and technology investment portfolios. 
Another example, focused more on local business 
development, is the World Bank’s Climate Innovation 
Centers (infoDev, 2018). Design lessons for these and 
similar mechanisms are available from the Global Fund 
in the area of public health (Sachs and Schmidt-Traub, 
2017).
7.2.4 Mission-oriented innovation
One way to structure a complex set of policies is to 
conceive of innovation policy as targeted towards 
achieving a concrete ‘mission’. Mission-oriented 
innovation policy defi nes an ambitious goal and then 
sets specifi c steps and milestones to achieve it (Foray 
et al., 2012).3 The mission requires public innovation 
organizations to set out tasks that mobilize various 
actors (business, non-profi t, public) for bottom-up 
experimentation across different sectors (Mazzucato, 
2017). 
Lessons from past mission-oriented innovation policies 
suggest that cross-sectoral innovation is necessary 
to reach goals: for example, the US Apollo Mission 
required not just ‘rocket science’ but also innovation in 
the textile sector for the astronaut suits, for instance. In 
addition, the German Energiewende [Energy Transition] 
policy has required all sectors in Germany to transform 
themselves, such as the steel sector lowering energy 
consumption through repurpose, reuse and recycling 
strategies (European Commission, 2018). Meanwhile, 
in the USA the SunShot Initiative in PV (see section 7.3) 
has mobilized 347 organizations through grants in nine 
subprogrammes, covering actors from manufacturing 
fi rms to municipalities seeking innovative solutions to 
permitting, zoning and fi nancing (DOE, 2018). Box 7.2 
describes an international mission-driven initiative for 
accelerating innovation in advanced materials.
This section has outlined the key elements of an 
innovation policy framework for accelerating low-
carbon innovation. One important takeaway from this 
discussion is that innovation policy itself can and must 
be innovative: different technologies and different 
areas of the innovation chain require different support 
mechanisms (Huenteler et al., 2016). Accelerating 
innovation may therefore require entirely new approaches 
to innovation policy.
3 This differs from invention-oriented innovation policy, which focuses on R&D only, or system-oriented policy that seeks to provide a good system conducive to innovation, but 
does not set a direction (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017).
Box 7.2 The Clean Energy Materials 
Innovation Challenge — Mission 
Innovation
Advanced materials – with ever-increasing 
performance requirements – are the 
fundamental components of new energy 
technologies, ranging from non-toxic, 
high-density batteries and advanced power 
electronics to low-cost organic solar cells and 
electric cars (Chu et al., 2016). Discovering 
and developing such materials much faster 
would accelerate the transition to a clean-
energy future. The Clean Energy Materials 
Innovation Challenge is part of the larger 
Mission Innovation, launched at COP 21, 
which aims for a coalition of countries to 
accelerate the energy innovation needed for a 
low-carbon future. 
The challenge aims to bring the rate of 
innovation in materials discovery closer to 
that in computing power, the ‘Moore’s Law’ of 
materials discovery. The goal is to combine 
three cutting-edge technologies (artifi cial 
intelligence, robotics, and computing) 
with materials sciences to accelerate the 
discovery of advanced materials by at least 
a factor of 10, from around 20 years to under 
two years and, eventually, a matter of months.
Mission Innovation launched the Materials 
Challenge in September 2016 with limited 
funding from the co-leading countries: Mexico 
and the United States of America, later joined 
by Canada.4 Funding was used to gather 
leading scientists in academia and business, 
thought-leaders, government representatives, 
NGOs and civil society observers from 18 
countries for a four-day Basic Research 
Needs (BRN) workshop to identify the 
fundamental research needs, challenges and 
opportunities, and defi ne the path forward. 
The workshop developed the concept of an 
integrated Materials Acceleration Platform 
(Aspuru-Guzik et al., 2018), an autonomous 
or self-driving laboratory with smart robots 
that are able to rapidly design, perform and 
interpret experiments in the quest for new 
high-performance, low-cost and clean-energy 
materials (Tabor et al., 2018).
In May 2018, Canada and Mexico funded two 
international collaborative demonstration 
projects of US$10 million each. Additional 
countries are launching similar projects in 
collaboration with this Innovation Challenge, 
including India, South Korea, European Union 
members, and even non-Mission Innovation 
countries such as Singapore. As such, it is 
a test-bed for increased intergovernmental 
cooperation in mission-oriented innovation 
policy and effective public private 
partnerships.
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7.3 Solar photovoltaic innovation 
Innovation in solar photovoltaic (PV) technology 
illustrates both the nonlinear nature of innovation and 
how the various innovation policies reviewed above drive 
and shape it. PV was deployed with a compound annual 
growth rate of about 38 percent between 1998 and 2015 
(Creutzig et al., 2017), continually exceeding forecasts 
(see fi gure 7.2a). PV diffusion spurred cost reductions 
through ‘learning by doing’, scale economies and R&D, 
but also lowered profi t margins through increasing 
competition (Nemet, 2006; Carvalho et al., 2017), which 
in turn stimulated further deployment of ever-cheaper 
systems. However, PV innovation preceded diffusion 
by several decades, driving down costs dramatically. 
From 1975 to 2016, PV module prices fell by about 99.5 
percent (fi gure 7.2b), and every doubling of installed 
capacity coincided with a 20 percent drop in costs 
(Kavlak et al., 2017). Public innovation policies were — 
and continue to be — crucial for this process throughout 
the innovation chain.
Governments often act as lead risk-takers. For example, 
the Sunshine Project launched by the Japanese Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry in 1974 (IEA, 2016) 
made Japan an early leader in PV manufacturing and 
deployment (Trancik et al., 2015). As for the US, the fi rst 
silicon PV cell was demonstrated by researchers at Bell 
Telephone Labs in 1954, which benefi ted from large 
contracts with US government agencies (Chapin et al., 
1954). Subsequently, the US government agencies NASA 
and the Advanced Research Projects Agency developed 
PV for satellite use (Perlin, 2002). As a result of the 1973 
oil crisis, new policies were enacted and research on PV 
expanded in the laboratories of the newly founded US 
Department of Energy (DoE) (Ruegg and Thomas, 2011). 
Government-funded innovation continues to this day. In 
a mission-oriented policy approach, the DoE launched 
the SunShot Initiative in 2011 with the concrete goal of 
reducing the cost of US solar energy systems – including 
the costs of installation, permitting and fi nancing – by 75 
percent to a levelized cost of US$0.06/kWh by 2020. As 
SunShot supported innovation that met this goal in 2017 
(three years earlier than expected), the target has been 
revised to US$0.03/kWh by 2030 (Chu et al., 2016).
In 1990, the German parliament enacted the fi rst PV 
feed-in tariff, which guaranteed the sale of all PV-
generated electricity substantially above market price. 
The feed-in tariff subsequently became a major law, 
setting a direction for innovation in Germany and 
effectively creating a PV market. In fact, the feed-in tariff 
is credited with drawing many producers into the market, 
thereby pushing Germany to become a global leader 
in solar installations (Trancik et al., 2015). This built 
on long-standing collaborations between German PV 
companies and a network of public research institutes 
(Jacobssen and Lauber, 2006), while the German SIB, 
4 Eighteen of the 24 Mission Innovation members participate in this initiative. The 
Materials Innovation Challenge international workshop and activities have been 
funded by Mexico’s Energy Innovation Funds, managed by the Ministry of Energy 
of Mexico (SENER), the US Department of Energy (DOE), Natural Resources 
Canada (NRCAN), and the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR).
KfW, boosted German renewable energy deployment by 
providing strategic fi nance in the form of concessional 
loans in 2009. In that year, Germany almost doubled its 
cumulative PV capacity to 10 GW and 41 percent of all 
projects benefi ted from KfW loans (Bickel and Kelm, 
2010). The next three years saw unprecedented growth 
in German PV capacity, which slowed only when the feed-
in tariff was reduced in 2012.
The baton of PV leadership then passed to China, whose 
companies have been manufacturing more than half 
of global PV cells every year since 2011 (Zhang and 
Gallagher, 2016). In the 2000s, Chinese manufacturers 
benefi ted from the generous demand-pull policies in 
richer countries (especially in Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the US), while transferring technology and vertically 
integrating production processes in China and benefi ting 
from fi nancial support from local governments (Zhang 
and Gallagher, 2016). In 2011, a feed-in tariff created 
a major market for PV also within China itself, while 
the Chinese SIB, China Development Bank, disbursed 
generous credit lines to Chinese manufacturers (Quitzow, 
2015). 
Against the backdrop of this comprehensive network of 
policies across the innovation landscape, solar PV is now 
nearing cost-competitiveness with electricity from fossil 
fuels and is being deployed around the world. The story 
of PV innovation is an international one: from the USA 
and Japan to Germany and then China and increasingly 
other countries. Yet, what is a success today looked less 
certain and faced many obstacles in the early stages, 
revealing the importance of public policies for PV 
innovation and market creation along the lines examined 
in the previous section. The next section discusses some 
common barriers to implementing innovation policy.
7.4 Barriers to implementing innovation policy
7.4.1 Organizational aims and mandates
The above-mentioned innovation policies recognize 
the institutions that plan and carry out the various 
polices as being key to their success. Unlike most 
public organizations and their fear of failure, the US 
energy innovation agency (ARPA-E) measures its 
success by how many risks it is willing to take and 
the impact of its successes (Mazzucato and Penna, 
2015a). Nevertheless, most public organisations are risk 
averse, so it is important to learn from the US energy 
innovation agency’s (ARPA-E) approach in terms of 
paying attention to the internal capabilities of public 
institutions: their willingness to set bold missions and 
nurture organizational capacity and experimentation, 
and their ability to evaluate themselves in dynamic ways, 
rather than by static cost-benefi t analysis (Kattel and 
Figure 7.2a: Cumulative solar PV installations compared 
to forecasts from various IEA World Energy Outlooks 
(WEO).
Source: Updated from ClimateWorks et al. (2015).
Figure 7.2b: Historical price reductions and annual 
installations, 1975–2017.
Sources: Earth Policy Institute (2018) and Barbose et al. (2018, Fig. 13) 
for prices, Earth Policy Institute and IRENA (2018) for capacity.
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Mazzucato, 2018). Staying abreast of how innovation 
is changing markets also requires these institutions to 
deliberately engage with a wider set of actors and to 
track and quickly learn from wider innovation progress 
(Shakya and Byrnes, 2017). Emboldening agencies and 
institutions is easier when they are kept apart from 
political decision makers and thus independent of the 
short-term political process (Haley, 2016). 
Setting strong policy mandates also helps strengthen 
an institution’s capabilities. For instance, for SIBs to 
effectively address the low-carbon finance gap, their 
mandate needs to define their sectoral and geographical 
focus areas, specify the instruments to be used, define 
‘green’ safeguards for project selection, and determine 
the SIB’s own financing. Given the high importance of 
in-house technological capabilities and the resources 
needed to build them, the sectoral focus areas must 
be aligned with the government’s mission-oriented 
low-carbon policy (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016). It is 
also important that the instruments that a SIB provides 
are appropriate for their target sectors and project 
types. For instance, projects with very long loan tenors 
require long-running loan guarantees. Importantly, 
these instruments should also be designed in a way 
that reflects the financial sector’s existing structures. 
One example is household rooftop solar projects in 
Germany: the KfW channelled loans through Germany’s 
local banks, utilizing Germany’s decentralized financial 
sector (Hall et al., 2016). Depending on the sectors and 
the scale, governments must also decide whether SIBs 
can refinance themselves in capital markets, as KfW has 
done (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015b) and, if so, whether 
they can utilize a state guarantee.
7.4.2 Funding
Many countries have significant barriers to financing 
innovative technologies because, on top of the 
technology being unproven, the countries themselves 
are considered high-risk places to invest, with high 
political risk, policy uncertainty and currency fluctuation 
(Schmidt 2014; BNEF et al., 2016), now exacerbated by 
an increased exposure of these countries to climate 
change risks (Buhr et al., 2018). This situation makes 
both international and domestic investors averse to 
exposing themselves to additional risk by investing in 
new technologies and business models without a solid 
track record (Mehta et al., 2017; Kidney et al., 2017). 
Most of the poorest countries are also small markets 
with a large proportion of low-income consumers who 
lack credit history, which limits potential investors’ 
interest in engaging with the government to improve 
investment conditions (GOGLA et al., 2017). In addition 
to these challenges, matching the right type and scale 
of finance to the opportunities in innovative small-scale 
distributed technologies has significant transaction 
costs, as well as the risk of the business models around 
these technologies having a limited track record (Hystra, 
2013; Lewis et al., 2017).
To stimulate innovation in low-carbon sectors, such as 
distributed energy, several developing countries have 
set up platforms that aggregate finance for small-scale 
renewable energy projects, thereby reducing transaction 
costs to public and private investors and managing risk 
(Shakya and Byrnes, 2017). Various types of aggregation 
platforms have successfully reduced the cost of capital 
to the energy enterprises by bundling the enterprises’ 
small ticket deals or their assets into portfolios that 
diversify risk across several projects, and standardizing 
project data to build investors’ confidence. This bundling 
has also allowed the platforms to meet the deal size 
preferred by larger-scale investors offering cheaper 
finance (Wilson et al., 2014). In addition, the platforms 
create a space for dialogue among public policymakers, 
entrepreneurs and private investors to resolve market 
challenges (Bertha Centre and WWF, 2016; Simanis, 
2012). Once again, it is important to recognize that 
as not all sources of finance are the same, those with 
an appetite for risk should be sought out (Mazzucato 
and Semieniuk, 2018). Financing constraints are also 
prevalent in developed countries, especially at the 
municipal level, and the online appendix A.3 explores 
innovative financing mechanisms to overcome these 
constraints for low-carbon lighting.
Large amounts of funding are by themselves insufficient, 
as funding needs to be stable over time. Cyclical 
spending is problematic on both the supply and demand 
sides. On the supply side, fluctuations in spending due 
to political decisions (or the expectation that spending 
will not be stable) can hinder investments in long-term 
projects (Chan et al., 2017), whereas on the demand side, 
the business cycle is an important consideration. While 
the financial crisis of 2008 led to various ‘green stimuli’, 
this increased spending was often soon replaced by 
austerity measures. Perhaps the most dramatic casualty 
of tightened fiscal belts was the Spanish support for 
renewable energy. Until 2008, Spain’s feed-in tariff 
supported one of the fastest expansions of not-yet-
commercialized renewable energy. However, the feed-in 
tariff was paid by the central government and added 
to its fiscal deficit, so when Spain was hard-pressed 
to tighten the budget, it was reduced retroactively. 
Spanish renewable energy investment dropped after 
2008 and collapsed completely after 2012 (Mir-
Artigues et al., 2018), contributing to a crisis in Spanish 
PV manufacturing companies (Ibarloza et al., 2018). 
Ringfencing support policies across the business cycle is 
therefore crucial for long-lead-time innovation processes.
7.4.3 International competition
Countries’ domestic policies are also affected by the 
industrial policy aspect of innovations. Developed 
countries fear that their expensive R&D efforts will 
be appropriated by other, poorer countries that take a 
large market share due to lower production costs. The 
most prominent case is perhaps the migration of the 
PV manufacturing industry to China, reviewed above. 
‘Free-riding’ on others’ efforts, whether perceived or real, 
is prevalent in the literature analysing how countries 
contribute to global climate change mitigation efforts 
(Barrett, 2007). The flipside of this fear is the concern 
of developing countries — which are almost completely 
excluded from the current corporate R&D activities 
(Nolan, 2018) — that they will remain excluded from a 
new, green technological revolution. They see themselves 
at risk of having to buy the new technology from 
developed countries, without benefiting economically 
from the transition to a low-carbon economy, and at 
risk of ‘premature deindustrialization’ (Rodrik, 2016). 
Overcoming these differences touches on some of 
the most controversial aspects of the global political 
economy, but may be critical for effective innovation 
policies around the world.
7.5 Conclusion: opportunities and  
challenges
Creating markets and shaping innovation policy is 
crucial to bringing about the technologies needed to 
close the emissions gap. Public sector institutions can 
take the lead thanks to their unique ability to take risk 
and be patient and strategic from a societal rather than 
strictly financial point of view. Equal attention must be 
given to the supply and demand sides, with feedback 
loops key to allowing diffusion patterns to feed into 
innovation patterns. Common success factors include 
specialist organizations coordinating activities across 
the innovation chain, patient and strategic finance that 
leverages other actors, and setting directions while 
sustaining a portfolio of innovation processes in that 
direction. A mission-oriented approach to policy can 
open the innovation process up to a large number of 
participants.
International collaboration has the potential to unlock 
additional innovation capacity through leveraging greater 
pools of money and talent and providing an avenue for 
international best-practice-sharing. Mission Innovation 
and its sister organization, the Clean Energy Ministerial, 
which exists to accelerate technology diffusion, have 
the potential to play such a role. Other international 
initiatives have also set ambitious targets, such as the 
pledge by tropical nations under the International Solar 
Alliance to help each other mobilize US$1 trillion for solar 
energy deployment. They can be even more effective 
when they join with powerful private international 
initiatives, such as the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, 
which is committed to funding clean-energy innovation.
Challenges remain, however. Sustaining portfolios 
of technologies is expensive and identifying which 
investments to prioritize is challenging, as the innovation 
landscape alters so quickly during this unprecedented 
and rapid transition. Innovation organizations must 
also constantly innovate themselves in order to match 
realities with policies, while competing for talent 
with private sector employers. Developing countries 
face an uphill battle in competing with better-funded 
competitors from developed countries; furthermore, 
finding niches that are both emissions-mitigating and 
revenue-generating is as uncertain as innovation itself. 
The new international initiatives have great potential 
but they also face problems inherent in international 
cooperation. Governments are inclined to cooperate 
but less willing to send funds across borders, and the 
same is true of private actors sharing data and insights 
when they participate in these initiatives (Cherry et al., 
2018). Even if innovation is successfully accelerated, the 
world must still grapple with unintended consequences 
like the rebound effect where, in the case of energy-
saving innovations, part of energy saved per unit of 
the innovative product is brought back through an 
increased consumption of the now more efficient, 
and hence cheaper product or consumption of other 
energy-intensive products with the money saved on the 
innovative product (Sorrell 2008; Gillingham et al., 2016). 
Public institutions carry a large responsibility for 
innovation, but in an era of tight budgets, committing the 
necessary finance is difficult. Organizations leveraging 
private initiatives need to continue learning and 
improving. Meanwhile, other issues such as financial 
market regulation favouring low-carbon portfolios 
would be a useful complement (Campiglio et al., 2018). 
Ultimately, however, the policies rely on confident and 
stable enough public institutions with good governance 
that can survive short-term economic and funding 
fluctuations. If they are willing to learn from mistakes 
while staying confident of their key contribution, they 
could help dramatically lower GHG emissions over and 
above current policies.
60 61EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
References
Chapter 1 – Introduction
Global Climate Action Summit (2018) Call to Global Climate Action. Available at: https://gallery.mailchimp.
com/4d2f96d610d72765b972863dc/files/700c8461-2296-4002-93b5-26c2df58e864/Call_To_Global_Climate_Action.pdf 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2018) Global Warming of 1.5°C. Summary for Policymakers. Available 
at: http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/ [accessed 5 November 2018].
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (2018) NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, 
Climate at a Glance: Global Mapping. Available at: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/ [Accessed 30 October 2018].
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2015) The Paris Agreement, Conference of the 
Parties. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf [Accessed 30 October 2018].
UNFCCC (2018) Talanoa Dialogue update. Available at: https://talanoadialogue.com/ [Accessed 25 October 2018].
United Nations Climate Change Secretariat (forthcoming) Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2018. Marrakech 
Partnership.
Chapter 2 – Trends and progress towards the Cancun pledges, NDC targets and peaking of emissions
Azevedo T.R., Costa Junior C., Brandão Junior A., Cremer M.D.S., Piatto M., Tsai D.S., Barreto P., Martins H., Sales M., 
Galuchi T., Rodrigues A., Morgado R., Ferreira A.L., Barcellos E Silva F., Viscondi G.F., Dos Santos K.C., Cunha K.B.D., 
Manetti A., Coluna I.M.E., Albuquerque I.R., Junior S.W., Leite C., Kishinami R. (2018) SEEG initiative estimates of 
Brazilian greenhouse gas emissions from 1970 to 2015. Sci. Data 5:180045. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/29809176
Boyd, R., Stern, N. and Ward, B. (2015) What will global annual emissions of greenhouse gases be in 2030, and will they 
be consistent with avoiding global warming of more than 2°C? Policy paper. London: ESRC Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
CAT (2017a) Climate Action Tracker. Available at: http://climateactiontracker.org/ [Accessed 7 January 2018].
CAT (2017b) Turkey, updated 6 November 2017. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/turkey/
CAT (2018a) Countries, updated 29 August 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries [Accessed 29 
August 2018].
CAT (2018b) Argentina, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/argentina/
CAT (2018c) Australia, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/australia/
CAT (2018d) Brazil, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil
CAT (2018e) Canada, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/canada/
CAT (2018f) China, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/
CAT (2018g) EU, updated 7 September 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/
CAT (2018h) India, updated 22 August 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/
CAT (2018i) Indonesia, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/indonesia
CAT (2018j) Mexico, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/mexico/
CAT (2018k) Russian Federation, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-
federation/
CAT (2018l) Saudi Arabia, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/saudi-arabia/
CAT (2018m) South Africa, updated 31 August 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/south-
africa/
CAT (2018n) South Korea, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/south-korea/
CAT (2018o) USA, updated 30 April 2018. Available at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa/
CCEE (2018) Resultado consolidado dos leilões - 05/2018. Available at: http://www.ccee.org.br/portal/faces/
acesso_rapido_header_publico_nao_logado/biblioteca_virtual?_afrLoop=232730220156963&_adf.ctrl-
state=51d78wo2r_46#!%40%40%3F_afrLoop%3D232730220156963%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D51d78wo2r_50 [Acccessed 
June 11 2018].
Cheong Wa Dae (2017) Congratulatory remarks by President Moon Jae-in at the 2nd Annual Meeting of the Board of 
Governors of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Available at: http://men.president.go.kr/activity/speeches.
php?srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=429&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=4 [Accessed 18 July 2017].
Climate Interactive (2017) Climate Scoreboard. Available at: https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/scoreboard/
Climate Transparancy (2017) Brown to Green: The G20 transition to a low-carbon economy. Germany: Climate 
Transparency, c/o Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform. Available at: https://www.climate-transparency.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Brown-to-Green-Report-2017_web.pdf 
COMMIT (2018) Long-term, Low-EmissionPathways in Brazil, Canada, EU, India and Japan - Contribution to the Talanoa 
Dialogue by the COMMIT  project
Council of the European Union (2017a) Energy efficient buildings – Presidency secures provisional deal with European 
Parliament. Press release 819/17. European Council, Council of the European Union. Available at: https://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/19/energy-efficient-buildings-presidency-secures-provisional-deal-with-
european-parliament/ 
Council of the European Union (2017b) Outcome of proceedings regarding the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency.
Council of the European Union (2017c) Provisional deal on effort sharing emissions - another step towards Paris targets. 
Press release 789/17. European Council, Council of the European Union. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/21/provisional-deal-on-effort-sharing-emissions-another-big-step-towards-paris-
targets/
den Elzen, M., Admiraal, A., Roelfsema, M., et al. (2016a) ‘Contribution of the G20 economies to the global impact of the 
Paris agreement climate proposals’. Climatic Change, 137(3–4):655–665.
den Elzen, M., Fekete, H., Höhne, N., et al. (2016b) ‘Greenhouse gas emissions from current and enhanced policies of 
China until 2030: Can emissions peak before 2030?’ Energy Policy, 89:224–236.
den Elzen, M., Kuramochi, T., Höhne, N., et al. (2018). ‘Are the G20 economies making enough progress to meet their NDC 
targets?’ Energy Policy (submitted).
Department of Energy (2018) Draft Integrated Resource Plan 2018. Republic of South Africa: Department of Energy. 
Available at: http://www.energy.gov.za/IRP/irp-update-draft-report2018/IRP-Update-2018-Draft-for-Comments.pdf 
[Accessed 30 August 2018].
Department of the Environment and Energy (2017a) Australia’s emissions projections 2017. Available at: http://www.
environment.gov.au/climate-change/emissions-projections
Department of the Environment and Energy (2017b) Australia’s 7th National Communication on Climate Change – A report 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Department of the Environment and Energy.
Dubash, N. K., Khosla, R., Rao, N. D., et al. (2018) ‘India’s energy and emissions future: an interpretive analysis of model 
scenarios’. Environmental Research Letters, 13(7):074018.
62 63EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
Ensor, L. (2018) Carbon Tax Bill enters Parliament, at last. BusinessDay. Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/
bd/national/2018-02-13-carbon-tax-bill-enters-parliament-at-last/?utm_source=CP+Daily&utm_campaign=37a1a579cd-
CPdaily13022018&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_a9d8834f72-37a1a579cd-
European Commission (2016a) Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy 
performance of buildings. Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission (2016b) EU Reference Scenario 2016. Energy, transport and GHG emissions Trends to 2050. 
Brussels: European Commision.
European Environment Agency (2017) Trends and projections in Europe 2017 – Tracking progress towards Europe’s 
climate and energy targets. Available at: https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trends-and-projections-in-europe.
EY (2017) South Africa publishes Second Draft Carbon Tax Bill for public comment. EY. Available at: http://www.ey.com/
gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert--south-africa-publishes-second-draft-carbon-tax-bill-for-public-comment 
[Accessed 20 February 2018].
Fawcett, A. A., Iyer, G. C., Clarke, L. E., et al. (2015) ‘Can Paris pledges avert severe climate change?’ Science, 
350(6265):1168–1169.
Fransen, T. and Levin, K. (2017) The Climate Effect of the Trump Administration. World Resources Institute. Available at: 
http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/12/insider-climate-effect-trump-administration
Government of Argentina (2016) Primera Revisión de su Contribución Determinada a Nivel Nacional. Available at: http://
www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Argentina%20First/17112016%20NDC%20Revisada%202016.pdf 
Government of Canada (2017) Canada’s 7th National Communication and 3rd Biennial Report. Available at: https://unfccc.
int/files/national_reports/national_communications_and_biennial_reports/application/pdf/82051493_canada-nc7-
br3-1-5108_eccc_can7thncomm3rdbi-report_en_04_web.pdf
Government of Russia (2017) Plan of measures on stimulation of development of the generating objects on the basis of 
renewables with rated volume up to 15 kW. Available at: http://government.ru/news/28559/
Grassi, G., House, J., Kurz, W. A., et al. (2018) ‘Reconciling global-model estimates and country reporting of anthropogenic 
forest CO2 sinks’. Nature Climate Change, 8:914–920.
Green, F. and Stern, N. (2017) ‘China’s changing economy: implications for its carbon dioxide emissions’. Climate Policy, 
17(4):423–442.
Guan, D., Meng, J., Reiner, D. M., et al. (2018) ‘Structural decline in China’s CO2 emissions through transitions in industry 
and energy systems’. Nature Geoscience, 11:551–555.
Höhne, N., den Elzen, M., Escalante, D. (2014) ‘Regional GHG reduction targets based on effort sharing: a comparison of 
studies’. Climate Policy, 14(1):122–147.
Höhne, N., Fekete, H., den Elzen, M., et al. (2017) ‘Assessing the ambition of post-2020 climate targets: a comprehensive 
framework’. Climate Policy, 18(4):1–16.
Holz, C., Kartha, S. and Athanasiou, T. (2018) ‘Fairly sharing 1.5: national fair shares of a 1.5°C-compliant global 
mitigation effort’. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 18(1):117–134.
IEA (2016) World Energy Outlook 2016. Paris: IEA.
IEA (2017) World Energy Outlook 2017. Paris: IEA.
INECC (2017) Evaluación Estratégica del Programa Especial de Cambio Climático 2014-2018 – Informe Final. Mexico: 
INECC. Available at: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/261388/Informe__evaluacion_PECC_final_
limpio_1_.pdf.
Jotzo, F., Karplus, V., Grubb, M., et al. (2018) ‘China’s emissions trading takes steps towards big ambitions’. Nature 
Climate Change, 8:265–267.
KAUST (2014) Appraisal and Evaluation of Energy Utilization and Efficiency in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Volume 2: 
Energy Efficiency Audit: Case Studies. King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST).
Kitous, A., Keramidas, K., Vandyck, T., et al. (2017) Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2017: How climate policies improve 
air quality – Global energy trends and ancillary benefits of the Paris Agreement. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union. Available at: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC107944/kjna28798enn(1).pdf
Kuramochi, T., Fekete, H., Hans, F., et al. (2017a) Greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios for major emitting countries: 
Analysis of current climate policies and mitigation commitments 2017 update. NewClimate Institute, PBL and 
IIASA. Available at: https://newclimate.org/2017/11/01/greenhouse-gas-mitigation-scenarios-for-major-emitting-
countries-2017/
Kuramochi, T., Fekete, H., Hans, F., et al. (2017b) Greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios for major emitting countries: 
Analysis of current climate policies and mitigation commitments 2017 update – Supporting Information. NewClimate 
Institute, PBL and IIASA.
Kuramochi, T., Höhne, N., Sterl, S., et al. (2017c) States, cities and businesses leading the way: a first look at decentralized 
climate commitments in the US. NewClimate Institute and The Climate Group. Available at: https://newclimate.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/states-cities-and-regions-leading-the-way.pdf
Larsen, J., Larsen, K., Herndon, W., et al. (2018) Taking Stock 2018. Rhodium Group, Available at: https://rhg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/Taking-Stock-2018-Report-TA.pdf
Le Quéré, C., Andrew, R. M., Friedlingstein, P., et al. (2018) ‘Global Carbon Budget 2017’. Earth System Science Data, 
10(1):405–448.
Levin, K. and Rich, D. (2017) Turning Points: Trends in Countries’ Reaching Peak Greenhouse Gas Emissions over Time. 
World Resource Institute. Available at: http://www.wri.org/publication/turning-points
Luderer, G., Vrontisi, Z., Bertram, C., et al. (2018) ‘Residual fossil CO2 emissions in 1.5–2°C pathways’. Nature Climate 
Change, 8(7):626–633.
Meinshausen, A. (2016) INDC Factsheets. The University of Melbourne, Climate and Energy College. Available at:  
http://climatecollege.unimelb.edu.au/ndc-indc-factsheets
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (2018) Enerugii kihon keikaku an (Draft Basic Energy Plan). 
In Japanese. Tokyo: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Available at: http://search.e-gov.go.jp/servlet/
PcmFileDownload?seqNo=0000173982 
Ministry of Environment (2018) The strategy to achieve National Emission Targets 2030 to be renewed. Available at: 
http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/web/board/read.do?pagerOffset=10&maxPageItems=10&maxIndexPages=10&searchKey= 
&searchValue=&menuId=21&orgCd=&boardId=902790&boardMasterId=522&boardCategoryId=&decorator= [Accessed 
10 October 2018].
Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (2017) The Third Biennial Report of the Russian Federation.
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (2016) Third National Communication of Brazil to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/branc3v3.pdf
Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development Argentina (2015) Tercera Comunicación Nacional del 
Gobierno de la República Argentina a las Partes de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre Cambio 
Climático.
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (2018) Press releases: Ministry announces 8th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and 
Demand. Available at: http://english.motie.go.kr/en/pc/pressreleases/bbs/bbsView.do?bbs_cd_n=2&bbs_seq_n=605 
[Accessed April 12, 2018].
Mitra, A., Chitkara, P., Ross, K., et al. (2017) Pathways for Meeting India’s Climate Goals. Working paper. World Resources 
Institute.
MOTIE, MOE and MOLIT (2017) Joint press release by Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE), Ministry of 
Environment (MOE), and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MOLIT) on the occasion of joint report to the 
President.
National Law Information Center (2016) Presidential Decree 27180 of 24 May, 2016 (enforced 1 June, 2016); partial 
amendment of the Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth. National Law Information 
Center, Korea. Ministry of Government Legislation.
Nereim, V. (2017) Saudi Arabia Slows Pace of Energy Subsidy Cuts to Boost Economy. Bloomberg. Available at: https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-19/saudi-arabia-slows-pace-of-energy-subsidy-cuts-to-boost-economy
NewClimate Institute, PBL and IIASA (2018) GHG mitigation scenarios for major emitting countries: an overview of 
recently adopted policies. Available at:  https://newclimate.org/2018/04/30/update-ghg-mitigation-scenarios-for-major-
emitting-countries-an-overview-of-recently-adopted-policies/
Olivier, J. G. J., Peters, J. A. H. W. and Schure, K. M. (2017) Trends in global emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases: 
2017 Report. Bilthoven: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. Available at: http://www.pbl.nl/en/news/
newsitems/2017/greenhouse-gas-emission-levels-continued-to-rise-in-2016
Olivier, J. G. J., Schure, K. M. and Peters, J. A. H. W. (2018) Trends in global CO2 and other greenhouse gases: 2018. 
Bilthoven: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (in preparation).
64 65EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
Pan, X., den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., et al. (2017) ‘Exploring fair and ambitious mitigation contributions under the Paris 
Agreement goals’. Environmental Science & Policy, 74:49–56.
PBL (2017) PBL Climate Pledge NDC tool. Available at: www.pbl.nl/indc
Peters, G. P., Marland, G., Le Quéré, C., et al. (2011) ‘Rapid growth in CO2 emissions after the 2008–2009 global financial 
crisis’. Nature Climate Change, 2:2.
Peters, G. P., Le Quéré, C., Andrew, R. M., et al. (2017) ‘Towards real-time verification of CO2 emissions’. Nature Climate 
Change, 7:848–850.
Qi, Y., Stern, N., Wu, T., et al. (2016) ‘China’s post-coal growth’. Nature Geoscience, 9:564.
Republic of South Africa (2017) Draft Carbon Tax Bill. Available at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/
CarbonTaxBll2017/Draft%20Carbon%20Tax%20Bill%20December%202017.pdf
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (2016) Sixth National Communication of Turkey. Ankara: 
Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.
Robiou du Pont, Y., Jeffery, L., Gutschow, J., et al. (2017) ‘Equitable mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement goals’. 
Nature Climate Change, 7:38-43.
Rochedo, P. R. R., Soares-Filho, B., Schaeffer, R., et al. (2018) ‘The threat of political bargaining to climate mitigation in 
Brazil’. Nature Climate Change.
Rogelj, J., Fricko, O., Meinshausen, M., et al. (2017) ‘Understanding the origin of Paris Agreement emission uncertainties’. 
Nature Communications, 8:15748. Available at: http://doi: 10.1038/ncomms15748
Saunois, M., Jackson, R. B., Bousquet, P., et al. (2016) ‘The growing role of methane in anthropogenic climate change’. 
Environmental Research Letters, 11:120207.
Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (2017) Acciones de México para establecer un mercado de 
carbono. Available at: https://www.gob.mx/semarnat/articulos/acciones-de-mexico-para-establecer-un-mercado-de-
carbono?idiom=es [Accessed 21 May 2018]. 
Sha, F., Ji, Z. and Linwei, L. (2015) An Analysis of China’s INDC. Beiing: China National Center for Climate Change Strategy 
and International Cooperation.
State of California (2018) California and States Representing Over 40 Percent of U.S. Car Market Sue to Defend National 
Clean Car Rules. Available at: https://www.gov.ca.gov/2018/05/01/california-and-states-representing-over-40-percent-of-
u-s-car-market-sue-to-defend-national-clean-car-rules/
The Government of the Republic of Korea (2017) Second Biennial Update Report of the Republic of Korea: Under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2nd_biennial_
update_report_republic_of_korea_eng.pdf
The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations (2017) Reference: C.N.464.2017.TREATIES-
XXVII.7.d (Depositary Notification). United Nations. Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/
CN.464.2017-Eng.pdf 
Toumi, H. (2017) Saudi Arabia to impose 5% VAT on fuel from January 1. Gulf News. Available at: http://gulfnews.com/
business/economy/vat/saudi-arabia-to-impose-5-vat-on-fuelfrom-january-1-1.2126739 [Accessed March 21, 2018].
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2018) Annual Energy Outlook 2018. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/
aeo/
UN DESA (2017) World Population Prospects, the 2017 Revision. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UN DESA).
UNEP (2017) The Emissions Gap Report 2017. A UN Environment Synthesis Report. Nairobi: United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP).
UNFCCC (2014) FCCC/SBSTA/2014/INF.6. Compilation of economy-wide emission reduction targets to be implemented 
by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention. Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/sbsta/eng/inf06.pdf
UNFCCC (2015) Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). Available at: http://www4.unfccc.int/
submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx
UNFCCC (2016) NDC registry. Available at: http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx
UNFCCC (2018) Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data - Detailed data by Party. Available at: http://di.unfccc.int/detailed_data_
by_party 
US EPA (2017) EPA Takes Another Step To Advance President Trump’s America First Strategy, Proposes Repeal Of “Clean 
Power Plan. Available at: https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumps-america-
first-strategy-proposes-repeal [Accessed 22 May 2018].
US EPA (2018) EPA Administrator Pruitt: GHG Emissions Standards for Cars and Light Trucks Should Be Revised. Available 
at: https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-administrator-pruitt-ghg-emissions-standards-cars-and-light-trucks-should-be
Vishwanathan, S. S. and Garg, A. (2017) INDIA Policy implications of a low-carbon growth, MILES Project Factsheet, IIMA-
IDDRI.
Vrontisi, Z., Luderer, G., Saveyn, B., et al. (2018) ‘Enhancing global climate policy ambition towards a 1.5°C stabilization: a 
short-term multi-model assessment’. Environmental Research Letters, 13:044039.
WMO (2017) WMO Greenhouse Gas Bulletin. Available at: https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=4022
Worden, J. R., Bloom, A. A., Pandey, S., et al. (2017) ‘Reduced biomass burning emissions reconcile conflicting estimates 
of the post-2006 atmospheric methane budget’. Nature Communications, 8:2227.
Chapter 3 – The emissions gap
Allen, M.R., Frame, D.J., Huntingford, C., Jones, C.D., Lowe, J.A., Meinshausen, M. and Meinshausen, N. (2009) ‘Warming 
caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth tonne’. Nature, 458:1163–1166.
Bauer, N., Rose, S.K., Fujimori, S., van Vuuren, D.P., Weyant, J., Wise, M., Cui, Y., Daioglou, V. et al (2018) ‘Global energy 
sector emission reductions and bioenergy use: overview of the bioenergy demand phase of the EMF-33 model 
comparison’. Climatic Change (in press).
Bertoldi, P., den Elzen, M., Ford, J., Klein, R. Ley, D., Roberts, T. and Rogelj, J. (2018) ‘Cross-Chapter Box 11: Consistency 
Between Nationally Determined Contributions and 1.5°C Scenarios’. In Flato, G., Fuglestvedt, J., Mrabet, R. and Schaeffer, 
R., eds. Global Warming of 1.5 °C: an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the 
threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.
Bertram, C., Johnson, N., Luderer, G., Riahi, K., Isaac, M. and Eom, J. (2015) ‘Carbon lock-in through capital stock inertia 
associated with weak near-term climate policies’. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 90:62–72.
Bertram, C., Luderer, G., Popp, A., Minx, J.C, Lamb, W.F., Stevanović, M., Humpenöder, F., Giannousakis, A. and Kriegler, 
E. (2018) ‘Targeted policies can compensate most of the increased sustainability risks in 1.5 °C mitigation scenarios’. 
Environmental Research Letters 13:064038.
CAT (2018) Climate Action Tracker. Available at: http://climateactiontracker.org/ [Accessed 25 May 2018].
Clarke, L., Jiang, K., Akimoto, K. et al. (2014) ‘Assessing Transformation Pathways’. In Edenhofer O. et al. (eds.) Climate 
Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press.
Collins, M., Knutti, R., Arblaster, J. et al. (2013) ‘Chapter 12 – Long-term climate change: Projections, commitments and 
irreversibility’. In Stocker, B.D. et al. (eds.) Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I Contribution 
to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New 
York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Comyn-Platt, E., Hayman, G., Huntingford, C., Chadburn, S.E., Burke, E.J., Harper, A.B., Collins, W.J., Webber, C.P., Powell, 
T., Cox, P.M., Gedney, N. and Sitch, S. (2018) ‘Carbon budgets for 1.5 and 2°C targets lowered by natural wetland and 
permafrost feedbacks’. Nature Geoscience, 11:568–573.
Cowtan, K. and Way, R.G. (2014) ‘Coverage bias in the HadCRUT4 temperature series and its impact on recent 
temperature trends’. Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society, 140:1935–1944.
Davis, S.J., Caldeira, K., Matthews, H.D. (2010) ‘Future CO2 emissions and climate change from existing energy 
infrastructure’. Science, 329(5997):1330–1333.
Edenhofer, O., Steckel, J.C., Jakob, M. and Bertram, C. (2018) ‘Reports of coal’s terminal decline may be exaggerated’. 
Environmental Research Letters, 13:024019.
Fischer, H., Meissner, K.J., Mix, A.C. et al. (2018) ‘Palaeoclimate constraints on the impact of 2°C anthropogenic warming 
and beyond’. Nature Geoscience, 11:474–485.
Fujimori, S., Hasegawa, T., Rogelj, J., Su, X., Havlik, P., Krey, V., Takahashi, K. and Riahi, K. (2018). ‘Inclusive climate change 
mitigation and food security policy under 1.5 ◦C climate goal’. Environmental Research Letters, 13(7):074033.
66 67EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
Gillett, N.P., Arora, V.K., Matthews, D. and Allen, M. (2013) ‘Constraining the ratio of global warming to cumulative CO2 
emissions using CMIP5 simulations’. Journal of Climate, 26:6844–6858.
Grubler, A., Wilson, C., Bento, N. et al. (2018) ‘A low energy demand scenario for meeting the 1.5 °C target and sustainable 
development goals without negative emission technologies’. Nature Energy, 3:515–527.
Holz, C., Siegel, L.S., Johnston, E., Jones, A.P. and Sterman, J. (2018) ‘Ratcheting ambition to limit warming to 1.5 °C – 
trade-offs between emission reductions and carbon dioxide removal’. Environmental Research Letters, 13:064028.
Huppmann, D., Rogelj, J., Kriegler, E., Krey, V. and Riahi, K. (2018a) ‘A new scenario resource for integrated 1.5°C research’. 
Nature Climate Change. Available at: http://doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0317-4
Huppmann, D., Kriegler, E., Krey, V. et al. (2018b) IAMC 1.5°C Scenario Explorer and Data hosted by IIASA. Integrated 
Assessment Modeling Consortium and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Available at: https://data.ene.
iiasa.ac.at/iamc-1.5c-explorer
IEA (2017) World Energy Outlook 2017. Paris: IEA.
IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva:IPCC.
IPCC (2018). Global Warming of 1.5°C an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response 
to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. Summary for Policy Makers. 
Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/ [accessed on 5 November, 2018].
Jakob, M. and Steckel, J.C. (2016) ‘Implications of climate change mitigation for sustainable development’. 
Environmental Research Letters, 11:104010.
Jeffery, M.L., Gütschow, J., Rocha, M.R. and Gieseke, R. (2018) ‘Measuring Success: Improving Assessments of 
Aggregate Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Goals’. Earth’s Future, 6(9):1260–1274.
Johnson, N., Krey, V., McCollum, D.L., Rao, S. Riahi, K. and Rogelj, J. (2015) ‘Stranded on a low-carbon planet: Implications 
of climate policy for the phase-out of coal-based power plants’. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 90(Part 
A):89–102.
Kitous, A., Keramidas, K., Vandyck, T. et al. (2017) Global Energy and Climate Outlook 2017: How climate policies improve 
air quality – Global energy trends and ancillary benefits of the Paris Agreement. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union. Available at: http:// doi:10.2760/474356
Knutti, R. and Rogelj, J. (2015) ‘The legacy of our CO2 emissions: a clash of scientific facts, politics and ethics’. Climatic 
Change, 133(3):361– 373.
Kriegler, E., Bertram, C., Kuramochi, T. et al. (2018) ‘Short term policies to keep the door open for Paris climate goals’. 
Environmental Research Letters, 13:074022. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aac4f1
Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Bauer, N. et al. (2015) ‘Making or breaking climate targets: The AMPERE study on staged accession 
scenarios for climate policy’. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 90(Part A):24–44.
Kuramochi, T., Fekete, H., Hans, F. et al. (2017) Greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios for major emitting countries: 
Analysis of current climate policies and mitigation commitments 2017 update. Supporting Information. NewClimate 
Institute. Available at: https://newclimate.org/2017/11/01/greenhouse-gas-mitigation-scenarios-for-major-emitting-
countries-2017/
Lowe, J.A. and Bernie, D. (2018) ‘The impact of Earth system feedbacks on carbon budgets and climate response’. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 376(2119).
Luderer, G., Bertram, C., Calvin, K., De Cian, E. and Kriegler, E. (2016) ‘Implications of weak near-term climate policies on 
long-term mitigation pathways’. Climatic Change, 136(1):127–140.
Luderer, G., Vrontisi, Z., Bertram, C. et al. (2018) ‘Residual fossil CO2 emissions in 1.5–2°C pathways’. Nature Climate 
Change, 8:626–633.
Markandya, A., Sampedro, J., Smith, S.J. et al. (2018) ‘Health co-benefits from air pollution and mitigation costs of the 
Paris Agreement: a modelling study’. The Lancet Planetary Health, 2(3):e126–e133.
Matthews, H.D., Gillett, N.P., Stott, P.A. and Zickfield, K. (2009) ‘The proportionality of global warming to cumulative 
carbon emissions’. Nature, 459:829–832.
Matthews, H.D., Solomon, S., Pierrehumbert, R. (2012) ‘Cumulative carbon as a policy framework for achieving climate 
stabilization’. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 
370(1974):4365–4379.
Matthews, H.D., Landry, J.-S., Partanen, A.-L., Allen, M., Eby, M., Forster, P.M., Friedlingstein, P. and Zickman, K. (2017) 
‘Estimating Carbon Budgets for Ambitious Climate Targets’. Current Climate Change Reports, 3(1):69–77.
McCollum, D.L., Zhou, W., Bertram, C. et al. (2018) ‘Energy investment needs for fulfilling the Paris Agreement and 
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals’. Nature Energy, 3:589–599.
Meinshausen, M., Meinshausen, N., Hare, W., Raper, S.C.B., Frieler, K., Knutti, R., Frame, D.J. and Allen, M. (2009) 
‘Greenhouse-gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2°C’. Nature, 458:1158–1163.
Meinshausen, M., Wigley, T.M.L. and Raper, S.C.B. (2011) ‘Emulating atmosphere-ocean and carbon cycle models with a 
simpler model, MAGICC6 - Part 2: Applications’. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 11:1457–1471.
Millar, R.J., Fuglestvedt, J.S., Friedlingstein, P. et al. (2017) ‘Emission budgets and pathways consistent with limiting 
warming to 1.5oC’. Nature Geoscience, 10:741–747.
Minx, J.C., Lamb, W.F., Callaghan, M.W. et al. (2018) ‘Negative emissions—Part 1: Research landscape and synthesis’. 
Environmental Research Letters, 13:063001.
PBL (2018) PBL Climate Pledge NDC tool. Available at: www.pbl.nl/indc
Peters, G.P. (2018) ‘Beyond carbon budgets’. Nature Geoscience, 11:378–380.
Pfleiderer, P., Schleussner, C.-F., Mengel, M. and Rogelj, J. (2018) ‘Global mean temperature indicators linked to warming 
levels avoiding climate risks’. Environmental Research Letters, 13:064015.
Rao, S., Klimont, Z., Leitao, J. et al. (2016) ‘A multi-model assessment of the co-benefits of climate mitigation for global 
air quality’. Environmental Research Letters, 11:124013.
Riahi, K., Kriegler, E., Johnson, N. et al. (2015) ‘Locked into Copenhagen pledges – Implications of short-term emission 
targets for the cost and feasibility of long-term climate goals’. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 90(Part 
A):8–23.
Riahi, K., van Vuuren, D.P., Kriegler, E. et al. (2017) ‘The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land use, and 
greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview’. Global Environmental Change, 42:153-168.
Richardson, M., Cowtan, K., Hawkins, E. and Stolpe, M.B. (2016) ‘Reconciled climate response estimates from climate 
models and the energy budget of Earth’. Nature Climate Change, 6:931–935.
Richardson, M., Cowtan, K. and Millar, R.J. (2018) ‘Global temperature definition affects achievement of long-term climate 
goals’. Environmental Research Letters, 13:054004.
Rogelj, J., Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R.C., Kriegler, E., Schaeffer, M., Krey, V. and Riahi, K. (2015) ‘Energy system 
transformations for limiting end-of-century warming to below 1.5°C’. Nature Climate Change, 5:519–527.
Rogelj, J., den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., Fransen, T., Fekete, H., Schaeffer, R., Sha, F., Riahi, K. and Meinshausen, M. (2016a) 
‘Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2°C’. Nature, 534:631–639.
Rogelj, J., Schaeffer, M., Friedlingstein, P., Gillett, N.P., van Vuuren, D.P., Riahi, K., Allen, M. and Knutti, R. (2016b) 
‘Differences between carbon budget estimates unravelled’. Nature Climate Change, 6:245–252.
Rogelj, J., Fricko, O., Meinshausen, M., Krey, V., Zilliacus, J. and Riahi, K. (2017) ‘Understanding the origin of Paris 
Agreement emission uncertainties’. Nature Communications, 8:15748. Available at: http://doi: 10.1038/ncomms15748
Rogelj, J., Popp, A., Calvin, K.V. et al. (2018a) ‘Scenarios towards limiting global mean temperature increase below 1.5°C’. 
Nature Climate Change, 8:325–332.
Rogelj, J., Shindell, D., Jiang, K. et al. (2018b) ‘Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C in the context of sustainable 
development’ in Flato, G., Fuglestvedt, J., Mrabet, R. and Schaeffer, R., eds., Global Warming of 1.5°C: an IPCC special 
report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, 
and efforts to eradicate poverty.
Smith, P., Davis, S.J., Creutzig, F. et al. (2016) ‘Biophysical and economic limits to negative CO2 emissions’. Nature Climate 
Change, 6:42–50.
Strefler, J., Bauer, N., Kriegler, E., Popp, A., Giannousakis, A. and Edenhofer, O. (2018) ‘Between Scylla and Charybdis: 
Delayed mitigation narrows the passage between large-scale CDR and high costs’. Environmental Research Letters, 
13:044015.
Tokarska, K.B. and Gillett, N.P. (2018) ‘Cumulative carbon emissions budgets consistent with 1.5°C global warming’. 
Nature Climate Change, 8:296–299.
68 69EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
UNEP (2015) The Emissions Gap Report 2015. A UNEP Synthesis Report. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP).
UNEP (2016) The Emissions Gap Report 2016: A UNEP Synthesis Report. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP).
UNEP (2017) The Emissions Gap Report 2017. A UN Environment Synthesis Report. Nairobi: United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP).
Unruh, G.C. (2000) ‘Understanding carbon lock-in’. Energy policy, 28(12):817–830.
van Vuuren, D.P., Stehfest, E., Gernaat, D.E.H.J., et al. (2018) ‘Alternative pathways to the 1.5°C target reduce the need for 
negative emission technologies’. Nature Climate Change, 8:391–397.
von Stechow, C., McCollum, D., Riahi, K., et al. (2015) ‘Integrating global climate change mitigation goals with other 
sustainability objectives: a synthesis’. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 40:363–394.
von Stechow, C., Minx, J.C., Riahi, K., Jewell, J., McCollum, D.L., Callaghan, M.W., Bertram, C., Luderer, G. and Baiocchi, G. 
(2016) ‘2oC and SDGs: united they stand, divided they fall?’ Environmental Research Letters, 11:034022.
Vrontisi, Z., Luderer, G., Saveyn, B. et al. (2018) ‘Enhancing global climate policy ambition towards a 1.5°C stabilization: a 
short-term multi-model assessment’. Environmental Research Letters, 13:044039.
Zickfeld, K., Eby, M., Damon Matthews, H. et al. (2009) ‘Setting cumulative emissions targets to reduce the risk 
of dangerous climate change’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
106(38):16129-16134.
Chapter 4 – Bridging the gap: Strengthening NDCs and domestic policies
Afanador, A., Begemann, E., Bourgault, C., Krabbe, O and Wouters, K. (2015) The potential of scaling up proven low-carbon 
solutions - Final Report. Ecofys, Cologne. Available at: https://www.sitra.fi/en/publications/potential-scaling-proven-low-
carbon-solutions/ [accessed 7 November 2018]
Allianz (2017) Allianz Climate & Energy Monitor 2017 - Assessing the needs and attractiveness of low-carbon investments 
in G20 countries. Allianz, Munich. Available at: https://www.allianz.com/en_GB/sustainability/articles/allianz-climate-
energy-monitor.html [accessed 7 November 2018]
Blok, K. (2004) ‘Improving Energy Efficiency by Five Percent and More per Year?’ J. Ind. Ecol., 8:87–99. Available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1162/1088198043630478
BPIE (2014) Investing in the European buildings infrastructure – An opportunity for the EU’s new investment package. 
Discussion Paper November 2014. Brussels, Belgium: Buildings Performance Institute Europe.
CCPI (2018) Climate Change Performance Index Available at: https://www.climate-change-performance-index.org/
CD-LINKS (2018) Climate policy database: CDlinks policy inventory. Available at: http://climatepolicydatabase.org/index.
php/CDlinks_policy_inventory [accessed 7 November 2018]  
Central Electricity Authority (2018) National Electricity Plan. India. Available at: http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/committee/
nep/nep_jan_2018.pdf
Climate Transparency (2018) Brown to Green: The G20 Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy. Berlin, Germany: Climate 
Transparency, c/o Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform.
European Parliament (2009) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/
EC and 2003/30/EC. Brussels, Belgium.
European Parliament (2010) Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the 
energy performance of buildings. Brussels, Belgium.
Fransen T., Northrop E., Mogelgaard K., Levin K., (2017) Enhancing NDCs by 2020: Achieving the Goals of the Paris 
Agreemen Working Paper. Washington, DC. World Resources Institute. Available online at http://www.wri.org/publication/
NDC-enhancement-by-2020
Fekete, H., Roelfsema, M., Höhne, N., den Elzen, M., Forsell, N. and Becerra, S. (2015) Impacts of good practice policies 
on regional and global greenhouse gas emissions. NewClimate Institute, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
Figenbaum, E., Assum, T. and Kolbenstvedt, M. (2015) ‘Electromobility in Norway – experiences and opportunities 
with electric vehicles’. Research in Transportation Economics, 50(C):29–38. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
retrec.2015.06.004
Government of Alberta (no date) Ending coal pollution. Available at: http://www.alberta.ca/climate-coal-electricity.aspx 
[accessed 11 October 2016].
Government of Canada (2016) Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change. Government of Canada, 
Ottawa.
Harris, M., Beck, M. and Gerasimchuk, I. (2015) The End of Coal: Ontario’s coal phase-out. IISD Report. Winnipeg; 
Manitoba; Canada: International Institute for Sustainable Development.
Iacobuta, G., Dubash, N.K., Upadhyaya, P., Deribe, M. and Höhne, N. (2018) ‘National climate change mitigation legislation, 
strategy and targets: a global update’. Climate Policy. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2018.1489772
ICCT (2016) Tietge, U., Díaz, S., Mock, P., German, J., Bandivadekar, A. and Ligterink, N., From laboratory to road: A 2016 
update. White Paper. Available at: https://www.theicct.org/publications/laboratory-road-2016-update
IEA (2016) World Energy Balances (2016 edition). Paris: International Energy Agency.
IEA (2017) World Energy Outlook 2017. Paris: International Energy Agency.
IEA (2018) Global EV Outlook 2018. Paris: International Energy Agency.
IRENA (2018) Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017. International Renewable Energy Agency. Available at: http://
www.irena.org/publications/2018/Jan/Renewable-power-generation-costs-in-2017
Jones, D. and Gutmann, K. (2015) End of an era: why every European country needs a coal phase-out plan. Greenpeace, 
Climate Action Network Europe.
Levaï, D. and Baron, R. (2017) Beyond emission targets: ambition in the context of the 2018 Facilitative Dialogue. IDDRI 
Policy Brief N°12/17. Paris. Available at: https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/files/import/publications/pb1217_dl-rb_
beyond-emissions.pdf
Kriegler, E., Bertram, C., Kuramochi, T., Jakob, M., Pehl, M., Stevanović, M., Fekete, H., Hilaire, J., Höhne, N., Luderer, G., 
Luna, L., Minx, J., Popp, A., Steckel, J., Sterl., S., Yalew, A.W., Dietrich, J.-P. and Edenhofer, O. (2018) ‘Short term policies 
to keep the door open for Paris climate goals’. Environmental Research Letters Available at: https://doi.org/https://doi.
org/10.1088/1748-9326/aac4f1
McCollum, D.L., Zhou, W., Bertram, C., de Boer, H.-S., Bosetti, V., Busch, S., Després, J., Drouet, L., Emmerling, J., Fay, 
M., Fricko, O., Fujimori, S., Gidden, M., Harmsen, M., Huppmann, D., Iyer, G., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Nicolas, C., Pachauri, S., 
Parkinson, S., Poblete-Cazenave, M., Rafaj, P., Rao, N., Rozenberg, J., Schmitz, A., Schoepp, W., van Vuuren, D. and Riahi, 
K. (2018) ‘Energy investment needs for fulfilling the Paris Agreement and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals’. 
Nature Energy, 3: 589–599. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-0179-z
METI (2015) Top Runner Program. Developing the World’s Best Energy- Efficient Appliance and More. March, 2015. Tokyo, 
Japan: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Muncrief, R. and Rodriguez, F. (2017) Briefing: A roadmap for heavy-duty engine CO2 standards within the European Union 
framework. Washington D.C., USA: The International Council on Clean Transportation.
The New Climate Economy (2015) Seizing The Global Opportunity: Partnerships For Better Growth And A Better Climate. 
The 2015 New Climate Economy Report. Washington D.C., USA: The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate.
The New Climate Economy (2018) Unlocking the Inclusive Growth Story of the 21st Century: Accelerating Climate Action in 
Urgent Times. Washington D.C., USA: The New Climate Economy. Available at:  https://newclimateeconomy.report/2018/ 
[accessed 7 November 2018]
OECD (2016) How stringent are environmental policies? Paris: OECD. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/economy/
greeneco/How-stringent-are-environmental-policies.pdf [accessed 7 November 2018]
Parkinson, G. (2016) Last coal-fired power generator in South Australia switched off. RenewEconomy, 9 May 2016. 
Available at: http://reneweconomy.com.au/last-coal-fired-power-generator-in-south-australia-switched-off-88308/ 
[Accessed 11 October 2016].
Roelfsema, M., Fekete, H., Höhne, N., den Elzen, M., Forsell, N., Kuramochi, T., de Coninck, H. and van Vuuren, D.P. (2018) 
‘Reducing global GHG emissions by replicating successful sector examples: the ‘good practice policies’ scenario’. Clim. 
Policy. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2018.1481356
Rogelj, J., den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., Fransen, T., Fekete, H., Winkler, H., Schaeffer, R., Sha, F., Riahi, K. and Meinshausen, 
M. (2016) ‘Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 °C’. Nature, 534:631–639. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/nature18307
Stiglitz, J., Stern, N., Duan, M., Edenhofer, O., Giraud, G., Heal, G., La Rovere, E.L., Morris, A., Moyer, E., Pangestu, M., 
Shukla, P.R., Sokona, Y. and Winkler, H. (2017) Report of the high-level commission on carbon prices. Supported by the 
70 71EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
World Bank Group; Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Energie; Ministère de la transition écologique et 
solidaire, Republique Française. Washington D.C, USA: Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition. Available at: https://www.
carbonpricingleadership.org/report-of-the-highlevel-commission-on-carbon-prices
UNFCCC (2015) Paris Agreement. The Conference of the Parties. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/
english_paris_agreement.pdf  [Accessed 30 October 2018].
UNFCCC (2016) FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris 
from 30 November to 13 December 2015 Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf
UNIDO (2010) Global Industrial Energy Efficiency Benchmarking: An Energy Policy Tool. Working Paper November 2010, An 
Energy Policy Tool. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Industrial Development Organization.
Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Cabeza, L.F., Serrano, S., Barreneche, C. and Petrichenko, K. (2015) ‘Heating and cooling energy trends 
and drivers in buildings’. Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews 41:85–98. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/J.
RSER.2014.08.039
Yang, Z. and Bandivadekar, A. (2017) 2017 Global update: Light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards. 
Washington D.C., USA: The International Council on Clean Transportation.
Chapter 5 – Bridging the gap: The role of non-state and subnational actors
Abbott, K. W., Genschel, P., Snidal, D. and Zangl, B. (2012) Orchestration: Global governance through intermediaries.
Aether and Ricardo Energy and Environment (2016) Greenhouse Gas Inventories for England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland: 1990–2014. Report to the Department of Energy and Climate Change, The Scottish Government, The 
Welsh Government and The Northern Ireland Department for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs.
Allen, A. (2003) ‘Environmental planning and management of the peri-urban interface: perspectives on an emerging field’. 
Environment and urbanization, 15(1):135-148.
America’s Pledge (September 2018) ‘Fulfilling America’s Pledge: How States, Cities, and Businesses Are Leading the 
United States to a Low-Carbon Future.’
Andonova L.B., Betsill M.M., and Harriet B. (2009) ‘Transnational Climate Governance’. Global Environmental Politics, 
9(2):52-73
Andonova, L. B., Hale, T. N. and Roger, C. B. (2017) ‘National policy and transnational governance of climate change: 
Substitutes or complements?’ International Studies Quarterly, 61(2):253-268.
Arup and C40 Cities for Climate Leadership Network (2014) Working Together: Global Aggregation of City Climate 
Commitments. Available at: https://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/researches/images/24_Working_
Together_Global_Aggregation.original.pdf?1411483385.
Australian Capital Territory Government (ACT) (2017) ACT greenhouse gas emissions. Available at: https://www.
environment.act.gov.au/cc/acts-greenhouse-gas-emissions [accessed 20 August 2018].
Bansard, J.S., Pattberg, P.H. and Widerberg, O. (2017) ‘Cities to the rescue? Assessing the performance of transnational 
municipal networks in global climate governance’. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 
17(2):229–246. Available at: http://link. springer.com/10.1007/s10784-016-9318-9.
Bernstein, S. and Hoffmann, M. (2018) ‘The politics of decarbonization and the catalytic impact of subnational climate 
experiments’. Policy Sciences, 51(2):189-211.
Betsill, M., Dubash, N. K., Paterson, M., van Asselt, H., Vihma, A. and Winkler, H. (2015) ‘Building productive links between 
the UNFCCC and the broader global climate governance landscape’. Global Environmental Politics, 15(2):1-10.
Bhardwaj, A. and Khosla, R. (2017) Mainstreaming Climate Action in Cities: The Case of Rajkot. Centre for Policy Research. 
Available at: http://www.cprindia.org/research/reports/mainstreaming-climate- action-indian-cities-case-study-rajkot.
Biermann, F., Chan M-S., Mert, A. and Pattberg, P. (2007) ‘Multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development: 
does the promise hold?’ In: Glasbergen, P., Biermann, F., Mol A., eds. Partnerships, governance and sustainable 
development: Reflections on theory and practice, 239. Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing.
Blok, K., Höhne, N., van der Leun, K. and Harrison, N. (2012) ‘Bridging the greenhouse-gas emissions gap’. Nature Climate 
Change, 2(7):471.
Broekhoff, D., Piggot, G. and Erickson, P. (2018) Building Thriving, Low-Carbon Cities: An Overview of Policy Options for 
National Governments. Coalition for Urban Transitions. London and Washington, D.C.
Broto, V. C., and Bulkeley, H. (2013) ‘A survey of urban climate change experiments in 100 cities’. Global Environmental 
Change, 23(1):92-102.
Bulkeley, H., Andonova, L.B., Betsill, M.M., Compagnon, D., Hale, T., Hoffmann, M.J., Newell, P., Paterson, M., Roger, C. and 
VanDeveer, S.D. (2014) Transnational Climate Change Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/transnational-climate-change-governance/44AC553A1719681F5BD1D8C91B5
DD999
CDP (2016) Out of the starting blocks: Tracking progress on corporate climate action. Available at: https://www.cdp.net/
en/research/global-reports/tracking-climate-progress-2016
CDP and We Mean Business (2016) The business end of climate change. Available at: https://newclimateinstitute.files.
wordpress.com/2016/06/business-end-of-climate-change.pdf
CDP (2018) CDP Supply Chain Report 2017. Closing the Gap: Scaling up sustainable supply chains. Available at: https://
www.cdp.net/en/research/global-reports/global-supply-chain-report-2018 [accessed 1 August 2018].
Chan, S. and Pauw, P. (2014) A Global Framework for Climate Action (GFCA) - Orchestrating Non- State and Subnational 
Initiatives for More Effective Global Climate Governance. German Development Institute Discussion Paper (34/2014).
Chan, S., Falkner, R., van Asselt, H. and Goldberg, M. (2015) Strengthening Non-State Climate Action: a progress 
assessment of commitments launched at the 2014 UN Climate Summit. Working paper No. 216. London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE), German Development Institute (DIE).
Chan, S. and Hale, T. (2015) Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions in the Developing World. Working paper. 
Available at: http://static1.squarespace.com/static/552be32ce4b0b269a4e2ef58/t/55afedf9e4b05618327de3
4c/1437593081002/WP_Galvanizing+the+Groundswell+of+Climate+Actions+in+the+Developing+World%284%29.pdf
Chan, S., Brandi, C. and Bauer, S. (2016) ‘Aligning transnational climate action with international climate governance: the 
road from Paris’. Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, 25(2):238-247.
Chan, S., Falkner, R., Goldberg, M. and van Asselt, H. (2016) ‘Effective and geographically balanced? An output-based 
assessment of non-state climate actions’. Climate Policy, 1-12. doi:10.1080/146930 62.2016.1248343.
Chan, S., Ellinger, P. and Widerberg, O. (2018) ‘Exploring national and regional orchestration of non-state action for a < 1.5 
°C world’. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 18(1):135-152.
Climate Bonds Initiative (2018) Green Bonds Market Summary: H1 2018. Available at: https://www.climatebonds.net/
files/files/H1%202018%20Highlights_12072018.pdf [accessed 1 August 2018].
Climate Initiatives Platform (2018) http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Welcome [accessed 1 July 2018].
ClimateSouth, 2018. Cooperative Climate Action: Global Performance & Delivery in the Global South. Preliminary 
findings of the ClimateSouth Project. Research report published by the German Development Institute/Deutsches 
Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford, the African Centre 
for Technology Studies (ACTS), and The Energy and Resources Institute, prepared by the ClimateSouth Project team of 
Sander Chan, Thomas Hale, Kennedy Mbeva, Manish Shrivastava, Jacopo Bencini, Victoria Chengo, Ganesh Gorti, Lukas 
Edbauer, Imogen Jacques, Arturo Salazar, Tim Cholibois, Debora Leao Andrade Gouveia, Jose Maria Valenzuela.
Compact of Mayors (2015) Climate Leadership at the Local Level: Global Impact of the Compact of Mayors. Available at: 
https://data.bloomberglp.com/mayors/sites/14/2016/01/BR_AggregationReport_Final_SinglePages-FINAL-2016.pdf
Dolšak, N. and Prakash, A. (2017) ‘Join the club: how the domestic NGO sector induces participation in the covenant of 
mayors program’. International Interactions, 43(1):26-47.
Erickson, P. and Tempest, K. (2014) Advancing Climate Ambition: How city-scale actions can contribute to global 
climate goals. Working paper no. 2014-06. Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute. Available at: https://www.sei-
international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate/SEI-WP-2014-06-C40-Cities-mitigation.pdf
EU Covenant of Mayors (2018) Available at: https://www.covenantofmayors.eu.
Floater, G., Heeckt, C., Ulterino, M., Mackie, L., Rode, P., Bhardwaj, A., Carvalho, M., Gill, D., Bailey, T. and Huxley, R. (2016) 
Co-benefits of urban climate action: a framework for cities. C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and LSE Cities. Available 
at: https://www.c40.org/researches/c40-lse-cobenefits
Fong, W. K., Sotos, M., Doust, M., Schultz, S., Marques, A. and Deng-Beck, C. (2015) Global Protocol for Community-Scale 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventories (GPC). World Resources Institute: New York, NY, USA.
Fuhr, H., Hickmann, T. and Kern, K. (2018) ‘The role of cities in multi-level climate governance: local climate policies and 
the 1.5 °C target’. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 30:1-6.
Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions (2015) Lima-Paris Action Agenda Independent Assessment Report. 
Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552be32ce4b0b269a4e2ef58/t/56673b3cb204d59deb517d
8d/1449605948836/LPAA_Assessment_Report_7DEC15.pdf
72 73EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
Global Climate Action Summit (2018). ‘Call to Global Climate Action.’ Available at: https://gallery.mailchimp.
com/4d2f96d610d72765b972863dc/files/700c8461-2296-4002-93b5-26c2df58e864/Call_To_Global_Climate_Action.
pdf.
Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy (2018) Implementing Climate Ambition: Global Covenant of 
Mayors 2018 Global Aggregation Report. Available: https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/2018_GCOM_report_web.pdf. [accessed 1 September 2018]
Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy (2018) Available at: https://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/ 
[accessed 1 August 2018].
Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change (2014) Low Carbon Investment Registry: Analysis of Results. Available at: 
http://www.iigcc.org/files/publication-files/LowCarbonInvestmentRegistryReport.pdf.
Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change (2018) Low Carbon Investment Registry Highlights. Available at: http://
globalinvestorcoalition.org/portfolio/summary/ [accessed 1 August 2018].
Graichen, J., Healy, S., Siemons, A., Höhne, N., Kuramochi, T., Gonzales-Zuñiga, Sterl, S., Kersting, J. and Wachsmuth, J. 
(2017) International Climate Initiatives – A way forward to close the emissions gap? Initiatives’ potential and role under the 
Paris Agreement. Berlin: Öko-Institut.
Green, J. F. (2017) Policy entrepreneurship in climate governance: Toward a comparative approach. Environment and 
Planning C: Politics and Space, 35(8):1471-1482.
Hale, T. (2016) “All hands on deck”: The Paris agreement and nonstate climate action. Global Environmental Politics, 
16(3):12-22.
Higher Education Sustainability Initiative (HESI) (2017) 2017 Summary Report. Available at: https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/17374HESI_2017_Report.pdf
Hoffmann, M. J. (2011) Climate governance at the crossroads: experimenting with a global response after Kyoto. Oxford 
University Press.
Hsu, A., Moffat, A.S., Weinfurter A.J. and Schwartz, J.D. (2015a) ‘Towards a New Climate Diplomacy.’ Nature Climate 
Change, 5(6):501–503.
Hsu, A., Cheng, Y., Xu, K., Weinfurter, A., Yick, C., Ivanenko, M., Nair, S., Hale, T., Guy, B. and Rosengarten, C. (2015b) The 
Wider World of Non-state and Subnational Climate Action. Yale Data¬Driven Environmental Solutions Group. Available at: 
www.tinyurl.com/yale¬NAZCA-plus.
Hsu, A., Cheng, Y., Weinfurter, A., Xu, K. and Yick, C. (2016) ‘Track climate pledges of cities and companies’. Nature, 
532:303-306. Available at: http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.19764!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/
pdf/532303a.pdf.
Hsu, A., Xie, Y., Feierman, A., Nicolai-Scanio, Z., Rauber, R., Weinfurter, A., Huang, T., Martin, G., Thomas, R., Janaskie, S., 
Long, S., Yan, C., Hochstrasser, F. and Li, A. Z. (2017) Who’s Acting on Climate Change? Subnational and non-state global 
climate action. Available at: http://datadriven.yale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/DDY_Taking-Stock-of-Global-
Climate-Action.pdf.
Hsu, A., Höhne, N., Kuramochi, T., Roelfsema, M..Weinfurter, A., Xie, Y., Lütkehermöller, K., Chan, S., Corfee-Morlot, J., 
Drost, P., Faria, P., Gardiner, A., Gordon, D.J., Hale, T., Hultman, N.E., McDaniel, S., Moorhead, J., Reuvers, S., Setzer, J., 
Singh, S., Weber, C., Widerberg, O. (Forthcoming) ‘A Research Roadmap for Quantifying Non-State and Subnational 
Climate Mitigation Action’. Nature Climate Change, Forthcoming.
Hsueh, L. (2017) ‘Transnational Climate Governance and the Global 500: Examining Private Actor Participation by Firm-
Level Factors and Dynamics’. International Interactions, 43(1): 48-75.
ICLEI (2015) Measuring Up 2015: How US Cities Are Accelerating Progress Toward National Climate Goals. Available at: 
http://icleiusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Measuring_Up_2015.pdf.
ICLEI (2018a) Carbonn Climate Registry. Available at: http://carbonn.org/ [accessed 1 August 2018].
ICLEI (2018b). What’s Driving Changes in Local GHG Emissions? Results from Contribution Analysis. Available at: http://
icleiusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ICLEI_GCAS-Contribution-Analysis-Report.pdf
Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT) (2018) Non-state and Subnational Action Guidance. NewClimate 
Institute, World Resources Institute, CDP and The Climate Group. Available at: http://www.climateactiontransparency.org/
icat-guidance/non-state-subnational-action/
Kuramochi, T., Höhne, N., Sterl, S., Lütkehermöller, K. and Seghers, J.C. (2017) States, cities and businesses leading the 
way: a first look at decentralized climate commitments in the US. Cologne, Germany: New Climate Institute. Available at: 
https://newclimate.org/2017/09/13/states-cities-and-businesses-leading-the-way-a-first-look-at-decentralized-climate-
commitments-in-the-us/.
Marrakech Partnership. Work Programme (2017-2018) for the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action (version 1). 
Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/mpgca_workprogramme_final.pdf.
Mayer, F., and Gereffi, G. (2010) ‘Regulation and economic globalization: Prospects and limits of private governance’. 
Business and Politics, 12(3):1-25.
Michaelowa, K. and Michaelowa, A. (2017) ‘Transnational climate governance initiatives: designed for effective climate 
change mitigation?’ International Interactions, 43(1):129-155.
Nordic Council of Ministers (2017) Nordic participation in global and regional climate initiatives. Available at: https://www.
diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1162400/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
Okereke, C. (2007) An exploration of motivations, drivers and barriers to carbon management:: The UK FTSE 100. 
European Management Journal, 25(6):475-486.
Pattberg, P., Biermann, F., Chan, S. and Mert, A. (2012) Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development: 
Emergence, Influence and Legitimacy. Cheltenham; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Pattberg, P. and Widerberg, W. (2016) ‘Transnational Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: 
Conditions for Success’. AMBIO, 45(1):42–51.
Roelfsema, M., Harmsen, M., Olivier, J. and Hof, A. (2015) Climate action outside the UNFCCC: Assessment of the 
impact of international cooperative initiatives on greenhouse gas emissions. PBL policy brief no. 1188. The Hague, PBL 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.
Roelfsema, M. (2017) Assessment of US City Reduction Commitments, from a Country Perspective. PBL policy brief no. 
1993. The Hague, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.
Roelfsema, M., Harmsen, J.H.M., Olivier, J.J.G., Hof, A.F. and van Vuuren, D.P. (2018) ‘Integrated assessment of 
international climate mitigation commitments outside the UNFCCC’. Global Environmental Change, 48:67-75.
Roger, C., Hale, T. and Andonova, L. (2017) ‘The comparative politics of transnational climate governance‘. International 
Interactions, 43(1):1-25.
Scottish Government (2017) Scottish Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2016. Available at: https://www.gov.scot/
Resource/0053/00536542.pdf [accessed 20 August 2018].
Second Nature (2018) Second Nature Reporting Platform. Available at: www.secondnature.org. 
Sharma, D. and Tomar, S. (2010) ‘Mainstreaming climate change adaptation in Indian cities’. Environment and 
Urbanization, 22(2):451-465.
The Climate Group (2015) Compact of States and Regions Disclosure Report 2015. Available at: https://www.
theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/archive/files/Compact-of-States-and-Regions-Disclosure-Report-2015.pdf.
The Climate Group (2016) Compact of States and Regions Disclosure Report 2016. Available at: https://www.
theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/downloads/compact_report_2016_0.pdf.
The Climate Group (2017) Global States and Regions Annual Disclosure: 2017 Update: How Over 100 States and 
Regions are Acting on Climate Change. Available at: https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/disclosure_
update_2017_digital.pdf.
UNFCCC (2015) Report No. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1. Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Available at: http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.
United Nations Climate Change Secretariat (2017) Yearbook of Global Climate Action 2017. Marrakech Partnership. 
Available at: http://unfccc.int/tools/GCA_Yearbook/GCA_Yearbook2017.pdf.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2015) Climate commitments of subnational actors and business: A 
quantitative assessment of their emission reduction impact. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi.
UNEP (2016) The Emissions Gap Report 2016. Available at: unenvironement.org/emissionsgap.
UNEP (2017) The Emissions Gap Report 2017. Available at: unenvironement.org/emissionsgap.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2013) Compilation of information on mitigation 
benefits of actions, initiatives and options to enhance mitigation ambition. United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Bonn, Germany, Technical Paper FCCC/ TP/2013/4.
74 75EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2014) Compilation of information on mitigation 
benefits of actions, initiatives and options to enhance mitigation action: list of selected cooperative initiatives. Available 
from: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_jun_2013/items/7655.php.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2017) Draft decision 1/CP.23. Preparations for the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Paris Agreement. Available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cop23/eng/l13.pdf.
U.S. Climate Alliance (USCA) (2017) 2017 Annual Report: Alliance States Take the Lead. Available at: https://www.
usclimatealliance.org/annual-report/.
van der Ven, H., Bernstein, S. and Hoffmann, M. (2017) ‘Valuing the contributions of nonstate and subnational actors to 
climate governance’. Global Environmental Politics, 17(1): 1–20.
Weischer L., Morgan J. and Patel M. (2012) ‘Climate clubs: can small groups of countries make a big difference in 
addressing climate change?’ Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, 21:177–192.
Widerberg, O. and Pattberg, P. (2015) ‘International cooperative initiatives in global climate governance: Raising the 
ambition level or delegitimizing the UNFCCC?’ Global Policy, 6(1): 45-56.
Widerberg, O. and Stripple, J. (2016) ‘The expanding field of cooperative initiatives for decarbonization: a review of five 
databases’. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 7(4):486- 500.
Yale, NewClimate Institute, PBL (2018) Global climate action from cities, regions and businesses. Research report 
published by Data Driven Yale, NewClimate Institute, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, prepared by 
project team of Angel Hsu, Amy Weinfurter, Andrew Feierman, Yihao Xie, Zhi Yi Yeo, Katharina Lütkehermöller, Takeshi 
Kuramochi, Swithin Lui, Niklas Höhne, Mark Roelfsema. Available at: http://bit.ly/yale-nci-pbl-global-climate-action
Chapter 6 – Bridging the gap: Fiscal reforms for the low-carbon transition
Adeoti, J.O., Chete, L., Beaton, C. and Clarke, K. (2016) Compensation Mechanisms for Fuel Subsidy Removal in Nigeria. 
Geneva: Global Subsidies Initiative of the International Institute for Sustainable Development.
Aldy, J.E. and Pizer, W.A. (2015) The Competitiveness Impacts of Climate Change Mitigation Policies. J. Assoc. Environ. 
Resour. Econ., 2, 565–595.
Atansah, P., Khandan, M., Moss, T., Mukherjee, A. and Richmond, J. (2017) When Do Subsidy Reforms Stick? Lessons from 
Iran, Nigeria, and India. CGD Policy Paper. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Available at: https://www.
cgdev.org/publication/when-do-subsidy-reforms-stick-lessons-iran-nigeria-and-india
Bach, S., Kohlhaas, M., Meyer, B., Praetorius, B., and Welsch, H. (2002). The effects of environmental fiscal reform in 
Germany: a simulation study. Energy policy, 30(9), 803-811.
Banzhaf, H.S. and Lavery, N. (2010) Can the land tax help curb urban sprawl? Evidence from growth patterns in 
Pennsylvania. Journal of Urban Economics, 67(2), 169–179.
Baranzini, A., Caliskan, M. and Carattini, S. (2014) Economic Prescriptions and Public Responses to Climate Policy. Cahier 
de recherche No. HES-SO/HEG-GE/C-14/3/1, Geneva: Haute École de Gestion de Genève.
Baranzini, A. and Carattini, S. (2017) Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with 
survey data. Environ. Econ. Policy Stud., 19(1), 197–227.
Barrett, S. (1997) The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements. Resource and Energy 
Economics, 19(4), 345–361.
Bast, E., Doukas, A., Pickard, S., van der Burg, L. and Whitley, S. (2015) Empty promises: G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal 
production. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Bauer, N., Mouratiadou, I., Luderer, G., Baumstark, L., Brecha, R.J., Edenhofer, O. and Kriegler, E. (2016) Global fossil energy 
markets and climate change mitigation – an analysis with REMIND. Climatic Change, 136(1), 69–82.
Beaton, C., Gerasimchuk, I., Laan, T., Lang, K., Vis-Dunbar, D. and Wooders, P. (2013) A Guidebook to Fossil-Fuel Subsidy 
Reform. Geneva: International Institute for Sustainable Development.
Bento, A.M., Jacobsen, M.R. and Liu, A.A. (2018) Environmental policy in the presence of an informal sector. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 90, 61–77.
Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2014) Why do developing countries tax so little? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(4), 
99–120. Bill H.1726 https://malegislature.gov/Bills/190/H1726 
Böhringer, C. and Rutherford, T.F. (2017) Paris after Trump: An inconvenient insight. Oldenburg Discussion Papers in 
Economics, Vol. 400, No. 17, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics.
Bovenberg, A.L. (1999) Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: an Updated Reader’s Guide, International Tax and 
Public Finance. 6: 421. Kluwer Academic Publishers
Bristow, A.L., Wardman, M., Zanni, A.M. and Chintakayala, P.K. (2010) Public acceptability of personal carbon trading and 
carbon tax. Ecol. Econ., 69(9), 1824–1837.
Burniaux, J-M. and Chateau, J. (2014) Greenhouse gases mitigation potential and economic efficiency of phasing-out 
fossil fuel subsidies. International Economics, 140, 71–88.
Busch, J. and Mukherjee, A. (2018). Encouraging State Governments to Protect and Restore Forests Using Ecological 
Fiscal Transfers: India’s Tax Revenue Distribution Reform. Conservation Letters, 11(2).
CAB (2017) California’s 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan. The strategy for achieving California’s 2030 greenhouse gas 
target. California Air Resources Board. Available at: https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf
Campbell, T.H. and Kay, A.C. (2014) Solution aversion: On the relation between ideology and motivated disbelief. Journal 
of personality and social psychology, 107(5), 809–824.
Carbone, J.C., Morgenstern, R.D., Williams III, R.C. and Burtraw, D. (2013) Deficit Reduction and Carbon Taxes: Budgetary, 
Economic, and Distributional Impacts. Resources for the Future Report (Resources for the Future).
Carl, J. and Fedor, D. (2016) Tracking global carbon revenues: A survey of carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade in the real 
world. Energy Policy, 96, 50–77.
Chelminski, K. (2018) ‘Fossil fuel subsidy reform in Indonesia: The struggle for successful reform’. In: Skovgaard, J. and 
van Asselt, H. eds. The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Their Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cherry, T.L., Kallbekken, S. and Kroll, S. (2017) Accepting market failure: Cultural worldviews and the opposition to 
corrective environmental policies. J. Environ. Econ. Manage., 85, 193–204.
Chiroleu-Assouline, M. and Fodha, M. (2014) From regressive pollution taxes to progressive environmental tax reforms. 
European Economic Review, 69(C), 126–142.
Clements, B., Coady, D., Fabrizio, S., Gupta, S., Alleyne, T. and Sdralevich, C. (eds.) (2013) Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons 
and Implications. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Coady, D., Flamini, V. and Sears, L. (2015) The Unequal Benefits of Fuel Subsidies Revisited: Evidence for Developing 
Countries. IMF Working Paper. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Coady, D., Parry, I.W., and Shang, B. (2018) Energy Price Reform: Lessons for Policymakers. Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy, 12(2), 197–219.
Cosbey, A., Droege, S., Fischer, C., Reinaud, J., Stephenson, J., Weischer, L. and Wooders, P. (2012) A Guide for the 
Concerned: Guidance on the Elaboration and Implementation of Border Carbon Adjustment. Entwined Policy Report No. 03. 
Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2178312 
Dechezleprêtre, A. and Sato, M. (2017) The impacts of environmental regulations on competitiveness. Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy, 11(2), 183–206.
DeMarco, J. (2018) Carbon pricing bill passes Massachusetts Senate. Citizens’ Climate Lobby News, 21 June 2018. 
Available at: https://citizensclimatelobby.org/carbon-pricing-bill-passes-massachusetts-senate/
Dorband, I., Jakob, M., Kalkuhl, M. and Steckel J.C. (2018) Are poor households more strongly impacted by carbon pricing? 
A global comparative analysis of distributional effects. Working Paper. MCC Berlin.
Dressler, L., Hanappi, T. and van Dender, K. (2018) Unintended technology-bias in corporate income taxation: The case of 
electricity generation in the low-carbon transition. OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 37, OECD Publishing: Paris.
Drews, S. and van den Bergh, J.C.J.M. (2016) What explains public support for climate policies? A review of empirical 
and experimental studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 855–876.
Dyson, C. (2018) Councilmember Cheh has proposed a carbon price — here’s what you need to know. www.
carbonpricedc.org. 29 May 2018. Available at: http://www.carbonpricedc.org/2018/05/29/cheh-carbon-pricing-draft/
Edenhofer, O., Knopf, B., Bak, C. and Bhattacharya, A. (2017) Aligning climate policy with finance ministers’ G20 agenda. 
Nature Climate Change, 7(7), 463–465.
El-Katiri, L. and Fattouh, B. (2017) A brief political economy of energy subsidies in the Middle East and North Africa. 
International Development Policy/Revue internationale de politique de développement, 7.
Fay, M., Hallegatte, S., Vogt-Schilb, A., Rozenberg, J., Narloch, U. and Kerr, T. (2015) Decarbonizing Development: Three 
Steps to a Zero-Carbon Future. Washington, DC: World Bank.
76 77EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
Flues, F. and Thomas, A. (2015) The Distributional Effects of Energy Taxes: Preliminary Report. OECD Taxation Working 
Papers, No. 23, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Flues, F. and van Dender, K. (2017a) Permit allocation rules and investment incentives in emissions trading systems. 
OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 33, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Flues, F. and van Dender, K. (2017b) The impact of energy taxes on the affordability of domestic energy. OECD Taxation 
Working Papers, No. 30, Paris: OECD Publishing.
FOEN (2017) CO2 levy. Federal Office for the Environment. 11 May 2016. Available at: https://www.bafu.admin.ch/bafu/
en/home/topics/climate/info-specialists/climate-policy/co2-levy.html
Frondel, M., Kambeck, R. and Schmidt, C.M. (2007) Hard coal subsidies: A never-ending story? Energy Policy, 35(7), 
3807–3814.
Fullerton, D. (2011) Six distributional effects of environmental policy. Risk Analysis: An International Journal, 31(6), 
923–929.
Gerasimchuk, I., Bassi, A.M., Ordonez, C.D., Doukas, A., Merrill, L. and Whitley, S. (2017) Zombie energy: Climate benefits 
of ending subsidies to fossil fuel production. Geneva: Global Subsidies Initiative of the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development.
Golub, A.A., Fuss, S., Lubowski, R., Hiller, J., Khabarov, N., Koch, N., Krasovskii, A., Kraxner, F., Laing, T., Obersteiner, M., 
Palmer, C., Piris-Cabezas, P., Reuter, W.H., Szolgayová, J., Taschini, L. and Wehkamp, J. (2018) Escaping the climate policy 
uncertainty trap: options contracts for REDD+. Climate Policy, 18(10).
Golub, A., Lubowski, R. and Piris-Cabezas, P. (2017) Balancing Risks from Climate Policy Uncertainties: The Role of 
Options and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. Ecological Economics, 138(C), 90–98
Gössling, S., Fichert, F., Forsyth, P. and Niemeier, H.M. (2017) Subsidies in aviation. Sustainability, 9(8), 1295.
Goulder, L. H. (1995) Environmental taxation and the double dividend: a reader’s guide. International Tax and Public 
Finance, 2(2), 157–183.
Goulder, L.H. and Hafstead, M.A.C. (2013) Tax Reform and Environmental Policy: Options for Recycling Revenue from a Tax 
on Carbon Dioxide. Discussion Paper. Resources for the Future.
Government of Alberta (2018) Carbon Levy and Rebates. Available at: https://www.alberta.ca/climate-carbon-pricing.aspx 
Haberl, H. et al. (2012) Correcting a fundamental error in greenhouse gas accounting related to bioenergy. Energy policy, 
45, 18–23.
Hafstead, M., Metcalf, G.E. and Williams III, R.C. (2017) Adding quantity certainty to a carbon tax through a tax 
adjustment mechanism for policy pre-commitment. Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F., 41, 41.
Hagen, A. and Schneider, J. (2017) Boon or Bane? Trade Sanctions and the Stability of International Environmental 
Agreements. Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics, Vol. 403, No. 17, University of Oldenburg, Department of 
Economics.
Harding, M. (2014) Personal Tax Treatment of Company Cars and Commuting Expenses: Estimating the Fiscal and 
Environmental Costs. OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 20, Paris: OECD Publishing.
High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices (2017) Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Washington 
DC: World Bank.
Hirth, L. and Steckel, J.C. (2016) The role of capital costs in decarbonizing the electricity sector. Environmental Research 
Letters, 11(11), 114010.
Hsu, S.L., Walters, J. and Purgas, A. (2008) Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher 
gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619.
IEA (2015) Energy and Climate Change: World Energy Outlook Special Report. Paris: International Energy Agency.
IEA (2017) World Energy Outlook 2017. Paris: International Energy Agency.
Jain, A., Agrawal, S. and Ganesan, K. (2018) ‘Lessons from the world’s largest subsidy benefit transfer scheme: The case 
of liquefied petroleum gas subsidy reform in India’. In: Skovgaard, J. and van Asselt, H. eds. The Politics of Fossil Fuel 
Subsidies and Their Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jakob, M. and Marschinski, R. (2013) Interpreting trade-related CO2 emission transfers. Nature Climate Change 3(1), 
19–23.
Jakob, M., Steckel, J.C. and Edenhofer, O. (2014) Consumption-Versus Production-Based Emission Policies. Annu. Rev. 
Resour. Econ., 6, 297–318.
Jenkins, J.D. (2014) Political economy constraints on carbon pricing policies: What are the implications for economic 
efficiency, environmental efficacy, and climate policy design? Energy Policy, 69(C), 467–477.
Jewell, J., McCollum, D., Emmerling, J., Bertram, C., Gernaat, D.E.H.J., Krey, V., Paroussos, L., Berger, L., Fragkiadakis, K., 
Keppo, I., Saadi, N., Tavoni, M., van Vuuren, D., Vinichenko, V. and Riahi, K. (2018) Limited emission reductions from fuel 
subsidy removal except in energy-exporting regions. Nature, 554, 229–233.
Kalkuhl, M. and Brecha, R.J. (2013) The carbon rent economics of climate policy. Energy Economics, 39, 89–99. 
Kalkuhl, M., Edenhofer, O. and Lessmann, K. (2012) Learning or lock-in: optimal technology policies to support mitigation. 
Resource and Energy Economics, 34(1), 1–23.
Kalkuhl, M. and Edenhofer, O. (2017) Ramsey meets Thünen: the impact of land taxes on economic development and 
land conservation. International Tax and Public Finance, 24(2), 350–380.
Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S. and Cherry, T.L. (2011) Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and 
revenue recycling in the lab. J. Environ. Econ. Manage., 62(1), 53–64.
Klenert, D. and Mattauch, L. (2016) How to make a carbon tax reform progressive: The role of subsistence consumption. 
Economics Letters, 138(C), 100–103.
Klenert, D., Mattauch, L., Combet, E., Edenhofer, O., Hepburn, C., Rafaty, R. and Stern, N. (2018a) Making carbon pricing 
work for citizens. Nature Climate Change, 8(8), 669–677.
Klenert, D., Schwerhoff, G., Edenhofer, O. and Mattauch, L. (2018b) Environmental Taxation, Inequality and Engel’s Law: 
The Double Dividend of Redistribution. Environmental and Resource Economics, 71(3), 605–624.
Lessmann, K., Marschinski, R. and Edenhofer, O. (2009) The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global 
warming game. Economic Modelling, 26(3), 641–649.
Levinson, A. and O’Brien, J. (2018) Environmental Engel Curves: Indirect Emissions of Common Air Pollutants. Review of 
Economics and Statistics.
Loft, L., Gebara, M. F., and Wong, G. Y. (2016). The experience of ecological fiscal transfers: Lessons for REDD+ benefit 
sharing (Vol. 154). CIFOR.
Marten, M. and Van Dender, K. (forthcoming) The use of revenues from carbon pricing. OECD Taxation Working Papers, 
Paris: OECD Publishing.
Martin, R., Muûls, M., de Preux, L.B. and Wagner, U.J. (2014) Industry compensation under relocation risk: a firm-level 
analysis of the EU emissions trading scheme. American Economic Review, 104(8), 2482–2508.
May, P. H., Millikan, B., and Gebara, M. F. (2011). The context of REDD+ in Brazil: drivers, agents and institutions (Vol. 55). 
CIFOR.
Mehling, M.A., van Asselt, H., Das, K. and Droege, S. (2018) Beat Protectionism and Emissions at a Stroke. Nature, 
559(7714), 321–324.
Merrill, L., Bassi, A.M., Bridle, R. and Christensen, L.T. (2015) Tackling fossil fuel subsidies and climate change: Levelling 
the energy playing field. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.
Moerenhout, T.S.H. (2018) ‘Reforming Egypt’s Fossil Fuel Subsidies in the Context of a Changing Social Contract’. In: 
Skovgaard, J. and van Asselt, H. eds. The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Their Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Murray, B.C., Pizer, W.A. and Reichert, C. (2017) Increasing emissions certainty under a carbon tax. Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F., 
41, 14.
Nature Editorial (2017) US Republican idea for tax on carbon makes climate sense. Nature, 542(7641), 271–272 (16 
February 2017).
NCE (2018) New Climate Economy report: Unlocking the inclusive growth story of the 21st Century: accelerating climate 
action in urgent times. Available at: https://newclimateeconomy.report/2018/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2018/09/
NCE_2018_FULL-REPORT.pdf
Nordhaus, W. (2015). Climate clubs: Overcoming free-riding in international climate policy. American Economic Review, 
105(4), 1339–1370.
OECD (2015) Impacts of Carbon Prices on Indicators of Competitiveness: A Review of Empirical Findings. Paris: OECD 
Publishing
78 79EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
OECD (2016) Effective Carbon Rates: Pricing CO2 through Taxes and Emissions Trading Systems. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264260115-en
OECD (2017) Investing in Climate, Investing in Growth. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD (2018a) Taxing Energy Use 2018: Companion to the Taxing Energy Use Database. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264289635-en
OECD (2018b) Effective Carbon Rates 2018: Pricing Carbon Emissions Through Taxes and Emissions Trading. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264305304-en
OECD (2018c) OECD Companion to the Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels 2018. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264286061-en
Ohlendorf, N., Jakob, M., Minx, J.C., Schröder, C. and Steckel, J.C. (2018) Distributional Impacts of Climate Mitigation 
Policies – a Meta-Analysis. Working Paper. MCC Berlin.
Parry, I. and Bento, A. (2000) Tax deductions, environmental policy, and the “double dividend” hypothesis. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 39(1), 67–96.
Parry, I., Veung, C. and Heine, D. (2014) How much carbon pricing is in countries’ own interests? The critical role of co-
benefits. Working paper 14174, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Parry, I., Mylonas V., and Vernon, N. (2018) Mitigation Policies for the Paris Agreement: An Assessment for G20 Countries. 
Working Paper 18/193. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Rafaty, R. (2018) Perceptions of Corruption, Political Distrust, and the Weakening of Climate Policies. Glob. Environ. Polit., 
18(3), 106–129
Rausch, S. and Reilly J. (2015) Carbon Taxes, Deficits, and Energy Policy Interactions. Natl. Tax J., 68(1), 157–178.
Rentschler, J. and Bazilian, M. (2017a) Reforming fossil fuel subsidies: drivers, barriers and the state of progress. Climate 
Policy, 17(7), 891–914.
Rentschler, J. and Bazilian, M. (2017b) Principles for Designing Effective Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reforms. Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy, 11(1), 138–155.
Rentschler, J., Kornejew, M. and Bazilian, M. (2017) Fossil fuel subsidy reforms and their impacts on firms. Energy Policy, 
108, 617–623.
Rodríguez-Manotas, J., Bhamidipati, P.L. and Haselip, J. (2018). Getting on the ground: Exploring the determinants of 
utility-scale solar PV in Rwanda. Energy Research & Social Science, 42, 70–79.
Santos, G. (2017) Road fuel taxes in Europe: do they internalize road transport externalities? Transport Policy, 53, 
120–134. 
Santos, R., Ring, I., Antunes, P. and Clemente, P. (2012). Fiscal transfers for biodiversity conservation: the Portuguese 
Local Finances Law. Land use policy, 29(2), 261–273.
Schmidt, T.S. (2014) Low-carbon investment risks and de-risking. Nature Climate Change, 4(4), 237–239.
Searchinger, T.D. et al. (2009) Climate change. Fixing a critical climate accounting error. Science, 326(5952), 527–528.
Steenblik, R. (2008) A Subsidy Primer. Geneva: Global Subsidies Initiative of the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development.
Stern, N. et al. (2006). Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change. London: HM Treasury.
Su, Q. and DeSalvo, J.S. (2008) The effect of transportation subsidies on urban sprawl. Journal of Regional Science, 48(3), 
567–594.
Toft, L., Beaton, C. and Lontoh, L. (2016) International Experiences with LPG Subsidy Reform. Geneva: Global Subsidies 
Initiative of the International Institute for Sustainable Development.
Waissbein, O., Glemarec, Y., Bayraktar, H. and Schmidt, T.S. (2013) Derisking renewable energy investment. A framework 
to support policymakers in selecting public instruments to promote renewable energy investment in developing countries. 
New York, NY (United States): United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Ward, J., Sammon, P., Dundas, G., Peszko, G., Kennedy, P.M., Wienges, S. and Prytz. N. (2015) Carbon leakage: theory, 
evidence, and policy design. Working Paper 100369. World Bank Group.
Welsch, H., and Ehrenheim, V. (2004). Environmental fiscal reform in Germany: a computable general equilibrium 
analysis. Environmental economics and policy studies, 6(3), 197-219.
Whitley, S. and van der Burg, L. (2015) Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform: From Rhetoric to Reality. London: New Climate 
Economy.
Williams III, R.C, Gordon, H., Burtraw, D., Carbone, J.C. and Morgenstern, R.D. (2014) The Initial Incidence of a Carbon Tax 
across Income Groups. Resources for the Future.
World Bank and Ecofys (2018) State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018. Washington, DC: World Bank. © World Bank. 
Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29687 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO
Chapter 7 – Bridging the gap: The role of innovation policy and market creation
Aspuru-Guzik, A., Persson, K., et al. (2018) Materials Acceleration Platform. Accelerating Advanced Energy Materials 
Discovery by Integrating High-Throughput Methods with Artificial Intelligence. Report of the Clean Energy Materials 
Innovation Challenge Expert Workshop. Available at: http://mission-innovation.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Mission-
Innovation-IC6-Report-Materials-Acceleration-Platform-Jan-2018.pdf
Barbose, G., Darghouth, N., LaCommare, K., Millstein, D. and Rand, J. (2018) Tracking the Sun: Installed Price Trends for 
Distributed Photovoltaic Systems in the United States - 2018 Edition. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
Barrett, S. (2007) Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bertha Centre and WWF (2016) Switching on finance for off-grid energy. Available at: https://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/files/
BerthaOffGridEnergy.pdf
Bhattacharya, A., Meltzer, J. P., Oppenheim, J., Qureshi, Z. and Stern, N. (2016) Delivering on sustainable infrastructure for 
better development and better climate. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Bickel, P. and Kelm, T. (2010) Evaluierung der KfW-Förderung für Erneuerbare Energien im Inland in 2009: Gutachten im 
Auftrag der KfW. Zentrum für Sonnenenergie- und Wasserstoff-Forschung Baden-Württemberg. Available at: https://
www.kfw.de/Download-Center/Konzernthemen/Research/PDF-Dokumente-alle-Evaluationen/Evaluation-Erneuerbare-
Energien-2009.pdf
BNEF, Lighting Global, IFC and GOGLA (2016) Off-grid solar market trends report 2016. Available at: https://data.
bloomberglp.com/bnef/sites/4/2016/03/20160303_BNEF_WorldBankIFC_Off-GridSolarReport_.pdf
Buhr, B., Volz, U., Donovan, C., Kling, G., Lo, Y., Murinde, V., Pullin, N. (2018) Climate Change and the Cost of Capital in 
Developing Countries. UNEP Inquiry. Available at: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26038/1/ClimateCostofCapital_FullReport_
Final.pdf
Campiglio, E., Dafermos, Y., Monnin, P., Ryan-Collins, J., Schotten, G. and Tanaka, M. (2018) ‘Climate change challenges 
for central banks and financial regulators’. Nature Climate Change, 8(6):462–468. 
Carvalho, M., A. Dechezleprêtre and M. Glachant (2017) Understanding the dynamics of global value chains for solar 
photovoltaic technologies. WIPO Economic Research Working Paper no. 40.
Chan, G., Goldstein, A.P., Bin-Nun, A., Anadon, L.D. and Narayanamurti, V. (2017) ‘Six principles for energy innovation’. 
Nature, 552(7683):25–27.
Chapin, D.M., Fuller, C.S. and Pearson, G.L. (1954) ‘A New Silicon p‐n Junction Photocell for Converting Solar Radiation 
into Electrical Power’. Journal of Applied Physics, 25(5):676–677. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1063/1.1721711>.
Cherry, A., Haselip, J., Ralphs, G., and Wagner, I.E. (Eds.) (2018) Africa-Europe Research and Innovation Cooperation: Global 
Challenges, Bi-regional Responses. Palgrave Macmillan. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-319-69929-5
Chu, S., Cui, Y. and Liu, N. (2016) ‘The path towards sustainable energy’. Nature Materials, 16: 16. Available at: <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1038/nmat4834>.
ClimateWorks, NewClimate Institute, Ecofys, and Climate Analytics (2015) Faster and Cleaner: Decarbonization in the 
Power and Transport Sectors Is Surpassing Predictions and Offering Hope for Limiting Warming to 2°C. Available at: 
https://newclimate.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/faster-cleaner-decarbonization-in-the-power-transport-sectors.pdf 
CPI (2013) Risk Gaps: a map of risk mitigation instruments for clean investments. Climate Policy Initiative.
CPI (2018) Blended Finance in Clean Energy: Experiences and Opportunities. Climate Policy Initiative.
Creutzig, F., Agoston, P., Goldschmidt, J.C., Luderer, G., Nemet, G. and Pietzcker, R.C. (2017) ‘The underestimated potential 
of solar energy to mitigate climate change’. Nature Energy, 2(9).
Dena (2017) LED – Klimaschutz durch Innovation. Ausbau und Finanzierung von LED-Beleuchtungsanlagen bei der 
Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart. Available at: https://www.dena.de/fileadmin/dena/Dokumente/Veranstaltungen/Vortraege_
LED_Konferenz/Forum3_1_Goerres.pdf
80 81EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
DoE (2014) LPO Financial Performance. Available at: https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/11/f19/DOE-LPO-
MiniReport_Final%2011%2013%2014_0.pdf
DOE (2018) Solar Project Download. Available at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/downloads/solar-projects-download 
Du, J. and Ouyang, D. (2017) ‘Progress of Chinese electric vehicles industrialization in 2015: A review’. Applied Energy, 
188: 529–546.
Earth Policy Institute (2018) Data center: Climate, Energy, and Transportation. Available at: http://www.earth-policy.org/
data_center/C23
Edler, J. and Fagerberg, J. (2017) ‘Innovation policy: what, why, and how’. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 33(1):2–23. 
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grx001
Edler, J. and Georghiou, L. (2007) ‘Public procurement and innovation – Resurrecting the demand side’. Research Policy, 
36(7):949–963.
European Commission (2018) Mission-oriented R&I policies: Case Study Report Energiewende (DE). Available at:  
http://europa.eu/!md89DM
Foray, D., Mowery, D.C. and Nelson, R.R. (2012) ‘Public R&D and social challenges: What lessons from mission R&D 
programs?’ Research Policy, 41(10):1697–1702. 
Freeman, C. (1995) The ‘National System of Innovation’ in Historical Perspective. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
19(1):5–24.
Gallagher, K.S. (2006) China shifts gears: Automakers, oil, pollution, and development. MA: MIT Press. 
Gallagher, K.S., Grübler, A., Kuhl, L., Nemet, G. and Wilson, C. (2012) ‘The Energy Technology Innovation System’. Annual 
Review of Environment and Resources, 37(1):137–162. Available at: <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/
annurev-environ-060311-133915>.
Gao, P., Malorny, C., Sha, S., Guan, M., Wu, T., Luk, T., Yang, L., Lin, D., Xu, X. (2015) Supercharging the Development 
of Electric Vehicles in China. McKinsey & Company. Available at: http://www.mckinseychina.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/McKinsey-China_Electric-Vehicle-Report_April-2015-EN.pdf
Geddes, A., Schmidt, T.S. and Steffen, B. (2018) The multiple roles of state investment banks in low-carbon energy 
finance: An analysis of Australia, the UK and Germany. Energy Policy, 115:158–170.
Gillingham, K., Rapson, D., Wagner, G. (2016) ‘The Rebound Effect and Energy Efficiency Policy’. Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy, 10(1):68–88.
GOGLA, Lighting Global, IFC and Berenschot (2017) Global off-grid solar market report: semi-annual sales and impact 
data: July to December 2016. Available at https://www.gogla.org/sites/default/files/documenten/final_sales-and-impact-
report_h22016_full_public.pdf
Haley, B. (2016) ‘Getting the Institutions Right: Designing the Public Sector to Promote Clean Innovation’. Canadian Public 
Policy, 42(S1):S54–S66.
Hall, S., Foxon, T.J. and Bolton, R. (2016) ‘Financing the civic energy sector: How financial institutions affect ownership 
models in Germany and the United Kingdom’. Energy Research & Social Science, 12:5–15.
Harrysson, S., Ulmefors, M. and Kazlova, A. (2015) Overview and Analysis of Electric Vehicle Incentives Applied Across 
Eight Selected Country Markets. InnoVentum AB/Copenhagen Business School, A Study for Blekinge Institute of 
Technology within the Project GreenCharge Sydost 20151210. Available at: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/
diva2:882227/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
Hou J., Cai X. and Wu X. (2012) ‘Exploration and research on development model of electric vehicle industry.’ Zhejiang 
Electric Power, 9:72-74, 81 (in Chinese).
Huenteler, J., T. Schmidt, J. Ossenbrink and V. Hoffmann (2016) ‘Technology life-cycles in the energy sector — 
Technological characteristics and the role of deployment for innovation’. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
104:102-121.
Hystra (2013) Marketing innovative devices for the base of the pyramid: lessons from 15 global pioneers that 
challenge conventional sales and marketing approaches to successfully serve the poorest. Available at: https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/51bef39fe4b010d205f84a92/t/57d014976a49630231034279/1473254596574/
Marketing+Innovative+Devices+for+the+BOP_Full+report.pdf
Ibarloza, A., Heras-Saizarbitoria, I., Allur, E. and Larrea, A. (2018) ‘Regulatory cuts and economic and financial 
performance of Spanish solar power companies: An empirical review’. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 
92(September 2017):784–793. Available at: doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2018.04.087
IEA (2016) Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Japan, 2016 Review. Paris: International Energy Agency.
IEA (2018a) Tracking Clean Energy Progress. Paris: International Energy Agency. Available at: http://www.iea.org/tcep/ 
IEA (2018b) Global EV Outlook 2018: Towards Cross-Modal Electrification. Paris: International Energy Agency.
IEA and IRENA (2017) Perspectives for the energy transition: Investment needs for a low-carbon energy system. IEA/OECD 
and IRENA.
infoDev (2018) Climate Technology Program. The World Bank Group. Available at: http://www.infodev.org/climate
IRENA (2018) Capacity and Generation: Trends in Renewable Energy. Available at: http://resourceirena.irena.org/gateway/
dashboard/?topic=4&subTopic=16 
Jacobsson, S. and Lauber, V. (2006) The politics and policy of energy system transformation – Explaining the German 
diffusion of renewable energy technology. Energy Policy, 34(3):256–276.
Kattel, R. and Mazzucato, M. (2018) Mission-oriented innovation policy and dynamic capabilities in the public sector. 
Working Paper IIPP WP 2018-05.
Kavlak, G., McNerney, J., and Trancik, J.E. (2017) Evaluating the Causes of Photovoltaics Cost Reduction. SSRN Working 
Paper. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2891516
Kidney, S., Giuliani, D., and Sonerud, B. (2017) Public sector agenda for stimulating private market develop in green 
securitisation in Europe. CCCEP.
Laplane, L. and Mazzucato, M. (2018) Socialising the risks and rewards of public investments: economic, policy and legal 
issues. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose Working Paper, forthcoming.
Lester, R.K. (2014) ‘Energy innovation’. In: Locke, R.M. and Wellhausen, R.L., eds., Production in the Innovation Economy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lewis, S., Shakya, C., and Steele, P. (2017) Money where it matters: Financing the Sustainable Development Goals and 
Paris Agreement through local finance. London: IIED.
Lu, J.Y. (2018) Comparing U.S. and Chinese electric vehicle policies. EESI. Available at: http://www.eesi.org/articles/view/
comparing-u.s.-and-chinese-electric-vehicle-policies
Lundvall, B-Å. (ed.) (1992) National Innovation Systems: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. London: 
Pinter.
Mazzucato, M. (2016) ‘From market fixing to market-creating: a new framework for innovation policy’. Industry and 
Innovation 23(2):140–156. 
Mazzucato, M. (2017) Mission-oriented Innovation Policy: Challenges and Opportunities. UCL Institute for Innovation and 
Public Purpose Working Paper IIPP WP 2017-01. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/wp2017-01
Mazzucato, M. (2018a) Mission-Oriented Research & Innovation in the European Union: A problem-solving approach to fuel 
innovation-led growth. Report for the European Commission, ISBN 978-92-79-79918-1 Available at: https://publications.
europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5b2811d1-16be-11e8-9253-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
Mazzucato, M. (2018b) [2013] The Entrepreneurial State, 3rd ed. London: Penguin Books.
Mazzucato, M. and Penna, C. (Eds.) (2015a) Mission-Oriented Finance for Innovation: New Ideas for Investment-Led 
Growth. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Mazzucato, M. and Penna, C. (2015b) The rise of mission-oriented state investment banks: the cases of Germany’s KfW 
and Brazil’s BNDES. Working paper 1/2015 October. Available at: http://www.isigrowth.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
working_paper_2015_1.pdf
Mazzucato, M. and Penna, C. (2016) ‘Beyond market failures: The market creating and shaping roles of state investment 
banks’. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 19(4):305–326.
Mazzucato, M., Semieniuk, G. and Watson J. (2015) What Will it Take to Get us a Green Revolution? Sussex Energy Group 
Policy Paper.
Mazzucato, M. and Semieniuk, G. (2017) ‘Public financing of innovation: New questions’. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 33(1):24–48.
Mazzucato, M. and Semieniuk, G. (2018) ‘Financing renewable energy: Who is financing what and why it matters’. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 127:8–22.
82 83EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES
Mehta, A., Sandhu, S. C., Kinkead, B. and Teipekle, R. (2017) Catalyzing green finance: a concept for leveraging blended 
finance for green development. Asian Development Bank.
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), 2016 关于2015年度中国乘用车企车平均燃料消耗量核算情况的
公告. Available at: http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/n3054355/n3057585/n3057590/c5400754/content.html
Mir-Artigues, P., Cerdá, E. and del Río, P. (2018) ‘Analysing the economic impact of the new renewable electricity 
support scheme on solar PV plants in Spain’. Energy Policy, 114 (December 2017):323–331. Available at: https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.11.048
Nemet, G.F. (2006) ‘Beyond the learning curve: factors influencing cost reductions in photovoltaics’. Energy Policy, 
34:3218–3232. 
Nemet, G.F., Zipperer, V. and Kraus, M. (2018) ‘The valley of death, the technology pork barrel, and public support for large 
demonstration projects’. Energy Policy, 119:154–167. Available at: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0301421518302258>.
Nolan, P. (2018) ‘Reform, innovation and restructuring’. In: Zhang, J. and Laiming, Z. eds. China and the World Economy: 
Transition and Challenges. London and New York: Routledge. 
Nolden, C., Sorrell, S. and Polzin, F. (2016) ‘Catalysing the energy service market: The role of intermediaries’. Energy 
Policy, 98:420–430. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2016.08.041
NRDC, Coalition for Green Capital and Climate Finance Advisors (2016) Green & Resilience Banks. Available at:  
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/green-investment-bank-model-emerging-markets-report.pdf 
OECD (2017) Green Investment Banks: Innovative Public Financial Institutions Scaling up Private, Low-carbon Investment. 
Paris: OECD.
Polzin, F. (2017) ‘Mobilizing private finance for low-carbon innovation – A systematic review of barriers and solutions’. 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 77:525–535. 
Polzin, F., von Flotow, P. and Nolden, C. (2016a) ‘Modes of governance for municipal energy efficiency services – The 
case of LED street lighting in Germany’. Journal of Cleaner Production, 139:133–145. 
Polzin, F., von Flotow, P. and Nolden, C. (2016b) ‘What encourages local authorities to engage with energy performance 
contracting for retrofitting? Evidence from German municipalities’. Energy Policy, 94: 317–330. 
Polzin, F., Nolden, C. and von Flotow, P. (2018) ‘Drivers and barriers for municipal retrofitting activities – Evidence from a 
large-scale survey of German local authorities’. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 88:99–108.
Perez, C. (2017) Is Smart Green Growth the Solution? Lessons from History. Working paper BTTR WP 2017-01.
Perlin, J. (2002) From Space to Earth: The Story of Solar Electricity. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
Quitzow, R. (2015) ‘Dynamics of a policy-driven market: The co-evolution of technological innovation systems for solar 
photovoltaics in China and Germany’. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 17:126–148.
Ruegg, R. and Thomas, P. (2011) Linkages from DOE’s Solar Photovoltaic R&D to Commercial Renewable Power from Solar 
Energy. Department of Energy.
Rodrik, D. (2016) ‘Premature Deindustrialization’. Journal of Economic Growth, 21:1-33.
Schmidt, T.S. (2014) ‘Low-carbon investment risks and de-risking’. Nature Climate Change, 4(4):237.
Schmidt, T.S., Battke, B., Grosspietsch, D. and Hoffmann, V.H. (2016) ‘Do deployment policies pick technologies by (not) 
picking applications? – A simulation of investment decisions in technologies with multiple applications’. Research Policy, 
45(10):1965–1983.
Sachs, J.D., Schmidt-Traub, G. (2017) Global Fund lessons for Sustainable Development Goals. Science 356 (6333):32–
33.
Semieniuk, G. and Mazzucato, M. (2018) Financing Green Growth. SOAS Economics Department Working Paper no. 210.
Shakya, C. and Byrnes, R. (2017) Turning up the volume: Financial aggregation for off-grid energy. IIED Issue Paper, IIED, 
London.
Simanis, E (2012) Reality check at the bottom of the pyramid. Harvard Business Review June 2012. Available at:  
https:// hbr.org/2012/06/reality-check-at-the-bottom-of-the-pyramid
Singer, C.E. (2011) ‘Impact investing in energy enterprises: a three-act play’. Innovations: Technology, Governance 
Globalization, 6(3):55–70. 
Sorrell, S. (2007) ‘The rebound effect: an assessment of the evidence for economy-wide energy savings from improved 
energy efficiency’. Project Report. UK Energy Research Centre. http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/programmes/technology-and-
policy-assessment/the-rebound-effect-report.html
Sorrell, S. (2015) ‘Reducing energy demand: A review of issues, challenges and approaches’. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 47:74–82. doi:10.1016/j.rser.2015.03.002
Steffen, B. and Schmidt, T.S. (2017) ‘The role of public investment & development banks in enabling or constraining new 
power generation technologies’. 2017 14th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM). IEEE, pp. 1–6.
Tabor, D.P. et al. (2018) ‘Accelerating the discovery of materials for clean energy in the era of smart automation’. Nature 
Reviews Materials, 3:5–20. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41578-018-0005-z
The State Council (SC) (2012) 国务院关于印发节能与新能源汽车产业发展规划（2012―2020年）的通知. Available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-07/09/content_2179032.htm. 
Trancik J. et al. (2015) Technology improvement and emissions reductions as mutually reinforcing efforts: Observations 
from the global development of solar and wind energy. MIT and Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy.
Unruh, G.C. (2000) ‘Understanding carbon lock-in’. Energy Policy, 28(12):817–830.
Wilson, E., Rai, N., and Best, S. (2014) Sharing the load: Public and private sector roles in financing pro-poor energy 
access. IIED, London. Available at: http://pubs.iied.org/16560IIED
Wüstenhagen, R. and Menichetti, E. (2012) ‘Strategic choices for renewable energy investment: Conceptual framework 
and opportunities for further research’. Energy Policy, 40(1):1–10.
Zhang, F. and Gallagher, K.S. (2016) ‘Innovation and technology transfer through global value chains: Evidence from 
China’s PV industry’. Energy Policy, [online] 94:191–203. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.04.014>.
Zheng, J., Mehndiratta, S., Guo, J.Y. and Liu, Z. (2012) ‘Strategic policies and demonstration program of electric vehicle in 
China’. Transport Policy, 19(1):17–25.
84 85 BRIDGING THE GAP: SECTORS AND TOPICS COVERED IN THE UN ENVIRONMENT EMISSIONS GAP REPORTS
Bridging the gap:  
Sectors and topics covered in the  
UN Environment Emissions Gap Reports
In addition to assessing the emissions gap, the Emissions Gap Reports cover opportunities for bridging the gap. Previous 
reports have demonstrated how proven policies and measures, if scaled up across countries and regions in terms of 
ambition, stringency and geographical reach can contribute to bridging the emissions gap, while supporting broader 
development goals. A summary of key areas and sectors covered in previous reports is provided here.
Previous Emissions Gap Reports are available at http://www.unenvironment.org/emissionsgap.
The Emissions Gap Report 2017
Sectoral greenhouse gas emission reduction potentials in 2030
• Assessment of emission reduction options and GHG mitigation potentials in the agriculture, building, energy, 
forestry, industry and transport sector.
•  Evaluates the potentials for these options to bridge the emissions gap and compares the bottom up analysis with 
results from Integrated Assessment Models.
Phasing out coal
• Assessment of the role of phasing out coal for achievement of the Paris Agreement goal.
• Provides an overview of incentives that can facilitate and incentivize a smooth transition, including portfolios 
of market, non-market based and complementary instruments such as carbon prices, improved support to grid 
infrastructures and storage facilities, and de-risking clean investment for financial institutions and governments.
• Assesses policies for managing impacts on workers, coal owners, industry and energy users such as wage 
subsidies, compensatory subsidies, and redistributive policies. 
The role of short-lived climate pollutants
• Synthesizes findings regarding the GHG emission reduction potential of methane, tropospheric ozone, black 
carbon and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), as well as sulphur dioxide and organic carbon.
• Assesses the technical potential of measures available via proven technologies in the exploration and distribution 
of coal, oil and gas, and in the waste sector. 
Carbon dioxide removal
• Provides an overview and assessment of natural (biological) options for carbon dioxide removal options such as 
afforestation, reforestation and soil carbon sequestration. 
• Provides an overview and assessment of technological engineering carbon dioxide removal options such as direct 
air capture, bioenergy combined with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS), Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement 
and CO2 to Durable Carbon.
The Emissions Gap Report 2016
The role of energy efficiency
• Assesses energy efficiency policies in the building, industry, and transport sectors and the co-benefits that these 
can provide for governments, businesses and households. 
• Considers GHG emissions reductions opportunities through systems thinking and integration, circular and sharing 
economy as well as advances in information and communication technology. 
Sustainable Development Goals and climate change mitigation
• Considers the interaction between Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate change mitigation 
objectives and identifies areas of synergies and potential trade-offs between different goals and associated 
targets. 
• Outlines key elements of an integrated approach to the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
in the context of climate change to minimize trade-offs and maximize synergies between different objectives.
The Emissions Gap Report 2015
International Cooperative Initiatives
• Assessment of the quantitative impact of international cooperative initiatives on GHGs emission reductions in 
various different sectors, and of the role of non-state actors and the UNFCCC process.
• Provides an overview of private sector engagement in GHG mitigation efforts and summarizes key issues for 
improved monitoring, reporting and verification of these initiatives. 
Forest-related activities
• Provides an assessment of the total technical mitigation potential of reducing forest degradation by: Preventing 
selective logging, fire/drought, fuelwood harvest, and peatlands fire while enhancing forest management, and; 
enhancing carbon sequestration through reforestation, ‘wide-scale’ restoration of closed-canopy forest and 
mosaic restoration. 
• Assess the economic and technical mitigation potential of forest-related mitigation options such as expansion of 
protected areas, supply chain interventions, positive incentives for landholders and exogenous economic factors 
such as falling commodity prices.
• Considers the REDD+ mechanism’s role as a cost-effective instrument to realizing forest-based emission 
reductions from deforestation. 
The Emissions Gap Report 2014
Sustainable development and addressing climate change
• Provides an overview of the interface between sustainable development and climate change mitigation priorities 
and illustrates areas where these priorities can be mutually reinforcing and deliver multiple benefits for human 
development and wellbeing. 
• Assesses international collaborations supporting the sustainable development goals and barriers to attain them.
Energy efficiency
• Assesses the potential GHG emission reductions and multiple economic and social benefits that can be realized 
through energy efficiency measures in: buildings, appliances and lighting, industry, transport, and electricity 
production, transmission and distribution.
The Emissions Gap Report 2013
International Cooperative Initiatives
•  Considers the success factors of global dialogues, formal multilateral processes and implementation initiatives 
focusing on their goals; participation criteria; funding mechanisms; incentives and benefits; and transparency and 
accountability measures.
Agriculture: 
• Provides an overview of the potential mitigation contributions from sustainable agricultural practices such as 
no-tillage practices by direct seeding under the mulch layer of the previous season’s crop, as well as improving 
nutrient and water management in rice production, preventing GHG emissions from soil disturbances and fossil-
fuel use by farm machinery. 
The Emissions Gap Report 2012
Building sector: 
• Evaluates the GHG mitigation potentials and the economic and social co-benefits of improved building codes, 
appliance standards and labels, designed to increase energy efficiency.
Transport sector: 
• Evaluates the GHG mitigation potentials and the economic and social co-benefits of transit-oriented development, 
bus rapid transit, and vehicle performance standards for new light-duty vehicles.
Deforestation:  
• Analyzes a set economic instruments and policies as well as command-and-control measures used separately 
and in combination to scale-up the protection of forest areas and address the drivers of deforestation. 
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